

Vol. X, No. 4

FALL 1960

CROSS CULTURE

*A QUARTERLY REVIEW
to explore the implications
of Christianity for our times*

HESCHEL • RAHNER • CAMERON • ZAHN • WINTER

FOSTER • TAYLOR • CUNNEEN • HAYOUL

CONTENTS

Vol. X, No. 4—FALL 1960

The "Religious Issue" and the Limits of National Purpose (editorial)	JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN	313
Depth-Theology	ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL	317
Clericalism	CHARLES TAYLOR	327
The German Catholic Press and Hitler's Wars	GORDON ZAHN	337
Catholicism and Political Mythology	J. M. CAMERON	353
Reflections on Obedience	KARL RAHNER	363
Contemporary British Philosophy and Christian Belief	MICHAEL FOSTER	375
American Foreign Policy: a European Catholic View	MAURICE HAYOUL	387
Notes and Reviews		
Foreign Policy and Morals in the Nuclear Age	Ernst F. Winter	395
Recent Russian Studies	F. A. Walker	402
The Politics of Bernanos	William Bush	404
Rudolph Bultmann	Daniel J. Callahan	405
Free Speech in the Church	John F. Bannan	407
Faith and History	John J. Reardon	409
Index to Vol. X		411

EDITORS

William Birmingham
Alfred Di Lascia
James J. Greene
Bernard Gilligan

Joseph L. Caulfield
John F. Bannan
John J. Figueroa
Serge Hughes

Sally S. Cunneen
Leon King
Erwin W. Geissman
Eugene Fontinell

Contributing Editor: James Collins

Managing Editor: Joseph E. Cunneen

CROSS CURRENTS is available (to subscribers only) on microfilm. Address inquiries, including those for back volumes, to University Microfilms, 313-1st Ave., Ann Arbor, Mich.

CROSS CURRENTS is published quarterly by Cross Currents Corporation, a nonprofit membership corporation at 103 Van Houten Fields, West Nyack, N.Y. 2nd class mail privileges authorized at West Nyack, N.Y. Editorial communications and subscriptions should be sent to Cross Currents Quarterly, 103 Van Houten Fields, West Nyack, N.Y. Elmwood 8-4898. The price is \$1 per issue, \$3.50 per yearly subscription (U.S. & Canada), foreign \$4. U.S. distributor: B. de Boer, 102 Beverly St., Bloomfield, N.J. Printed in the U.S.A. by Waldon Press, 159 Lafayette St., New York 13, N.Y. WALKER 5-4744. Copyright 1960 by Cross Currents Corporation.

THE "RELIGIOUS ISSUE" AND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL PURPOSE

AN INTRODUCTION TO VOL. X, NO. 4

WE ASSUME THAT our readers are as fatigued as we are by the discussion of the "religious issue" in connection with the present election. Even those who share our taste for morbid humor must feel that the comic possibilities of inside journalism, sermonizing to the millions on what a Catholic in public office *must do* according to Catholic doctrine, have by now been rather exhausted. Nor will our readers be surprised that we view the issue as mostly a spurious one. As Catholics we are naturally anxious to promote the cause of healthy anti-clericalism—as understood by the late priest-statesman-philosopher, Don Luigi Sturzo—and have helpfully provided an article on clericalism in this number placing the subject in a somewhat more solid perspective than that generally provided in the current campaign.

The kind of inquisition to which Senator Kennedy has been subjected, however, has been carried on principally by those anxious to make debating points in an endless polemic against "Rome." To the doctrinal purists of Protestants-and-other-Americans-United, Senator Kennedy's pledge to uphold the constitution must be either insincere, or proof that he is not really a Catholic; to those ministers who represent what Dr. John Bennett calls "the Protestant underworld," appeals to common sense, American history, or a variety of pronouncements by the American hierarchy and contemporary Catholic theologians must obviously be unavailing. We can only relish the ironic fact that such super-Catholics as most nearly conform to the P.O.A.U. caricature will be voting on November 8th in harmony with those

positive thinkers who agree with Dr. Peale that Vice-President Nixon's Quakerism "never seemed to bother him."

Some related points may be worth underlining, however. Despite the fundamental bitterness of the present discussion, some real advance in understanding can well be achieved as its by-product if Catholics avoid temptations to self-pity and indiscriminate generalizations regarding "the Protestant attack." Many Americans who were honestly looking for further enlightenment have been glad to discover that local instances of Catholic pressure, about which they may have legitimate grievances, were not part of a Roman master-plan. Many Protestant ministers were happy to reassure their congregations with a simple explanation of the traditional distinction between Catholic intransigence in doctrine and freedom of political action. Responsible Jewish spokesmen were often helpful in cutting through much of the cant and hypocrisy involved in the traditional cliché that the United States is a Christian country. Perhaps we are now better able to realize that the political and religious vigor of the nation could survive a time when the president not only might abstain from participating in various Protestant services, but as a conscientious non-believer, might not attend services at all. The controversy has been helpful too in revealing the oddity of some old alliances. The Catholic radical right, which always used to enjoy quoting those areas of American Protestantism which attacked the National Council of Churches as socialistic (or worse), has received its fitting reward in being inundated by the obscene anti-Catholic

literature these same groups distributed concerning "the Vatican octopus."

Those participating in the limited advance in irenic understanding among the major religious traditions in America should not be unduly distracted by the irresponsibility of those who represent these traditions with least understanding. Catholicism is only now emerging into the mainstream of American life. The present wave of bigotry will have impoverished the nation if it succeeds in halting the slow advance of Catholics from their historically understandable, but considerably self-imposed cultural ghetto. Because of many emotional attacks, it may not always be easy to keep in mind, but the object of current criticism is quite often not the demands of Catholicism as such, but a reflection of the unlovely aspects of this defensive mentality, as individual Catholics take social, political, aesthetic and intellectual prejudices—to which, of course, they are individually entitled—and try to canonize them as "the Catholic position." Nor should fears expressed concerning a Catholic in the White House make us lose our sense of balance: the monopoly of the presidency by Protestantism cannot be considered a major American injustice at a time when we have not yet secured the most elementary human rights to millions of American Negroes.

The frivolous discussion of the "religious issue" has, however, been a considerable setback to the kind of commitment of which Rabbi Heschel is speaking in this number when he describes "Depth-theology." The sense of God, the idea of the holy, cannot make their impact on men busy with the clatter of heated argument over irrelevancies. Protestantism itself would seem to be the chief loser: a troubled young student, coming from a pious, conservative Protestant background, is apt only to be impelled toward indifferentism

and secularism by the absence of love in those he has been taught to look up to as his religious guides. He may never learn that Protestantism has something far more positive to offer him, that it now appears to be enjoying considerable intellectual and spiritual vitality, and that its most highly-regarded spokesmen—although retaining profound doctrinal disagreements with the Catholic notion of the Church and of authority, and practical concerns about various areas of ecclesiastical pressure (which we have no space to discuss here)—have been careful to dissociate themselves from the politico-religious coalition now stirring its witches' brew.

Nor do we feel it evidence of much sense of perspective to submit Senator Kennedy's statements on various aspects of religion and politics to the exhaustive analysis they have received. (Nor are we convinced that our theological understanding will be much deepened by giving similar attention to Vice-President Nixon.) The basic constitutional loyalty and over-all direction of Senator Kennedy in this area have been clear from the start. If the form of the questions and the political context have tended to make his answers slight the positive contribution that an informed Catholic conscience might provide in approaching the ever shifting forms of political realities in our times, the rest of the answer can best be given by a more mature participation of Catholics in the give-and-take of U. S. politics.

Naturally, because of the excessive preoccupation with an unreal "religious issue," matters of serious moral concern have hardly received a hearing. The influence of a wide-spread one-party press has not made it easy for the voter to appreciate the extreme flexibility of conviction of all the many Nixons, including the new one. The fact that many thoughtful Negro leaders were not enthusiastic about any of the major

candidates—with the exception of Senator Humphrey, who was defeated in the primaries—should be matter for examination of conscience by both the candidates and their partisans. The failure of the style of campaigning attempted by Adlai Stevenson in 1952 has only encouraged the practical politician in his indifference to means: the ways in which major political figures attempt to persuade us are certainly relevant to the moral character of the nation.

Because of the over-riding importance of foreign policy, Mr. Nixon's fatuous claim that America's prestige was never higher should be categorically denied, and placed beyond even the rather elastic boundaries of campaign rhetoric. Marcel Hayoul's article, providing a European Catholic perspective on our over-all approach, offers a partial counterweight. But even Senator Kennedy, although right in emphasizing the sense of national urgency, has not chosen to examine the moral dilemmas that underlie most of our assumptions in this area.

When we are told that the Soviet Union is gaining on the United States in terms of industrial production or scientific progress, when we see that living standards in the Communist satellite nations are rising, is this simply a matter for national unhappiness? Are we secretly hoping for crop failures on collective farms, and do we still believe that the Soviet economy is necessarily inefficient? What of our awareness of the interdependence of truth, and the traditional sense that scientific discovery is part of a universal human patrimony? We do not underestimate the value of the Rockefeller Brothers report recommending an increased rate of economic growth in the United States, the need for greater funds for scientific research and for strengthening the teaching of science in our schools, but use of the metaphor of "contest" to

describe our relations with the Communist countries is not always fortunate.

Of course, it would be naive to ignore the ambiguity involved in the power of industrial might at the service of Communist imperialism, but we must also try to see that it can be a good in itself, as well as for the people living within that economy, and not concentrate exclusively on the possibility of its dangerous misapplication. In this connection, the article of J. M. Cameron can provide a helpful corrective, although one fears that in America the "political mythology" which he analyzes is not restricted to Catholics.

The policy of unconditional surrender was a total failure in regard to Germany, and led to many of our current problems. Without falling into cynicism or a crudely materialistic explanation of history, can we not understand that a relaxation of the arms race, making possible a quicker development of heavy industry for peaceful purposes and greater distribution of consumer goods in Russia, eastern Europe, and even China, would be a "Communist gain" in which we would all be the winners?

Our new president will be rightly concerned about declining U. S. prestige and the health of the American economy, but tremendous moral confusion is involved in any assumption that part of our "national purpose" is to export the free enterprise system. The vastly enlarged program of foreign economic aid for the so-called under-developed nations, which is now long overdue, will involve our giving the major, but not the total amount needed, by means of international economic planning administered not by us, but through the United Nations. It would bolster economies which are not capitalist economies, and if successful, will strengthen a group of nations—by no means united on all issues—which will certainly tend to resist efforts to be enlisted as total

partisans on what we sanctimoniously call "the side of freedom."

Nor has the desire to win elections made the climate propitious for discussion of the most frightening political-moral dilemma of all: the kind of military preparedness on which we are now resting the defense of what we believe to be spiritual values. It is quite true that we must beware of emotionalism and sentimentality, and that in the present context a morally grounded realism insists on the maintenance of American power, not excluding military power, in order to provide time for further negotiation towards disarmament, and to guarantee that the non-Communist world not be subjected to the blackmail of Soviet rocketry. In this regard the most meaningful aspect of the Democratic plea for a greater defense build-up, from the viewpoint of moral concern, is the importance of having such conventional arms as might make it possible to resist local aggression without resorting to weapons for which few moral theologians would be able to find legitimate targets.

It is discouraging to realize that, although we claim McCarthyism is dead, any candidate insisting on the moral ambiguity of our stated military policy would be accused of wishing to surrender to Khrushchev. The review-article of Ernest Winter provides at least the encouragement that there is an increasing concern with our situation, in which technical specialists and moral theologians are working together.

Whatever the outcome of the election, a greater effort must be made to convey a sense of urgency in the critical re-examination of the means by which we are planning to defend our allies and fulfill our treaty commitments. Despite the recent ugly mood of Soviet diplomacy, we cannot afford the purely visceral reaction of flexing our muscles, working hard, and negotiating seriously

only when we have outstripped the Russians in long-range rockets.

In many of the areas on which we have touched, it appears that the limitation of our purely national goals has become a moral imperative. Yet with the recent revival, sometimes in sophisticated forms, of the old loaded question as to whether a Catholic could make a genuine commitment to the American ideal, the tendency toward an aggressive super-patriotism may be stimulated just at a time when it is least valuable. When Khrushchev makes a brutal frontal attack on the U. N., even the Hearst tabloids will rush to its defense. How many of us, however, are ready to work for a greatly strengthened international organization which would involve a certain surrender of sovereignty, some loss of maneuverability in pursuing national policies, and—with the enlarged General Assembly including the new nations from Africa (with Communist China soon to follow)—less ability to dominate the world scene.

Our printing of Gordon Zahn's study of German Catholic support of Hitler's wars has at least indirect relevance in this connection. We do not include it with any sense of moral superiority, but rather as an object lesson of the dangers which a failure to examine national purpose critically can do to the collective conscience. Can Catholics, whose traditions are essentially internationalist, forget that baptism in Christ involves them in the corporate destiny of mankind?

It may be that the foreign policy of the next administration will achieve the greatest gain for ourselves and the world by strengthening genuinely independent forces that will provide not only a brake to our pride, but a challenge to America to become once again a revolutionary idea in those young nations now choosing their path.

JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

DEPTH-THEOLOGY

ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL

WHERE IS RELIGION to be found? What sort of entity is it? What is its mode of being?

He who is in search of art will find it in works of art as preserved, e.g., in art collections. He who is in search of literature will find it in books as preserved in libraries. But where is the place of religion? Do visible symbols as preserved in temples, or doctrines and dogmas as contained in books, contain the totality of religion?

It seems preposterous to regard religion as an isolated, self-subsisting entity, as a *Ding an sich*. Indeed, there is an inherent weakness in religion's not taking offense at the segregation of God, in forgetting that the true sanctuary has no walls. Religion has often suffered from the tendency to become an end in itself, to seclude the holy, to become parochial, self-indulgent, self-seeking; as if the task were not to enoble human nature, but to enhance the power and beauty of its institutions or to enlarge the body of doctrines. It has often done more to canonize prejudices than to wrestle for truth; to petrify the sacred than to sanctify the secular. Yet the task of religion is to be a challenge to the stabilization of values.

Religion has become "religion"—institution, symbol, theology. It does not affect the pre-theological situation, the pre-symbolic depth of existence. To re-

direct the trend, we must lay bare what is involved in religious existence; we must recover the situations which both precede and correspond to the theological formulations; we must recall the questions which religious doctrines are trying to answer, the antecedents of religious commitment, the presuppositions of faith.

Religion is an answer to man's ultimate questions. The moment we become oblivious to ultimate questions, religion becomes irrelevant, and its crisis sets in. The primary task of philosophy of religion is to rediscover the questions to which religion is an answer. The inquiry must proceed both by delving into the consciousness of man and by delving into the teachings and attitudes of the religious tradition.

The urgent problem is not only the truth of religion, but man's capacity to sense the truth of religion, the authenticity of religious concern. Religious truth does not shine in a vacuum. It is certainly not comprehensible when the antecedents of religious insight and commitment are wasted away; when the mind is dazzled by ideologies which either obscure or misrepresent man's ultimate questions; when life is lived in a way which tends to abuse and to squander the gold mines, the challenging resources of human existence. *The primary issue of theology is pre-theological*; it is the total situation of man and his attitudes toward life and the world. It is from this point of view that we must realize that there are three dimensions in religion.

What are the three dimensions of religious existence? To the eye of the spectator, religion seems to consist exclusively of two components: of ritual

Rabbi Heschel teaches the philosophy of religion at Jewish Theological Seminary. His *God in SEARCH OF MAN* is now available through Meridian books; Farrar, Strauss & Cudahy have published his *MAN IS NOT ALONE* and *THE SABBATH*.

and myth, of sacrament and dogma, of deed and scripture. The importance of these components is beyond dispute; the emphasis in different systems upon either of the two only indicates the indispensability of both. To some the truth of religion is in its ritual,¹ to others the essence of religion is in its dogma.²

There is a third component, however, which may be regarded as the vital ingredient, and yet because of its imponderable nature it often escapes the eye of the observer. It is that which goes on within the person: the innerness of religion. Vague and often indescribable, it is the heart of religious existence. Ritual and myth, dogma and deed, remain externals unless there is a response from within the person, a moment of identification and penetration to make them internals. We must therefore distinguish between three dimensions of religious existence: a.) ritual, sacrament, or deed; b.) myth, dogma, or scripture; c.) the inner arts or the moments, the dimension of depth, the intimacy of religion. There are situations in which the dimension of depth is missing: the word is proclaimed, the deed is done, but the soul is silent. There are also situations in which nothing is happening to the senses, but the whole soul is aflame. Some consider the objective performance to be so sacred and effective that the inner component is of little account. What is the worth of one individual's evanescent response compared with the majesty of a revealed word, of a God-prescribed ritual? Others regard the inner moment as the vital

principle or the culmination of existence. The study of ritual is like phonetics, the science of sounds; the study of dogma is like grammar, the science of the inflections of language; while the study of inner acts is like semantics, the science of meanings.

We do not have a word for the understanding of these moments, for the events that make up the secret history of religion, nor for the records in which these instants are captured. Theology is the doctrine of God, but these moments are neither doctrine nor exclusively divine. The Psalms are not records of theology. The Psalms are the birth-pangs of theology; their words plummet-lines reaching into the depth of the divine-human situation out of which genuine theology arises.

Theology has often suffered from a preoccupation with the dogma, the content of believing. The act of believing—the question: what happens within the person to bring about faith? what does it mean to believe?—all this is the concern of a special type of inquiry which may be called depth-theology.

The theme of theology is the content of believing; the theme of depth-theology is the act of believing, its purpose being to explore the depth of faith, the substratum out of which belief arises. It deals with acts which precede articulation and defy definition.

Thus many issues of religious existence may be looked upon in two ways: from the perspective of depth-theology and from the perspective of theology.

The principle of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch rests upon two premises: one, that Moses was a prophet, i.e., inspired by God, the recipient of divine revelation; two, that Moses wrote the Pentateuch from the first to the last letter. The first premise refers to a mystery which we can neither

¹ Emile Durkheim, Robertson Smith stress the priority of ritual over belief.

² "From the age of fifteen, dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion. I know of no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of religion; religion, as a mere sentiment, is to me a dream and a mockery." J. H. Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, Ch. 2.

imagine nor define; the second premise refers to an act that can be described in categories of time and space. Theology would stress the second premise; depth-theology would stress the first premise.

Miracles happen simultaneously in two realms: in the realm of time and space, and in the realm of the soul. Is only an event in the physical world to be considered a marvel, while man's marvel at the miracle, the illumination of the soul, is to be considered inferior in importance?

When the people of Israel crossed the Red Sea, two things happened: the waters split, and between man and God all distance was gone. There was no veil, no vagueness. There was only His presence: This is my God, the Israelite exclaimed. Most miracles that happen in space are lost in the heart; the miracle of the Red Sea became a song, *The Song of the Red Sea*.

Theology declares; depth-theology evokes; theology demands believing and obedience; depth-theology hopes for responding and appreciation.

Theology deals with permanent facts; depth-theology deals with moments. Dogma and ritual are permanent possessions of religion; moments come and go. Theology abstracts and generalizes. It subsists apart from all that goes on in the world. It preserves the legacy; it perpetuates traditions. Yet without the spontaneity of the person, response and inner identification, without the sympathy of understanding, the body of tradition crumbles between the fingers. What is the ultimate nature of the sacred words which tradition preserves? These words are not made of paper but of life. The task is not to reproduce in sound what is preserved in graphic signs; the task is to resurrect its life, to feel its pulse, so that the life within the words should reproduce its kind within

our lives. Indeed, there is a heritage of insight as there is a tradition of words and rituals. It is a heritage easily forfeited, easily forgotten.

We stay away from depth-theology because its themes are not easily captured in words, because we are afraid of vagueness. There is no casuistry of the inner life, no codification of innerness. Yet a life made explicit, a soul efficiently organized, would be devoid of its resources.

Theology speaks for the people; depth-theology speaks for the individual. Theology strives for communication, for universality; depth-theology strives for insight, for uniqueness.

Theology is like sculpture, depth-theology like music. Theology is in the books; depth-theology is in the hearts. The former is doctrine; the latter an event. Theologies divide us; depth-theology unites us.

Depth-theology seeks to meet the person in moments in which the whole person is involved, in moments which are affected by all a person thinks, feels, and acts. It draws upon that which happens to man in moments of confrontation with ultimate reality. It is in such moments that decisive insights are born. Some of these insights lend themselves to conceptualization, while others seem to overflow the vessels of our conceptual powers.

To convey these insights, man must use a language which is compatible with his sense of the ineffable, the terms of which do not pretend to describe, but to indicate; to point to, rather than to capture. These terms are not always imaginative; they are often paradoxical, radical, or negative. The chief danger to philosophy of religion lies in the temptation to generalize what is essentially unique, to explicate what is intrinsically inexplicable, to adjust the uncommon to our common sense.

DEPTH-THEOLOGY warns us against intellectual self-righteousness, against self-certainty and smugness. It insists upon the inadequacy of our faith, upon the incongruity of dogma and mystery. The depth of insight is never fathomed, never expressed. Who can be sure of his own faith? Or who can find Him in the mirror of his concepts?

A story is told of a hasid who was listening to an expert in medieval Jewish scholasticism, holding forth upon the attributes of God, setting forth with logical exactness which statements may be predicated of God. After the discourse came to an end, the hasid remarked: If God were the way you described Him, I would not believe in Him....

Speculative theology, concerned as it is with achieving final formulations of the ideas of faith, is always in danger of taking itself too seriously, of believing it has found adequate expression in an area in which no words are ever adequate.

By the standards of speculative theology, the image and language of Psalm 19 appear to be objectionable. Surely terms such as King, Creator, Master are more acceptable, since they convey the supremacy and majesty of God as well as man's dependence on Him. In contrast the term shepherd implies not only man's dependence on God but also God's need for man. The sheep look to the shepherd for shelter, food, and protection. At the same time the well-being of the shepherd is bound up with the well-being of the sheep. They are to him milk, meat, clothing, and material wealth.

As said above, the theme of theology is the content of believing; the theme of depth-theology is the act of believing. The latter we call faith, the former creed or dogma. Creed and faith, theology and depth-theology depend upon each other.

Why are dogmas necessary? We can-

not be in rapport with the reality of the divine except for rare, fugitive moments. How can these moments be saved for the long hours of functional living, when the thoughts that feed like bees on the inscrutable desert us, and we lose both the sight and the drive? Dogmas are like the amber in which bees, once alive, are embalmed, and which are capable of being electrified when our minds become exposed to the power of the ineffable. For the problems with which we must always grapple are: how to communicate those rare moments of insight to all hours of our life? How to commit intuition to concepts, the ineffable to words, communion to rational understanding? How to convey our insights to others and to unite in a fellowship of faith? It is the creed that attempts to answer these problems.

The insights of depth-theology are vague; they often defy formulation and expression. It is the task of theology to establish the doctrines, to bring about coherence, and to find words compatible with the insights. On the other hand, theological doctrines tend to move on their own momentum, to become a substitute for insight, informative rather than evocative. We must see to it that each has an independent status, a power and efficacy of its own which enables it to contribute something in the cooperation.

And yet man has often made a god out of a dogma, a graven image which he worshipped, to which he prayed. He would rather believe in dogmas than in God, serving them not for the sake of heaven but for the sake of a creed, the diminutive of faith.

Dogmas are the poor mind's share in the divine. A creed is almost all a poor man has. Skin for skin, he will give his life for all that he has. Yea, he may be ready to take other people's lives, if they refuse to share his tenets.

Depth-theology may become an im-

passe, the catacomb of subjectivism. To be a passageway leading from man to man, from generation to generation, it must be crystallized and assume the form of a doctrine or principle. Theology is the crystallization of the insights of depth-theology.

However, crystallization may result in petrification. Indeed, the stability of the dogma or the institution has often taken precedence over the spontaneity of the person.

The vitality of religion depends upon keeping alive the polarity of doctrine and insight, of dogma and faith, of ritual and response, of institution and the individual. Religion degenerates when the spectacle becomes a substitute for spontaneity, when demonstration takes the place of penetration.

Innerness is not autonomous. Whatever happens within the person is affected by thoughts and facts that come from without. Without the content of theology, innerness is a void or turns to spiritual narcissism.

The two realms act upon each other. Theology must teach us whether the world is of God, an emanation of His being, or whether the world is by God, a creation of His will; whether there is a disjunctive relationship between God and man, or whether there is a dimension where God and man meet—and above all: what does God demand of man? Depth theology must guide us in experiencing our own selves as well as the world in the light of the teaching we receive, in translating a thought into prayer, a doctrine into a personal response, to perceive a mystery as a challenge, a problem as a call addressed to our innermost selves.

Outward action may take place in isolation. Inward action never happens in isolation; there are no walls in the inner life. All forces and motivations act upon each other; righteousness and wickedness reflect each other.

Psalm 19, the Shepherd Psalm, which adds almost nothing to a conceptual theology, is one of the most significant expressions of depth-theology.

The truly great events are never recorded. The dates of the Turco-Greek war and of the Battle of the Marne have been preserved. But the moment in which the line was born, "The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want" is not contained in the annals of history. Yet that moment has never ceased.

What are the antecedents of religious commitment? What are some of the acts that happen within the depths of a person, the moments that necessitate our groping for faith in the living God?

Not speculation, but the sense of mystery precipitated the problem of all problems. Not the apparent, but the hidden within the apparent; not the design of the universe, but the mystery of the design of the universe; not the definable issues, but the indefinable enigmas, the questions we do not know how to ask, have always poured oil on the flames of man's anxiety. Religion begins with the sense of the ineffable, with the awareness of a reality that discredits our pride.

The world seems to have two faces. Living in one realm, it seems that the face of the world is open to us; living in another realm, it is as if the world stood with its back to us. Citizens of two realms, we must all sustain a dual allegiance: we sense the ineffable in one realm; we name and exploit reality in another. To maintain the right balance of mystery and meaning, of stillness and utterance, of reverence and action seems to be the goal of religious existence. It is not only the sight of the pale populace of heaven, but also the galaxy of blades of grass that deprives us of intellectual levity. Our wisdom becomes cobweb, our understanding, obsolete. The experience of the sublime

is a humiliation as well as an exaltation.

The delicate balance of mystery and meaning, of reverence and action, has been perilously upset. Our knowledge has been flattened. We see the world in one dimension and treat all problems on the same level. From the fact that we learned how to replace the kerosene lamp, we have deduced that we can replace the mystery of existence. We may be able to experiment with mice and still be unable to experiment with prayer.

By the mystery I do not mean the fact that the world in which we live is not exhausted by those properties which can be measured, added, subtracted, multiplied. By the mystery I mean a dimension of all beings, including the measurable aspects of beings and the act of measuring itself. It is given with and within experience.

The mystery is not a matter pertaining to the things *not* yet known, but something that will never be known. It is something we face but to which we cannot relate ourselves. We stand in its presence, yet unable to grasp its essence. We are like deaf people who see the sounds but are unable to hear them.

"Every grain of sand is a mystery; so is every daisy in the summer, and so is every snowflake in the winter." The sense of mystery gives grandeur to the mind and fertility to the soul. We cripple man's character, we injure his soul, by pretending that there are no depths in reality and no abysses in human thought.

Sensitivity to the mystery of living is the essence of human dignity. It is the soil in which our consciousness has its roots, and out of which a sense of meaning is derived. Man does not live by explanations alone, but by the sense of wonder and mystery. Without it there

is neither religion nor morality, neither sacrifice nor creativity.

You will not enter the gates of religion through the door of speech. The way to God is through the depths of the self. The soul is a key; the depth is the door. In the depth of the soul there is a prayer, an invocation, a cry for meaning, a craving for justification.

There is only one legitimate form of religious expression: prayer. All other forms are commentaries: descriptions, discourses tend to become diversions.

THE ELEMENTS of depth-theology are those situations in which the door to ultimate significance is not locked, in which the mystery is not obscured. These elements are acts of wonder and awe, moments of embarrassment and moments of being pregnant with meaning, acts of yearning and luminous moments of insight. Let us try to discuss some of these elements.

The purpose of depth-theology, we have said, is not to establish a doctrine but to lay bare some of the roots of our being, stirred by the Ultimate Question. Its theme is faith in *status nascendi*, the birth-pangs of insight.

Faith is born in the throes of anxiety, in the anguish of ultimate embarrassment. How embarrassing for man to be the greatest miracle on earth and to spill out his time as if it were scum! How embarrassing for man to live in the shadow of greatness and to ignore it, to be a contemporary of God and not to sense it! Religion is what man does with his ultimate embarrassment.

What is it about the world we live in that evokes in us a sense of embarrassment, an awareness of the inadequacy of our mode of living and thinking? It is the awareness that the world is too great for us; it is the grandeur and mystery of being, the awareness of being present at the unfolding of an inconceivable eternal saga.

Embarrassment is the awareness of an incongruity of character and challenge, of perceptivity and a given reality, of mystery and comprehension. Experiencing the evanescence of time, one realizes the absurdity of man's sense of sovereignty. In the face of the immense misery of the human species, one realizes the insufficiency of all human effort to relieve it. In the face of one's inner anguish, one realizes the fallacy of absolute expediency.

There is hardly a person who does not submit his soul to the beauty parlor, who does not employ the make-up of vanity in order to belie his embarrassment. It is only before God that we all stand naked.

Embarrassment not only precedes religious commitment, it is the touchstone of religious existence. How embarrassing for man to have been created in the likeness of God and to be unable to recognize Him! In the words of Job:

Lo, He passes by me and I see Him not; He moves on, but I do not perceive Him. Job 9:11

The sense of embarrassment may be contrasted with the self-assurance of a non-religious type: "I do not need a God to tell me how to live. I am a good person without going to the synagogue or church." A religious man could never say: "I am a good person." Far from being satisfied with his conduct, he prays three times daily: "Forgive us, our Father, for we have sinned."

One of the most precious gifts which mankind received from the Bible is a *bad conscience*. The Bible requires the utmost—"Ye shall be holy"; "Thou shalt love thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy might"; "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Who could be pleased with his accomplishments? No voice is more authentic than the prophet's rebuke to complacency, the prophet's call to repentance. "I am before Thee like a vessel full of shame."

We realize our true plight in discovering that we care very little for our fellow man or for God; what is ultimately important is of no ultimate concern to us.

Another root of the sense of embarrassment is a sense of indebtedness, an awareness of owing gratitude, of being called upon to reciprocate, to answer, to live in a way which is compatible with the grandeur and mystery of living.

Indebtedness is the pathos of existence, the self-awareness of the self as committed, the awareness of a point where man must transcend the self. Indebtedness is an ontological category; it is given with the awareness of existence. Man cannot think of himself as human without being conscious of his indebtedness. Thus it is not a mere feeling, but rather a constitutive feature of being human. To eradicate it would be to destroy what is human in man.

We share a divine secret which we sense in rare moments: the transcendent significance of a good deed, the preciousness of a good thought, the awareness of being a need of God.

Thus it is not a feeling for the mystery of living, or a sense of awe, wonder, or fear which is the root of religion, but rather the question what to do with the feeling for the mystery of living, what to do with awe, wonder, or fear. Thinking about God begins when we do not know any more how to wonder, how to fear, how to be in awe. For wonder is not a state of esthetic enjoyment. Endless wonder is endless tension, a situation in which we are shocked at the inadequacy of our awe, at the weakness of our shock, as well as the state of being asked the ultimate question.

The soul is endowed with a sense of indebtedness, and wonder, awe and fear unlock that sense of indebtedness. Wonder is the state of our being asked.

In spite of our pride, in spite of our

acquisitiveness, we are driven by an awareness that something is asked of us; that we are asked to wonder, to revere, to think, and to live in a way that is compatible with the grandeur and mystery of living.

What gives birth to religion is not intellectual curiosity but the fact and experience of our being asked.

All that is left to us is a choice—to answer or to refuse to answer. Yet the more deeply we listen, the more we become stripped of the arrogance and callousness which alone would enable us to refuse. We carry a load of marvel, wishing to exchange it for the simplicity of knowing what to live for, a load which we can never lay down nor continue to carry not knowing where.

If awe is rare, if wonder is dead, and the sense of mystery defunct, then the problem of what to do with awe, wonder, and mystery does not exist, and one does not sense being asked. The awareness of being asked is easily repressed, for it is an echo of the intimation that is small and still. It will not, however, remain forever subdued. The day comes when the still small intimation becomes "like the wind and storm, fulfilling His word." (Psalm 148:8).

Indeed, the dead emptiness in the heart is unbearable to the living man. We cannot survive unless we know what is asked of us. But to whom does man in his priceless and unbridled freedom owe anything? Where does the asking come from? To whom is he accountable?

The sense of indebtedness, while present in the consciousness of all men, is translated in a variety of ways: duty, obligation, allegiance, conscience, sacrifice. Yet the content and direction of these terms are subject to interpretation.

To elucidate the meaning of ultimate indebtedness, we must first of all ask: indebted to what? or to whom? And does ultimate indebtedness exclude or include all other forms of indebtedness?

Religion has been defined as a feeling of absolute dependence. We come closer to an understanding of religion by defining one of its roots as a sense of personal indebtedness. God is not only a power we depend on; He is a God Who demands, Who decrees. He said, "Let there be," and "there was." In Biblical ontology, to be is to obey. The essence of being is obedience.

At the root of our sense of embarrassment and indebtedness is a sense of appreciation. There is no ultimate embarrassment without an intuition of absolute greatness, without an awareness of the grandeur and mystery of ultimate meaning.

Indebtedness is a sign of worthiness, of being a recipient of something precious and of holding it in trust. Our ultimate embarrassment is a sign of greatness, of being involved in a mysterious design. Man is abashed because his destiny is to reflect a Divine image rather than a caricature. To exist as a human means to assist the divine. For the divine to be done, the human part must be present.

No man is sterile. Every soul is pregnant with a seed of insight. It is vague and hidden. No mother has ever seen the life she carries under her heart. In some people the seed grows, in others it decays. Some give birth to life. Others miscarry it. Some know how to bear, to nurse, and to rear an insight that comes into being. Others do not know how to cherish the burden of a child, and others again do not see the child to which they give birth; the child may die at birth or may be taken away.

Such pregnancy is a sense of the fullness of time, of being with meaning. Things are marvels, moments are tokens of grace. There is abundance of love in God's concealment. No shadows can deceive a heart drunk with joy. Stillness is His witness. All noise is gone.

There is power in the seed. At times

it lifts us up high, and it is as if we walked from one mountaintop to another; at other times you feel like hiding in a corner, like vanishing in shame. It is a singing in the heart as well as a distress. You recognize the pregnant ones by the sign in the song.

We are pregnant with a thought for which we have no image. We are endowed with a song which we cannot utter, with a word we do not know how to spell. Then we open a Psalm, and there is the song and the word. Only then the song within us grows. We pour it into a deed; we fashion it into words, but the song is never exhausted.

What we must do is to nurse the song in the recesses of the soul.

Over and above all frustrations, there is a certainty that we are never alone in doing the good. We love with Him Who loves the world.

An Important New Series . . .
A Threefold Purpose . . .

**IMPACT
BOOKS**



Explore the various realms of human thought and experience.

Develop in modern man an appreciation of the struggle to know.

Build a solid foundation for a dialogue among men of different persuasions.

**INTRODUCING THE OLD
TESTAMENT**

By Frederick L. Moriarty, S.J.

Dramatically portrays the historic destiny of Israel by focusing on its heroic figures. "The book can be enjoyed as a handy, clear introduction to the literature, the religious thought and the great events of the Old Testament." *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* \$4.25

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

By Dietrich von Hildebrand

For a world dominated by the cult of science and technology, but still thirsting for true answers to reality's deepest problems—a new look at philosophy, its nature and role in man's life. \$4.25

SEVEN BOOKS OF WISDOM

By Roland Murphy, O.Carm.

An examination of the themes, the historical background and the problems of the Sapiential Books of the Old Testament that will lead all men to a deeper understanding of them. \$3.75

FROM AN IVORY TOWER

By Bernard A. Hausmann, S.J.

Expertly traces the development of non-Euclidian geometries, presents both the nature and methods of modern mathematics and confronts philosophers with some challenging problems arising in modern mathematical theory. \$3.50

The Bruce Publishing Company
4310 Bruce Building
Milwaukee 1, Wisconsin

PAUL CLAUDEL

TWO DRAMAS



BREAK OF NOON *Partage de Midi*



THE TIDINGS BROUGHT TO MARY *L'annonce faite à Marie*

Translations and Introductions

WALLACE FOWLIE

16 photographs

A limited edition, \$4.75

Each play in paper edition, \$1.45

"The greatest French dramatist of this century."

— Guy Dumur

"I read several times Claudel's *L'annonce* and received the strongest poetic — the strongest possible — artistic impression which has been mine for years."

— Thomas Mann

"Suddenly you seem to me the greatest poet on earth."

— Maurice Maeterlinck
to Claudel

"I honor Claudel not only as the greatest poet of France but as the greatest of all poets."

— Gertrud von Le Fort

"Paul Claudel — This great man of the theater, the greatest of all French poets of our time."

— Jean Louis Barrault



Henry REGNERY Company
CHICAGO 4, ILLINOIS

CLERICALISM

CHARLES TAYLOR

THE AIM OF THIS PAPER¹ is not to make a polemic against certain practices in the Church known under the collective title of 'clericalism' nor to offer anything like a rigorous definition of this term. A good deal has already been done along the latter line by people eminently more qualified, especially by Fr. Y-M. Congar.² But once a definition is given, we are still more or less at the beginning of our study. For clericalism was not simply a deviation in one corner of the Church's life; it affected and affects, directly or indirectly, the whole of that life and particularly all aspects of the relation between the Church and the world. It is these more extended ramifications that I would like to trace out here.

The first and most striking place in which clericalism is to be met with in a country like, say, England, is in the liturgical life of the Church. In many churches the faithful are systematically excluded from any active or indeed conscious participation in the liturgy. In this reduction of the laity to passive bystanders where they should be active participants, we have what might be called the paradigm manifestation of clericalism. If clericalism is the emphasis on the hierarchical *structure* of the Church which causes to be hid from view its *life* as the community of the faithful, then the result is that we 'see in the laity a simple accident, an appendix of the Church, at most necessary for its well-being.'³ In this way the

laity come to be looked on as a 'mass' and not as a 'people,' i.e. as amorphous, passive and anonymous. The prime result of clericalism is thus the dissolution of the laity *as a people*. And this is what is strongly evident at Sunday Mass. The laity, having no rôle to fulfil in common, being rather *les administrés* of the system, tend to fragment, each one dealing with the 'Church,' i.e. the clergy, about his own private problems, sins or vocation. Sunday Mass often becomes a place where people assemble, paradoxically enough, for private devotion.

But the manifestations of clericalism go beyond its 'paradigm instance,' and it is these that I should like to explore in this article. When the laity are somehow dropped from view as a people and become a number of individual clients of the Church, the Church not only loses something in those functions for which the laity are not essential, they cease entirely to be able to fulfil their rôle. Now the special rôle of the laity is to provide, or more correctly to be, the link between the Church and the world. To the extent that it ceases to exist as a people, it ceases to be able to fulfil that rôle. Clericalism has therefore indirect but nevertheless very important ramifications on the relation between the Church and the world.

The dual existence of both Church and world, neither of which can or should absorb the other, poses the ever-recurring problem of 'co-existence.' From a Christian standpoint, theocracy is unacceptable: the Church cannot rule the world because the world does not yet obey God in the full sense in which it will at the Parousia. The Church needs from the world the material basis

This article first appeared in DOWNSIDE REVIEW (quarterly, Downside Abbey, Bath, England, \$3 a year), a Benedictine journal which deals with all subjects of importance for religion, and cannot be too highly recommended.

of its continued existence, and it has a right to demand this, but little more. But does this mean that in all other respects the state of the world is a matter of indifference to the Church? In a sense this is obviously so, in the sense that the Church *needs* nothing else, and hence is guaranteed no more than this. Is there another sense in which this is not true? Some hold that there is not, that the Kingdom's not being 'of this world' must be taken in this sense that it is to be rigorously and absolutely non-continuous with anything which is started here. Thus the Church may and should protest against the grosser injustices of man to man, but it should not demand anything else of the world beyond what is necessary to its existence. For the rest it should restrict itself to instructing the faithful, which instruction will no doubt have ramifications but which does not reflect any concern with the world *per se*.

Against this there is the view that a Christian should not be indifferent to human development, that the growth in culture, civilization and productive potential is not devoid of significance for him. That the human nature which is to be redeemed and made the material of the temple has also a certain development to go through from its first primitive beginnings, a certain unfolding of its powers and potentialities, is evident and attested among other places by the famous passage of Genesis. What is in question is the continuity of the effort as it exists in history to make this development with its ultimate consummation in the Parousia. Now I do not see how *all* continuity can be denied it. Can we say that the human effort to increase control over nature, to raise living standards, to make the unity of the human race more real has no connection with God's plan for mankind? If we do, what can we mean by grace completing nature, not destroying it? The

point is well taken that the 'natural' development of man or of any part of creation is not enough, that moreover it is not even unequivocal, that it is as it were criss-crossed with sin so that everything and every measure is two-sided, every advance forces some retreat, or at least makes it a pressing danger, and so on. But it is just a confusion to say that this entails that there is no striving in created things themselves towards that unity and completeness which can in the final analysis only be given by God.

Now the connection of this question with clericalism is not hard to see. For the task of being with, if not in the forefront of this human development and thus of assuring both the presence of the Christian conscience in it and the 'baptism' of this effort by the Church falls to the laity. There is therefore a clear link between the view that this human development is devoid of significance and the view we have been calling clericalism, and also an important historical link between the dissolution of the laity as a people and the denigration of their task, of secular progress as a whole, a rejection of humanism. Before trying to trace in a little more detail the historical connection, I would like to examine more closely what clericalism means in this context.

A church suffering from clericalism can fall into straight theocracy, if the historical conditions permit. But, as we have seen, this is so contrary to the genius of Christianity that it has rarely been tried and then only half-heartedly. It has been recognized that when secular powers fail, Church leaders may have to take over, as was the case in the late Roman period, but they do not take over to run things by any other criteria than the secular powers would apply. Rule by ecclesiastics doesn't amount to theocracy although it has other undesirable features. When one thinks of the long period when the Church held im-

portant posts of secular power it is surprising that the temptation to theocracy was not more in evidence. Even when, in response to the claims of the Emperors, some extreme Caesaro-Papist views were put forward, these, although confusing temporal and spiritual power, did not amount to a demand for a theocracy. But clericalism in the form which we are examining at the moment has some of the same results as theocracy while rejecting the theory of it. For the sense of the irrelevance of things secular which, we have seen, tends to accompany clericalism leads to a making light of human development and hence human freedom—a feature which has been so evident in the recent history of the Church and which accounts for the popular idea of clericalism as a state of affairs where the clergy have inordinate power and for the confusion among critics of the Church between clericalism and theocracy.

We should therefore examine more closely the connection between theocracy and clericalism. The error behind theocracy is that of suppressing the distinction between the periods before and after the Parousia. Then there will be no divergence between the will of God and the behaviour of created beings. But this cannot be the case now. By no feat of engineering, social or mechanical, can it be made the case. To attempt nevertheless to make it the case by a kind of forced conformity is not only hopeless, it is also self-defeating. For in the course of trying to bend a recalcitrant nature to the will of God one crushes not only the evil in it but also that by which it is striving to reach perfection. Ivan Karamazov in the legend of the Grand Inquisitor makes a penetrating commentary on theocracy. It involves, as the Grand Inquisitor frankly admits, renouncing the original aim for which it was instituted. The Inquisitor sees that he has amended the plan of God,

because, as he says, people were too unhappy with the freedom which was required to carry it out. The plan of God requires the full development of human freedom so that men can accept God in freedom. Any tutelage must be at most temporary; as soon as it becomes permanent it destroys one of the prerequisites of success.

Now clericalism, in the aspect now under review, does respect the dualism between Church and world, and doesn't try to suppress it by force as does theocracy. But it, too, in a different way suspends the tension between human development and the will of God. For while it does not try to control this development, it looks on it as of no importance. All that the Church can ask of the world is that it leave it in peace and give it the wherewithal to carry on its job. But in framing its demands on the world to this end the Church does not have to take into account the needs of human development. It need brook no other claim. The necessary tension between the Church and the world has been suspended, or rather breaks out as a struggle for power between believers and non-believers, between two absolute claims.

An example of this among many others chosen in the political sphere—we could just as easily find examples in the intellectual or cultural spheres: one of the ways in which the Church assured itself the necessary independence, among other places, in China and some countries of eastern Europe was by large scale ownership of land. Quite apart from the injustices that might have been committed in the process, the fact is that land reform came to be desired by the vast majority of peasants and was moreover one of the preconditions not only of economic progress but of the independence of the peasants—in short something eminently desirable from the point of view of human well-being and

human promotion. The fact that the land-reform in these countries was carried through by communist regimes, who have not only viciously persecuted the Church but have committed many other injustices, has unfortunately hidden from view the Church's responsibility in all this. Anti-Catholic propaganda has a base because the Church was not concerned about the needs of human development; this concern was left to non-Christians who inevitably became anti-Christians. After saying to themselves, we need this for the Church, they never stopped to ask: does someone else need this for some other purpose, and if so, can we get along some other way? It is, of course, the job of an active laity to pose this second question should the clerics fail to do so, but it is a feature of clericalism that such a laity does not exist, and should it raise its head on an issue of this kind it would be smartly slapped down, at times even threatened with excommunication.

But clerical intervention often leads to a kind of political *non-intervention* when the Church should not be silent. The Church, i.e. in this context the hierarchy, should, of course, not intervene in the normal course of events in politics. The laity play their rôle, but they do not do so as a united body, as the Church. Precisely because everything in the world has a certain ambiguity, there is a sense in which it is true to say that there is no Christian solution to most temporal problems. Some solutions are more just and thus should be accepted by Christians, some are flagrantly unjust and must be rejected; but over a great range we do not and cannot know finally until the last days, and perhaps there is after all nothing to choose. No good is unmixed with evil. This is what makes one initially suspicious of so-called Christian Democratic parties. These must in the nature of things be involved in the day-

to-day struggles and manœuvrings of politics. But there is no Christian solution to a budget impasse or the structure of the state oil industry. There is the danger that the 'Christian' side of the programme become that of acting as the 'secular arm' of the Church, defending it from possible loss of its privileges. Now if this becomes the aim of a political party, then clericalism has triumphed, for one of the rôles that should be filled by lay politicians is to determine whether the Church's privileges are really defensible. Secondly, the lay politician must pursue all sorts of other secular aims, which, while not necessarily in conflict with the Church's demands, may involve other alliances and other political formations. Thus the unhealthy situation arises that exists in Italy to-day, where a vast, heterogeneous and thus thoroughly *immobiliste* party clutters up the political scene in return for the spoils of office assured by the millions of votes which can be gained by Church support. Any true political principle is thus undermined by a purely expedient alliance for power reminiscent of American political parties. The maintenance of this sprawling monster by the Vatican is a pure example of clericalism in that a political alliance is formed for the defence of the Church which blocks the solution of most of Italy's temporal political problems.

To the extent that the Church is purely interested in defending its privileges, there is a danger that, however legitimate these are, it not only fail to turn its attention to secular wrongs which are so crying that they leave no doubt as to what position a Christian should adopt, but—even more scandalous—that it acquire *via* the 'secular arm' which it has chosen to defend its privileges, a kind of vested interest in blocking any attempt to right these wrongs. We thus get the worst of both worlds: the Church indirectly underwrites in

the minds of many voters the detailed policies of Christian Democracy, while not speaking out plainly on, e.g. the use of nuclear weapons, and actually opposing, e.g. the work of Danilo Dolci, thus giving a handle to its enemies and deepening the trench between itself and many of those temporal forces that are working for justice. It thus generates the kind of tragic situation which we have seen in the priest-worker question.⁴

Clericalism tends to resemble theocracy therefore, not only in the slight importance which it gives and the slight respect which it pays to the temporal, but also in the fact that, precisely because of this slight respect, it sees no other rival claims in the field once the privileges of the Church are in question, and it therefore sets no limit to its right to interfere with the temporal in an indirect way *via* its 'secular arm.'

But there is still another respect in which clericalism resembles theocracy. We saw in connection with Dostoyevsky's legend of the Grand Inquisitor that theocracy leads to a suppression of the eschatological orientation of Christianity. The Christian conception of history as a march towards the Parousia is no longer possible once all initiative has been taken from the 'people of God.' The rules are simply laid down once and for all. Even if we were to conceive a theocracy with an eschatological orientation, such as, to take a political analogy, Communism, the very fact that the initiative of the 'laity' is suppressed in one generation tends to rigidify the 'clergy' in the next, for the latter must be recruited from the former. Clericalism tends, too, to reduce the emphasis on a consciousness of Christian history. For this one needs a highly developed sense of the Church as a community called to a collective vocation. In this way one can be conscious not only of the sense in which our salvation is al-

ready won, but also of that in which we can contribute to it as against just cashing in on it by minding our 'p's and q's.' It is this latter aspect which clericalism tends to put in the shade. Thus the rôle of the laity is seen as the negative one of not infringing a certain law. Some may do works of supererogation, but there is no sense that this is the *normal vocation* of the laity. Of course, if the laity are seen as a mass of individuals, then there is no sense in which active co-operation can be seen as the vocation of any but outstanding individuals, but this is just the mistake implicit in clericalism. Similarly, clericalism tends to give a purely negative sense to the period between the Ascension and the Parousia, i.e. it tends to see it purely as the expression of God's mercy—he could have drawn all things up at once but preferred not to so as to give us another chance. Of course there is an important truth here, that we are dependent on God's mercy, but the interim can be seen in a positive light as well, for it is also enriching the final Temple with all that man will have realized and offered to God during it. But to see this aspect one has to recognize that the temporal achievements of man can have some value in just this way, that human nature should be enriched so as to enrich man's offering to God. But this, too, is what clericalism tends to put in the shade. These two emphases—that on our salvation already being *achieved* and that on the element of divine *mercy* in the interim—as one-sided emphases are linked directly by the clericalist view in its original form. This view exalts the respect in which the Church is a hierarchy spreading out from Pentecost to all corners of the earth at the expense of the respect in which it is the community of the faithful offering its life to God—a life in which the whole of Creation is more and more integrated. Thus it stresses that in the

Church which is hierarchical in the ordinary language sense, the necessary subordination and discipline, but also the sense in which the Church as divinely instituted is already made. What is often forgotten is the respect in which the Church is a community where none is less necessary than any other, the sense in which the Church is made by its members and grows with them. Hence the laity are encouraged to take a passive rôle, simply to ensure their participation in an already won salvation—at the limit this can become a kind of other-worldly egoism—and they are encouraged to see the period of interim as fundamentally devoid of positive sense. The only positive task that falls to the Church here—and I do not want to understress its importance—is that of spreading the Gospel. But in a clerical orientation this is seen as the priests' job. There then grows up a division of labor: the layman saves himself, the priest saves others as well, this gives an extra retroactive justification to the greater respect and attention to be accorded to this aspect of the Church. (But clericalism can frustrate the missionary work as well if those new civilizations which are won to the Church are not seen as making any contribution whatever.) Hence for the laity the interim is seen as a time of waiting.

It is a clerical orientation in the Church that can perhaps be seen as partly responsible for the loss of an eschatological orientation in so much teaching, preaching and devotion, and for the common conception of life as a sort of exam on which the performance of individuals is judged and in virtue of which they receive a reward. Very often even the Second Coming is shaded out and all sorts of weird ideas about heaven and hell are substituted. In short the state of affairs in the interim is taken as permanent. This kind of pessimism is inevitable once the sense of

Christian history is lost as, we have seen, tends to occur under clericalism. And it is supplemented by an 'other-worldly' conception of salvation made all the more acute by the denigration of the temporal implicit in clericalism and by its emphasis on the discontinuity between this world and the next, on the irrelevance of human initiative to salvation. To be more exact, the sense of Christian history is not so much lost as it undergoes a distortion. All that has to do with the 'recapitulation' by man of what has been won by Christ is more or less lost from view, for this concerns most directly that respect in which the Church is the community of the faithful. What is retained is the necessity for missionary activity, for this has to do most directly with the respect in which the Church is an apostolic hierarchy spreading the news outward in space and time from one starting point. But the missionary activity itself is endangered by this one-sidedness while the life of the Church tends to be made static, self-preoccupied and other-worldly.

One-sided emphases in the Church always feed on their opposites, and it is often a chicken-and-egg question which was responsible for setting off the circle of mutual repulsion. We are in very much this difficulty, it seems to me, with regard to the rise of clericalism. But if we do not mind picking up the story sometime after the beginning, it seems clear that much must be attributed to the movements in the later middle ages towards 'representative government' in the Church, e.g. the Conciliar movement, as well as to Gallicanism and pre-Reformation heresies. These all, in one way or another, called in question the hierarchical nature of the Church, or what is at base the same, the divine foundation of the visible Church. It was inevitable that polemical one-sided answers should be given to these attacks.

But, of course, the traumatic event which drove the Church deep into closed defensive clericalism was the Reformation. The Reformers among other things split the two aspects of the Church finally and ultimately apart. The visible Church was made up of its members and was not hierarchical, but it did not necessarily coincide with the divinely founded Church which was invisible, and even, according to some Protestant theologians, fleeting (some have a theory of the Church as an 'event' whenever a body of faithful assemble in the right spirit).

Now it is clear that some of the confusion in many people's minds which allowed these errors such a wide and rapid diffusion arose from an already existing clerical deviation. This is clear both from what the Reformers rejected and from what they accepted of the Catholicism of their day. Reformation ecclesiology was already based on a disjunction between the two aspects of the Church which it sundered, which existed in people's minds partly as the result of clericalist practice, and one strand of its appeal was undoubtedly that it gave a renewed positive vocation to lay piety which many were seeking at the time (Brethren of the Common Life, etc.). But at the same time, the Reformers accepted, in separating the human from the divine in the Church, that small respect for things secular that we have seen is a mark of clericalism. Thus, for instance, the encouraging of priests and nuns to marry was not really the unambiguous return to humanism which it is represented as by modern liberal Protestants (e.g. the film *Martin Luther*); it was largely based on the idea that it didn't *matter* because these things had no rôle in the economy of salvation anyway, and this is hardly a humanist standpoint. Hence, too, the Reformation could lead right to the

most rigid theocracies, as was, e.g. Geneva.

But although itself in part a reaction to and continuation of clericalism, the Reformation led to a strengthening of it in the Catholic Church. The Jesuits have, not entirely deservedly, acquired the status of symbol of the worst elements of clericalism in the Counter-Reform church. The anti-humanism of the Jesuits was indeed very typical of the clericalist variety, and in it we can see both the deviation and the built-in resistances to deviation. For the Jesuits were, and are, great educators, but at the same time their attempt to do the ends of God with the means of man betrays a certain lack of respect for these means, a reduction of the tension between the claims of God and the claims of man which has given the term 'Jesuit' some of its ordinary language force.

The great tragedy of Counter-Reform clericalism has of course been that most of the human development has grown outside and against the Church, which like the Reformation produced another vicious circle of repulsion. The Church has done more to condemn humanist doctrines, on quite correct theological grounds of course, than it has tried to understand why all major humanist doctrines of the modern era have been anti-Christian. By 'humanist doctrine' I mean some view of man which tries to show the scope and/or importance of human development towards greater well-being, freedom, unity, justice and so on. All these views have been anti-Christian for at least one main reason: that Christianity has seemed to their protagonists a doctrine preaching the impossibility of human betterment or its irrelevance. And on the other side, in the course of denouncing the unfounded faith in man without God, Christianity has often been presented by its defenders as just such a doctrine. The vicious circle is thus joined. Now

that so many of these humanist doctrines have been discredited it is interesting to note that people are not turning in great numbers to the Church. Those on the Christian side who wish to say 'we told you so' should hold their breath a little longer. They too were being told something which they were too deaf to hear.

The point is that it is part of the genius of Christianity as a doctrine of the Incarnation to spawn a humanism. It is a commonplace to point out how much all existing humanisms, not to speak of the actual developments—exploration, industrialization, etc.—which have made them possible, owe to Christianity. But it is not often seen that the obverse side of this is that the Church requires that there be a humanism or humanisms for it to flourish, in the same way and for the same reason that it requires that there be a healthy society. This may not be so for short periods where the Church is recruiting people away from the secular civilization in which they are set, as, e.g. in the early days, or as might occur again in communist countries. But sooner or later the Church will have rediscovered a *modus vivendi*, the revolution is over and people must settle down to ordinary life. But then the Church must, through its lay members, penetrate every segment of secular life, not as an act of planned policy but as water permeates porous rock. In this way, even though they will be full of nascent contradictions and constantly subject to review, like anything in the world, there will be a number of ways, of styles of life where one is fully man and fully a Christian at one and the same time. Of course, as I have just said, there will be a starting point for new endeavours.

Our problem today is that we lack a permeation of this kind into the environment and lives of millions of people. The easy transition between being

a Christian and being a man virtually only exists for traditional societies and classes. For others there is greater and greater difficulty, culminating in what seems like flat contradiction between the two sets of demands. This was the case of the French working class, or at least a substantial part of it, to which the priest-workers went. Here there was no means of accommodating the secular hopes which played an important rôle in the lives of the individual and the class. One has only to read the letters and documents of the priest-workers to see that they were tragically torn between the demands of human solidarity, something of vital importance to the way of being a human being in this particular environment, and those of their priesthood. The Church has not yet found a way of being present in this world. It can of course never be of it but it cannot yet be in it.

The problem of de-Christianization is not just one of numerical absence from Church, it also concerns the absence of the Church from whole milieux and hence a gap between secular and Christian life, into which the few individuals who try to straddle it are always in danger of falling. The absence of the Church from the life of society just as much conditions the absence of individuals from the Church as the reverse. And as we pointed out above, this is not only because of the millennial hopes which are implicit in many humanist doctrines. When Suhard delivered his famous Pastoral, it seemed as though millennial hopes were going to sweep aside much of the old rotting structure of 'Christian Europe.' But this has succeeded in surviving and the millennial hopes have given away to disillusionment and apathy. This has not brought about a return to the Church, and we can see at least one reason for this. Absolute despair for man is not a basis for return to God. Many people have

no hope of ever achieving more integration in their lives or greater meaning (by integration is meant the integration of different values and life-goals with each other and with the way one in fact lives; by meaning is meant the having of a life-goal which one can be convinced is worthy of the energy, devotion and courage that are inevitably called for in life). They or their fathers may have believed in the classless society or *les lendemains qui chantent* or whatever people expected after 1945 from the Labour Government or the United Nations or whatever. But these beliefs are dissipated, and yet to try to put across that there is such a state as, e.g. sainthood, which is higher integration and greater meaning, in short which is really a fit object of all the generosity of spirit which has been given to the old goals (not that these were not also, in their way, fit goals) is often to be greeted with an incredulity and a sense of distance and inappropriateness which can make one doubt one's own sanity. It comes perhaps to this, that many people cannot see in their lives and in their own consciousness of their lives any evidence for believing that a being with the same nature was ever also God, and that they can become like him, insofar as they share the same nature. But incredulity at the idea of a God-man and the connected idea of sainthood is the intellectual concomitant of that absence of the Church from so much of secular life. For many who hold a confident humanism Christianity is an enemy; for many who are disillusioned it is an incomprehensible relic of a past age. It is in this sense that our society is justly described as post-Christian.

The Church therefore requires that there be a humanism, a conception of human life that allows for the possibility of the Incarnation, if its missionary effort is to penetrate modern society and

reach the millions that are now outside the Church. This is of course not only a task of intellectuals; it is perhaps above all that of people who can bridge the gap with their lives. The twentieth century is becoming and should become the era of such trail blazers. But this effort requires a laity which is conscious of its rôle, and it is here that clericalism is a negative force on two levels: by the low importance which it puts on things secular, it hides from view the gap which must be filled; and by holding the laity in tutelage it unfits those who must in the end carry through this work.

I have tried to explore some of the wider ramifications of clericalism not only in the life of the Church but in the closely related area of the link between the Church and the world. I hope I have succeeded in making the case that more is involved than simply the power of priests or bishops. Indeed these may not even be involved at all. What is in question is a one-sided view of the Church and its rôle. What is in question, therefore, is not a claim of the laity *against* the clergy. This is a secondary question. What is needed is a renewed emphasis on the vision of the Church as a single community made up of men both priest and lay. This is after all what is eternal in the Church. Paradoxically enough, clericalism is a problem much wider than that of mere 'priestly power.'

¹ For all that I say in this paper, I am very indebted to Fr Yves Congar, as well as to Fr Chenu and Fr de Lubac, and of course, to Emmanuel Mounier and the writers who have been influenced by him. Anyone familiar with these authors will find the themes in this paper very familiar.

² *Jalons pour une Théologie du Laïcat* by Y-M. Congar (Paris, Unam Sanctam 1954).

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁴ The letter of Cardinal Pizzardo to Cardinal Feltin which, last year, called a final

halt to the priest-worker movement in France contains the following startling passage: 'The "priest at work" is not only thrown into a materialist atmosphere, harmful for his spiritual life and often dangerous for his chastity, he is also led, as it were, in spite of himself to think like his work-mates in trade union and social matters, and to take part in their demands: a most dangerous chain of causation which leads him rapidly to take part in the

class war.' What are we to think of a society where the milieu in which the majority make their living is so fraught with spiritual danger for the priests of the Church? Does this not imply a danger for the spiritual life of the whole Church which has identified itself so completely with this society? In the fact that this last conclusion has never been drawn we can see the whole drama of the priest-worker tragedy.

THE DOWNSIDE REVIEW

A BENEDICTINE QUARTERLY

Baron von Hugel once wrote to a young friend: "Ne lisez jamais les petits journaux religieux." The *Downside Review* agrees with this stricture and hopes to evade it. In an age of digest, it attends to the needs of digestion. For while it is possible, with little effort on the part of either writer or reader, to set up a panoramic vision of philosophy, or theology, or history, this is really to take a further step in the flight from understanding. There is no profit in arranging already too-familiar concepts in a novel pattern. They must be conceived again and new. New readers must be invited to assist in the dynamic act of intelligence, wherein they were forged. There is no other way to intelligence, and intelligence is the only way of escape from anger and continued misunderstanding. And as the billiard cue striking the ball does not communicate motion to it, but actualizes its own inherent potency for motion, so, in an infinitely higher degree, the teacher or writer does not communicate his ideas but solicits in the reader an act purely his own. In practice this means, generally, long unhurried articles that will repay more than one reading. We will try not to fall too far below this program and its implied standards.

Annual Subscription, \$3; single copies, 75 cents

**Write to: Secretary, DOWNSIDE REVIEW
Downside Abbey, Bath, Somerset, England**

THE GERMAN CATHOLIC PRESS AND HITLER'S WARS

GORDON ZAHN

IN A VERY REAL SENSE it may be said that the political community exists in the consensus arising from the identification of each individual citizen with the interests of that community.¹ It follows, then, that the political sociologist will seek to discover the various means by which such identification is promoted and maintained in a wide range of concrete historical situations. And certainly foremost among such situations demanding his critical attention are the times of emergency—including in particular the crisis of war—in which the success or failure of attempts to achieve the desired identification (and the resulting consensus) may spell the difference between life and death for the political community.

The religious community, too, depends in large measure upon the per-

This is a revised and greatly expanded version of a paper presented before the American Catholic Sociological Society at its 1959 meeting in Chicago. Dr. Zahn, who is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Loyola University (Chicago), did the research for this essay on a senior research grant under the Fulbright program. Another essay by Dr. Zahn, "Social Science and the Theology of War," is contained in the new Catholic symposium on MORALITY AND MODERN WARFARE: THE STATE OF THE QUESTION (Helicon), edited by William J. Nagle.

The author wishes to acknowledge his debt to the personnel of the library of the Julius Maximilian Universität (Würzburg, Germany) for their helpful assistance in locating and obtaining the periodicals employed in his study.

sonal identification of the individual communicant with the mission of that community. A crucial difference may be granted in that the religious community will usually trace its ultimate existence and the certainty of its perpetuation to the operation of a supernatural power and promise; nevertheless, its strength or weakness as an observable social institution rests upon the consensus arising from the manifest acceptance by its living and acting human members of the value system and behavior patterns the religious community proclaims as right and true. The religious community, too, knows its times of crisis, historical situations which present the terrifying prospect that the Gates of Hell might, for all human intents and purposes, prevail after all.

The individual actor, citizen of the political community and religious communicant at one and the same time, finds himself the object of two forces, each imposing or demanding his active and whole-hearted identification with its immediate interests. In the "Good Society" of the philosopher in which "right order" obtains, this would present no serious problem. Unfortunately, however, this optimum is rarely, if ever, encountered in real historical situations. The individual usually finds himself forced to choose between competing or even conflicting political and religious identities and their associated roles. And his problem becomes all the more pressing to the extent that one or the other community is, or fancies itself to be, in a crisis situation. The political community of Imperial Rome made "crisis" demands that the fledgling Christian Church could not grant—and

the Age of Martyrs was the outcome. Other historical situations presented similar crises, not all of which had equally edifying results from the standpoint of the religious community. One such situation obtained in Nazi Germany when German Catholics were called to service in Adolf Hitler's wars—in particular the more clearly aggressive wars against Poland in 1939, the Low Countries in 1940, and the Soviet Union in 1941.

All social behavior is meaningful and purpose-fulfilling, with both the meaning and the purpose set in terms of the values held by the actor. It follows, then, that the researcher should be able to predict the general pattern of behavior to be manifested by a community and its individual members to the extent that he can accurately assess the value structure of the community under study. If his prediction does not hold, if too great a margin of error is encountered, this would suggest that the researcher's assessment of the community's value structure was incomplete or incorrect; that the community and its individual members were not really committed to the values proclaimed; or that the individual members of the community were more firmly committed to the values proclaimed by other competing communities or groups of which these individuals also formed a part. Obviously, the latter two alternatives constitute problems of consensus for the community under study.

This is, in essence if not in explicit statement, the "value framework" approach to the study of social behavior so effectively employed by Myrdal and others in their analysis of the "dilemma" represented by the persistence of race prejudice and discrimination in America despite the emphasis placed upon democratic and even egalitarian values in the American ideology. In the present instance, the religious community

of the Roman Catholic Church is the object of study, and its values relating to war and participation in war is the aspect under which it is being viewed. These values are proclaimed by this church to be unchanging and of universal applicability. They are rooted in the Fifth Commandment and its general proscription against the taking of human life. This proscription is modified by the traditional theological teaching which provides for the "just war" as one of three exceptions to the Commandment's broad statement (capital punishment and "last resort" self-preservation being the other two).

The theological determination of the justice or injustice of Hitler's wars is beyond the scope of this paper. However, as a heuristic device, the *assumption* is advanced that, on the basis of the traditional Catholic theology of war, it could be established that these wars did not meet the requisite conditions for the "just war." Obviously, this is a point at which this study is most vulnerable. If it can be maintained that Hitler's wars were "just," the whole framework of the study is destroyed. But, it should be noted, this would not be the case if it were merely maintained that the German Catholics *believed* the war to be a "just" war. Even if this were true (and the war actually unjust), the question would still remain: how could it be that the religious community was unable to recognize the injustice? For what it is worth, extensive discussion with approximately a hundred German Catholic informants revealed that the injustice of Hitler's wars is taken today as an uncontested, if somewhat irrelevant, fact. It nevertheless follows that, if these wars were in fact "unjust" wars, this would impose a response of non-compliance and non-participation upon all who would wish to identify themselves with the Roman Catholic religious community.*

It should not be necessary to add that this heuristic assumption does not imply any conclusion whatsoever as to the justice or injustice of the Allied war effort or the licitness of Catholic participation in the military forces opposing Nazi Germany. Nor should the special focus upon Catholic behavior suggest that other Christian religious communities would be any less subject to the obligation to refuse to support an unjust war, or that they succeeded where the Catholic community failed. Neither of these interpretations would be true. Preliminary probing indicated that it would not be difficult to show that German Protestant support for Hitler's wars was no less widespread or enthusiastic than that which is to be described in the body of this report. The special focus finds its sole justification in the fact that the Catholic community does boast a fuller elaboration of the "just war-unjust war" definitions and distinctions and, therefore, would be more likely to recognize the injustice of a given war and instruct its faithful accordingly. And in this connection, still another limitation must be given explicit statement: this is a sociological inquiry, and any moral evaluations in terms of "sin," whether formal or material, are definitely not intended, nor could they be derived from the data employed in this study.

In its most general framework, this analysis proceeds from a theoretical orientation stressing values as the ultimate key to social behavior and employs the method of logical reconstruction to apply this theoretical orientation to the behavior of German Catholics with respect to World War II. The heuristic assumption employed here gains immediately critical significance in that the sociologist, proceeding from the religious community's value structure as outlined here, should be able to predict a general behavioral pattern of

Catholic refusal to serve in or otherwise support *any* war which does not meet the requisite conditions for the "just war."

When the prediction is put to the test of actual behavior, one immediately encounters the incontestable fact that with *only a few exceptions on record*, German Catholics drafted into the armed forces of the Nazi Third Reich complied with those orders. Furthermore, the evidence shows that they were loyal to that cause: Shils and Janowitz, in their discussion of factors involved in *Wehrmacht* desertions, state that "Ethical-religious scruples seem to have played an equally small role. Although there were a few interesting cases of Roman Catholic desertions, Roman Catholics (except Austrians, Czechs, and Polish nationals) do not seem to have deserted disproportionately."⁴ And German Catholics took pride in this loyal service. Parish churches throughout Germany offer evidence of this in the tragically long honor rolls commemorating members killed in service. Even more direct evidence in documentary form is provided by the many laudatory references to Catholic contributions to the war effort made by the German Catholic bishops in their wartime *Hirtenbriefe* and other official statements.⁵

This pattern of active participation clearly contradicts the expected or predicted pattern of non-compliance. This would suggest that (1) the heuristic assumption is false, and Hitler's wars were actually just wars; (2) the value-assessment is wrong, and Catholics are permitted to kill in an unjust war; (3) the Catholics were not aware of their injustice; or (4) the wars were in fact unjust, but German Catholics—despite their awareness or suspicion of their injustice—voluntarily or under duress gave priority to their identification with the political community at the expense of the values and behavior patterns associated

with their identification with the religious community. The first alternative has been dismissed in setting the framework for this analysis⁶; the second can be dismissed on the logical grounds that if killing in an unjust war is permissible, there is no reason to distinguish between just and unjust wars in the first place. It is the present author's conclusion that both (3) and (4) are required to explain the nearly unanimous support given the Nazi war effort by Germany's Catholic population. In a more explicitly theoretical statement, the divergence of observed behavior from the patterns predicted on the basis of the value system ascribed here to the religious community is to be explained in terms of one or a complex of the following:

- external social controls (e.g. the power of the totalitarian state and the sanctions at its command) forced the individual German Catholic to support a war effort he considered to be unjust;
- ignorance of the fact that Hitler's wars were not "just wars" (and we include here, of course, the failure even to consider the question of their justice or injustice) accounted for his failure to evidence the predicted patterns of non-compliance.
- internalized social controls (e.g. nationalistic ties and sentiments) led him to evidence patterns of conformity to the demands of the war effort despite his awareness of the war's injustice.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DISTINCTIONS

IT IS IMPERATIVE that a fundamental distinction be made at the very outset between *support for the National Socialist regime* and *support for that regime's wars*. That this is a crucial distinction (and one not always recognized) is most clearly illustrated by the extremes of indignation that greeted the first publication of these conclu-

sions. Even men whose own personal experiences should support the validity of these research findings refuse to take this vital distinction into account.⁷ Of course no one can deny, nor would one wish to deny, that the Catholic Church and its leaders in Germany did oppose the Nazi program. Cardinal Faulhaber's stirring Advent sermons defending the Old Testament in 1933; Bishop von Galen's heroic protests against euthanasia and other violations of justice in 1941; and published acts of opposition on the part of such men as Berlin's von Preysing and Freiburg's Gröber have earned the respect and admiration of the entire world. The Catholic press, too, though forced by circumstances (to be noted later) to avoid all involvement in the "political" realm, acted with courage and, occasionally, daring in its counter-offensives against the Rosenberg "new heathenism," and every attempt to vilify and slander the Catholic clergy and religious orders.

All of this must be recognized. But we must also recognize that this Catholic resistance to the specified aspects of the National Socialist program could *and did* exist side by side with active and even enthusiastic support for the wars inaugurated by that regime. The validity of this distinction is demonstrated by the writings of Bishop von Galen himself. In the course of one of the heroic protests mentioned above, he set the distinction in most explicit terms:

Of course, we Christians make no revolution! We will continue to do our duty in obedience to God, out of love for our German *Volk* and *Vaterland*. Our soldiers will fight and die for Germany, but not for those men who wound our hearts and bring shame upon the German name before God and man by their cruel acts against their brothers and sisters of the religious orders.⁸

Once the distinction is firmly in mind, the next problem concerns method-

ological shortcomings imposed by difficulties involving the availability and adequacy of data relating to the Catholic press and its wartime contents. This problem, it should be noted, is a general one and confronts all researchers who seek to document events or statements crucial to a full understanding of the Nazi era. The extensive bombings of German cities, combined with the "prudential" destruction of possibly incriminating or embarrassing material, eliminated much of the material upon which a factual reconstruction of the situation would depend. And many of the documents that are available are of questionable value in that they require highly subjective interpretation since their authors were often obliged to "write between the lines" or, at least, to express themselves ambiguously so that a later critical review would not subject them to *ex post facto* reprisal. Finally, much of the "evidence" that would have a direct bearing upon an analysis of the consensus achieved under the Third Reich does not exist, merely because actual or would-be opponents of that regime relied upon word-of-mouth communication and intentionally refrained from putting too much in writing or other potentially incriminating form.

This means that much, if not all, of the scholarly analysis of this totalitarian community depends upon partially documented and highly interpretative evidence. This presents special dangers to the researcher. The gulf between "recapture" and "recall" on the part of any informant, however well qualified, may be wide and deep—especially when it touches upon situations of deep personal involvement and intense emotional impact, separated from the event by more than two decades of turbulent history. By the same token, one encounters two contradictory warnings: one which says "no one who did not

experience life under the Nazis can understand or interpret the period," another which insists that "anyone who did live through these events is too intimately involved to achieve the necessary objectivity."

All of which has prompted some to suggest that it is "impossible" to do research of the kind attempted here. But faced with the choice between a study admittedly weakened by these limitations or relinquishing an era most significant to sociological inquiry, the present writer would insist that it is the task of the social researcher to choose the former course and do the best he can under the circumstances. Every effort must be made to reconstruct the social situation, as it would have appeared to the individual actor, by discovering and identifying the social controls present and operative in that situation. The sociological approach has a distinct advantage here. Unlike the historian whose goal is the reconstruction of events with all their parts in proper balance, the sociologist develops valid generalizations on the basis of a revealing sample, if such is available. Fortunately such a sample is available for the projected analysis of the German Catholic press and its support for Hitler's wars.

It is impossible and unnecessary to review in detail the history of the persecution and suppression suffered by the religious press in Nazi Germany. This has been done elsewhere,⁹ and need only be outlined here. Catholic daily newspapers were the first to go, their suppression being accomplished as early as 1935. Two general categories of religious periodicals remained, the *Amtsblätter* (official diocesan journals published for the clergy) and the various *Kirchenzeitungen* (diocesan papers, usually official¹⁰, published for general Catholic circulation). The former continued publication throughout the war, though

restrictions on paper and other effects of the war (undoubtedly exploited for the purpose by the Nazis) reduced their appearance to a somewhat erratic schedule. The *Kirchenzeitungen*, continually subjected to a program of progressively more stringent controls and interferences on the part of Nazi press authorities, diminished in number and size to the point where only a small remnant continued publication into the war period—and these were obliged to suspend their activities by 1941, or 1942 at the latest.

Obviously, only those papers still in existence could exert influence upon the Catholic community when war became an actuality. The research upon which this report is based involved a review of all available issues of a sampling of periodicals in the latter two categories. Among these were the *Amtsblätter* of the Munich, Freiburg, and Münster dioceses (and the official journal of the Catholic Military Bishop). More directly pertinent to the present study were the general circulation diocesan papers for Munich, for the entire Bavarian province, and the *Klerusblatt* published by a society of diocesan priests at Eichstätt. Since these must be recognized as the three most important Catholic periodicals published for the most heavily Catholic province of Germany, they constitute an extremely significant "sampling" for the purpose of this study. Even were this not the case, the data to be reported here would hold significance in their own right: assuming, as this study does assume, that Hitler's wars were not "just" wars, one theoretically would expect to find *no evidence* of support for those wars in any officially recognized Catholic paper. This would derive from the responsibility of the Catholic press to communicate the true values of the religious community to its individual members. The fact that repeated instances of such support were

encountered—and that no single instance of even covert opposition to the war was found—supports the validity of the conclusions stated at the end of the preceding section.

Before turning to the specific findings and interpretations, some mention must be made of the method of "logical reconstruction." It should be obvious that there is no way to measure the *actual impact* of any of the controls inducing conformity to the totalitarian authority. Even if an informant were to declare that he had supported the war as a direct result of reading the patriotic exhortations published in his diocesan paper, such "evidence" would have to be discounted to the extent that the imperfections of human memory, compounded by the intense emotional tension of the situation being recalled, might be presumed to distort the remembered event. It is, therefore, preferable to resort to logical reconstruction under which one structures the situation in terms of postulated value commitments and infers the behavioral consequences. Thus, assuming a German Catholic were in doubt as to the permissibility of service in Hitler's wars, one source to which he might be expected to turn for guidance would be his diocesan paper; in such event, it is clear that the "values" promoted therein would influence (i.e. "control") him to resolve his doubts in favor of full support for the war effort. Or even assuming that the individual were never troubled by such doubt, the fact that the religious press still available to him was filled with war-support appeals would serve as a control reinforcing his personal commitment.

The validity of this logical reconstruction depends, of course, upon whether the role it assigns to the religious press can be justified. Two official definitions of the role of the German Catholic press are at hand. One is a self-

definition published in 1935 which informed the reader:

Our Catholic religious newspapers are *official publications devoted to pastoral guidance as commissioned and authorized by the hierarchy*. The editors of these papers are selected by the bishops and take part in the instruction and guidance of the Christian people according to policies set forth by the bishops; in every respect they are responsible to the bishops who watch over them and support these papers . . .¹²

Even earlier, Archbishop Gröber had described the distinguishing marks of the Catholic press. For one thing, it could not enjoy the flexibility open to others because it was bound by the inescapable limits set by the moral principles to which it was dedicated. These same principles subjected it to constant opposition and attack because they might require a paper to promote what others rejected, or *vice versa*. Finally, it could never permit itself by means of words or pictures to arouse the emotions of the reader in order to impose upon his understanding or misdirect his will. In brief, "A press which wishes to be and to remain Catholic must submit to the limits and the controls set by Catholic faith and moral teachings."¹³

With unchanging moral principle as its basis, such a definition would hold even in the face of totalitarian oppression. Therefore, the wartime papers, however small a remnant they might constitute, would still be regarded as "official publications devoted to pastoral guidance" and, consequently, would serve as a control upon the individual seeking such guidance. And since they would still be regarded as having been "commissioned and authorized by the hierarchy," even the wartime remnant represented a respected channel of communication serving the religious community. Were we to assume the contrary and hold that these papers (a) did not

reach the Catholic faithful or (b) that their contents had no impact upon the moral decisions and behavior of the faithful, there would remain little or no justification for the series of "compromises" made by the German bishops, however reluctantly, to keep even the last pitiful remnants of the Catholic press alive.

FINDINGS & INTERPRETATIONS

EVEN BEFORE the war, the Catholic periodicals reviewed for this study placed ever-growing emphasis on the patriotism and loyalty of the German Catholic population, particular stress being given to the heroic contributions made to the nation's past wars.¹⁴ This was partly defensive reaction to the fanatically anti-Catholic campaigns mounted by official and semi-official Nazi organizations and spokesmen. Catholics were publicly accused of being poor patriots, and the Church itself was vilified as an "alien influence." By a tragic irony, the more effective the refutations of these charges, the more thoroughly they probably contributed to the total "consensus" demanded by the political community. Nor was the hyper-nationalistic tone of these refutations the only factor here. There was also a "negative contribution" in the self-imposed avoidance wherever possible of any controversy which might give even the faintest semblance of a legitimate basis for punitive action; for every time a paper was confiscated or suppressed, it would seem to support the Nazi canards of Catholic obstructionism and disloyalty.

Careful analysis of the pre-war issues of the papers reviewed does offer some evidence of attempts to evade the totalitarian controls. Reading "between the lines" one can find what may have been viewed by their authors as daring appeals to the reader to be alert and

vigilant in recognizing and resisting the Nazi assaults against Church and Faith. One such item is an inspirational account of an incident in the Spanish Civil War in which a young boy was killed by the Loyalists for praying before a statue of the Virgin after an elder brother had denied the Faith under duress¹⁵; it is possible to see this as an instructive example to the German youth who might one day face a similar demand from the Nazis. Even the repetitious summaries of heroic services rendered by Catholics in defense of historic German values¹⁶ might be read as subtle appeals to the reader to prepare for the day when the Nazi betrayers of those values would be overthrown.

The Catholic author and editor had to keep two audiences constantly in mind: the individual who might turn to the paper for spiritual strength and pastoral guidance in a time of crisis; and the omnipresent Nazi censor who was always seeking the slightest sign of resistance and who held the power to terminate publication summarily. The wartime existence of a Catholic periodical, then, represents a value judgment that it was preferable to continue publication (even though this required meeting the standards and tone demanded by the Nazis—in effect, becoming a captive auxiliary of the Goebbels propaganda ministry) rather than to cease publication. Obviously, this value judgment abandoned both the dedication to principle and the obligation to oppose that which must be opposed, which were defined by Gröber as the essential marks of a Catholic press. Even the hidden resistance suggested above does not reduce the cogency of this observation. For a message written "between the lines" to be subtle enough to escape the careful scrutiny of the eager censor, it would have had to be much too subtle to be caught by the ordinary reader—and this is especially

true for the ordinary reader who was himself trapped in a most difficult situation and would be psychologically disposed to welcome any assurance, however superficial, that it was permissible for him to conform to Nazi demands. Such a reader would be far more likely to see the Spanish incident as proof that the Franco regime (and, by extension, its Nazi benefactors) was truly on the side of God, and to interpret the battlefield sacrifices of the heroic German Franciscans as proof of the legitimacy of bearing arms for the *Vaterland* than he would be likely to seek out discomfiting messages hidden "between the lines."

With the outbreak of war following upon the Nazi assault against Poland in 1939, all restraint vanished. The rigid, Nazi-imposed detachment of the Catholic press from all questions of state and political affairs crumbled away as page after page was devoted to fervent appeals for "patriotism" and exhortations to "duty." The first wartime issue of the Bavarian *Kirchenzeitung* declared:

Our fathers and brothers are at the Front and we know that they are fulfilling their difficult duty to the ultimate in a spirit of comradeship and readiness for self-sacrifice. But their heroic sacrifice would be an accusation and a judgment upon us if we at home were not similarly willing to close ranks in a mutually supporting community of action . . .¹⁷

This set the tone for all that was to follow. As long as publication continued, the German Catholic who turned to his diocesan paper in search of instruction and guidance (or to quiet his misgivings) as to the justice or injustice of Hitler's aggressive wars, or the nature and extent of his personal obligation to support them, would find no equivocation or reticence in the answers appearing there. The Fatherland, he would learn, was involved in a titanic struggle

for its very existence, making it the moral duty (if not a holy privilege) of every Christian to serve wherever and however he could in a spirit of full dedication to and identification with the nation's cause. "Not all of us have been called to the Front to serve the Fatherland" is the Lenten message for 1940; some serve on the "Second Front" of war production; but there is a "Third Front," too, one of prayer and penance—"At this Front all can serve: men and women, old and young, the sick and the healthy. No one should be missing from this army if we are to have victory and the victory blessed by God . . ."¹⁸

It would be impossible to reproduce here the complete texts of such appeals or the hyper-nationalistic tone achieved by their authors, many if not most of whom were clergymen. A review of a few of the featured articles should suffice. "Heroic Reflections of Courage" recalled the sacrifices made by the nation's heroes of World War I and then added the new generation because "We know how great and strong the old German heroic spirit was made manifest in them."¹⁹ "We Play Our Part in the War" declared another title; the "part" was summarized as follows: it is a self-evident duty of the Christian to love his *Volk*; but this love must be one of act, not only one of emotion; the greater the need for help, the greater the obligation; but when does a *Volk* have a greater need for help than in time of war?²⁰ A "letter" to "our soldiers" bore the title "Of Great Confidence".²¹ Other titles are self-explanatory: "The Unity of Front and Homeland"²²; "Between No-Man's-Land and Home"²³; "War and the Younger Generation"²⁴; "The War Dead"²⁵; "A Saintly Soldier"²⁶; and, finally, "War, School for Sacrifice."²⁷

These featured articles were supplemented with "boxed" items usually consisting of "patriotic" quotations of re-

ligious content or authorship²⁸, although these frequently quoted excerpts from Hitler's speeches. The total impression left with the reader is one of an utterly nationalistic commitment to the war effort. If the assumption that the Hitler wars were not just wars is tenable, one must conclude that those responsible for the tone and content of the wartime Catholic press gave little heed to Archbishop Gröber's injunctions against emotional appeals that might impose upon the understanding or misdirect the will.

But this observation forces consideration of still another type of material found in the wartime issues of the German Catholic press. It is material of prime significance to the present study in that it consists of "news reports" of episcopal statements or direct quotations from such statements. One editor expressed it in these words:

In recent weeks the German bishops have again lifted their voices in words of guidance and comfort for the faithful in the *Heimat* and at the Front concerning the tasks and the sacrifices the present demands of us. One common theme runs through these pastoral writings: in times that demand of men the fullest dedication and ultimate surrender of self, the Catholic turns to the sources of spiritual strength and grace which surmount mere natural powers and perfect the heroism of fighting men . . .²⁹

The Fulda statements cited earlier are evidence of such content. Another example may be found in Bishop Kumpfmüller's (Augsburg) assurance that ". . . the Christian is always the best comrade; the Christian remains loyal to the flag to which he has sworn allegiance, come what may."³⁰ Bishop Bornebawer of Trier is quoted as calling upon the faithful to "put all of our inner and external powers at the service of the *Volk*, not only as Germans but also as Christians following the prin-

ples of our Faith; we must make every sacrifice that the situation demands of us."³¹ Appeals by Bishop Rackl³² (Eichstätt) and Cardinal Faulhaber³³ on behalf of the *Winterhilfe* collections stressed patriotic motives as much as charity. The importance of such quotations in establishing for the ordinary reader the "official" status of the wartime Catholic press and its nationalistic commitment to the war effort should be obvious.

There is no point in multiplying instances of open and direct support for the Nazi war effort. The nature, as well as the limitations, of the data and sources are such that a more "statistical" approach in terms of quantity measurements would add little to the study. To return to the earlier statement of the problem, a new and significant dimension has emerged to help explain the divergence of actual German Catholic behavior from the patterns of non-compliance predicted on the basis of our provisional application of the theological principles governing "just" and "unjust" war. The individual's ignorance of the war's injustice (as that injustice has been assumed for this study) must now be seen in terms of the fact that the Catholic in ignorance or doubt who turned to the Catholic periodicals still available to him, or to the published statements of prominent Church leaders, would have learned that it was not only permissible but *even obligatory* for him to participate in the nation's war effort. A wealth of historical analyses of the Third Reich period has revealed the wide range of social controls—including excesses of violence and terror hitherto unknown to civilized man—by which all institutions and individuals were subjected to the imposed consensus of the totalitarian political community. What the present study adds is a graphic demonstration of this by showing that a re-

ligious community which did heroically reject certain aspects of that consensus was, nevertheless, manoeuvered into a position of actually serving as a channel of the totalitarian state's control insofar as participation in its war effort was concerned.

Thus we begin with our problem of the individual Catholic called to service in an unjust war and try to discover the range of controls promoting conformity, the behavioral consensus demanded by the political community. The first and most obvious controls were those of the totalitarian state authority itself with its unlimited power to punish and reward. The less formal controls of general community opinion were also rallied in support of the war. And, of at least equal importance, the internal controls of nationalistic commitment operative in the individual himself would undoubtedly play a significant part in determining his course of action.

But the Catholic was also a member of a religious community who, if the war was not a just war, would be expected to reject the political community's demands. Faced with his failure to do this, the analyst might be tempted to accept the superficial explanation that the state's controls were *ipso facto* more effective than those of the religious community. Indeed, if a test had been made, it is quite likely that such would have been the case, that the influence of the ultimate sanction of the State (death) would have carried more weight than the ultimate sanction of the Church (excommunication). *But the test was not made.* Instead, the external controls of the political community (and its sanctions) were *augmented* by the official episcopal directives and other nationalistic exhortations published in the religious press. In much the same fashion, the individual's internal controls of patriotic sentiments and national bias

were reinforced by the inward assurance (encouraged by those contents of the religious press) that his service in Hitler's wars was actually the fulfillment of a personal moral obligation.

At another level, the same pattern of analysis would hold true for the individuals responsible for the publication of the Catholic periodicals. That the external state controls were a major factor has already been established in the cursory review of the Nazi program of restriction that finally culminated in the suppression of both the Catholic daily newspapers and the general circulation diocesan *Kirchenzeitungen*. The Nazi theorists recognized the Catholic press as a channel of communication serving a rival institution. As a totalitarian power requiring the complete monopoly of the citizen's loyalty, the Third Reich faced two alternatives of action: outright suppression and elimination of the Catholic press, or its exploitation to further the interests of the political community. Nazi Germany attempted both—with some degree of success.

More subtle pressures were employed in addition to direct government control and censorship of the press. As one editor I interviewed recalled his particular problem, he knew that any action on his part which would earn the displeasure of the Nazis would have jeopardized the livelihood and security of his many employees and their families—and this to accomplish what would be little more than a futile gesture doomed to certain defeat. Another editor told of the insidious Nazi practice of "matching" and comparing the content of different papers so that, if one diocesan weekly gave less prominence to a patriotic theme than that given it by another diocesan weekly, the former would immediately come under suspicion and find itself subjected to more

rigid surveillance and, quite possibly, punitive action.

But the operation of state controls, direct or indirect, does not appear to be the total explanation of the position taken by the Catholic press with respect to the Hitler war effort. The tone of hyper-nationalistic enthusiasm encountered throughout the periodicals reviewed for this paper does not impress the reader as a forced tone. Part of the explanation must be traced to the same internal controls mentioned above; editors and authors, too, were subject to the influence of nationalistic ties and sentiments. Thus, the failure to meet the Gröber description of unbending dedication to principle and of readiness to speak out, in season or out of season, against that which must be opposed arose in part from the fact that the justice of the German cause was never seriously questioned (or deemed relevant) by the editors and others responsible for the wartime Catholic press. At least that is a conclusion to be drawn from the "instruction and guidance of the Christian people" found in its pages.

In all of this one must remember, of course, that this "instruction and guidance" was to be "according to the policies set forth by the bishops." To understand the wartime position of the German Catholic press, one must remember that the German hierarchy—and this includes the most outspoken opponents of National Socialism—evidenced a similar position of support for the war effort. It would have been highly unusual for the editors of Bavarian church weeklies to ignore the combined Bavarian hierarchy and its appeal to the faithful "to devote your full efforts to the service of the Fatherland and the precious *Heimat* in conscientious fulfillment of duty and serious awareness of your mission."³⁴ A systematic examination of the hierarchy's

position relative to the war is not possible here; but the evidence presented does show that even these revered leaders were by no means free from the nationalistic fervor which colored and distorted the moral judgments of the Catholic faithful.

CONCLUSIONS

THE BASIC sociological question raised in this study is this: what social controls were operative in inducing German Catholics to conform to the demands of the Nazi war effort? The sociological answer is this: *in addition* to the full range of secular controls (external and internal), the individual was subject to spiritual controls (external and internal) supporting these patterns of conformity. As a sociological finding, this neither makes nor implies any "judgment" or evaluation in terms of "guilt," whether on the part of the individual, the hierarchy, or the religious press subject to the authority of the hierarchy.

It is quite proper, however, to point to certain inferences that might be drawn from this report. First, it should be clear that, faced with a test of strength with the modern political community, the religious community is at something of a disadvantage. This would suggest the need for a reexamination of institutional and personal control systems within the religious community so that it will be better able to assure consensus on the part of its communicants to its values—despite the penalties this might involve at the hands of an aroused political community. Stated another way, the religious community no longer evidences the integrity it once had when its members accepted martyrdom rather than cast the pinch of incense on the pagan altar-stone.

This is of extreme relevance here. Whether any significant portion of the

German Catholic population would have refused to support the Hitler war effort, even if the bishops and the Catholic press had counselled them to do so, must remain one of the imponderables of history. We must remember that the Catholic "man-in-the-street," like the editor of his diocesan paper and his bishop as well, was subject to the external controls of the totalitarian state and the internal controls of nationalistic ties and sentiments. Thus, he probably did not need the added encouragement of the moral impulsion furnished by his spiritual guides, however surely they must have reinforced and validated his contribution to the war effort. Be that as it may, however, if Hitler's wars were unjust wars, the leaders of the religious community would seem to have had an obligation to present the Catholic population with a choice, however difficult and discomfiting, between the unjust service demanded by the Nazi state and the inflexible moral obligation to uphold religious principles and commandments. That such a choice was not presented reveals a problem that goes to the heart of the question of the effectiveness, perhaps the nature of the very existence, of the religious community in relation to the modern secular state.

Before such a choice can be presented, however, the religious community must clearly define its values and free them from all distortion and confusion. One major source of distortion revealed here is what some writers have termed the "heresy" of Nationalism. In his impressive work of Catholic political scholarship, published before World War II, John Eppstein stated the issue in almost brutal terms:

... the national bias of many Catholic theologians and publicists both before, during and after the Great War, in dealing with this problem (which most of all demands clear thought

and the absence of special pleading) has been so transparent, their response to the pacific leadership of the Holy See so meagre and indeed contemptible that the student must now be on his guard against taking the words of any particular Catholic divine or author as representing the mind of the Church as a whole...³⁵

The behavior of German Catholics in support of Hitler's wars and the encouragement they received in that behavior from the Catholic press and the Catholic clergy and hierarchy may be taken as a documented case study supporting the Eppstein analysis. The same analysis, as was pointed out before, would be supported by a comparable study of German Protestant support of Hitler's wars. Indeed, it can be argued that the acquiescence on the part of American Catholics to the murderous bombings of German civilian centers and their support for the morally questionable war aim of "unconditional surrender" is evidence that their moral judgments, too, were colored and distorted by the force of Nationalism. At least, these may be taken as hypotheses for further research.

Nevertheless, German Catholic support for Hitler's wars does hold particular significance in that it presents the dramatic paradox of all-out support for what may have been history's most "unjust" war. If it is true that this pattern of behavior would probably have been duplicated by Catholics of any nation who had been placed in a comparable situation, this study should serve to introduce a new framework for consideration of Church-State relationships. If nothing else, it should stimulate an extensive, and perhaps long over-due, theological re-examination of the limits to which national identification and civil responsibilities should be, may be, or even can be merged with or incorporated into religious identification and moral responsibilities.

¹ For the purposes of this paper, the term "consensus" is employed in a purely *behavioral* sense—i.e. referring to agreement in observable behavior, regardless of whether such behavior is voluntary in nature or imposed upon the actor.

² In a more comprehensive monograph, "German Catholics and Hitler's Wars: A Study in Social Control" (to be published), the present author attempts a more extensive discussion of the theological problem in setting what is termed "the value-selection frame of reference" for his analysis of Catholic contributions to the Nazi war effort.

The most favorable theological evaluation encountered saw the war as one of "mixed" justice and injustice, or—to state the same thing another way, one in which injustice was present on both sides.

To the writer's knowledge (based on a selective review of postwar German theological writings and, more important, direct interrogation of prominent German Catholic theologians) no systematic inquiry into the justice or injustice of the German cause in World War II has been published. This omission is perhaps every bit as significant as it is unfortunate.

³ Franziskus Stratmann, O. P., *War and Christianity Today* (trans. John Doebele) (Westminster: Newman Press, 1956), pp. 83-4. "Should the State undertake an unjust war, the citizen has without any doubt the right and duty to refuse military service; this even if it be asserted that national welfare demands the war. In the first place, an unjust war can never serve the true welfare of a State. Secondly, even the true but material (temporal) prosperity of a State must be subordinated to the moral (eternal) welfare of its citizens. On this point there are no differences of opinion among Catholic moralists. It follows quite simply from the fact that sin may not be committed for the sake of any temporal good, be it ever so great."

This eminent German theologian continues to set forth in some detail the distinguishing marks of just and unjust wars. (pp. 84-87).

⁴ Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the *Wehrmacht* in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XII, pp. 280-315.

⁵ Limitation of space permits but a few examples to be given here. The 1942 Fulda declaration of the combined German hierarchy refers to ". . . the German soldiers who with so much heroism and patience have taken upon themselves the burden of extraordinary dangers and deprivations. Filled with gratitude,

we stand in spirit with those whose bravery and loyalty bear the seal of serious wounds." The letter continues, making specific mention of the priests and religious who had offered so much at the front and in the homeland in service to the sick and wounded. (text published in *Kirchlicher Anzeiger für die Erzdiözese Köln*, 1942 volume, p. 141; exact date not noted.)

The 1943 Fulda pastoral gave further recognition of Catholic contributions to the war effort. "In our thoughts, prayers, desires and sorrows we are, before all else, with our fighting men who are defending the Homeland in heroic battle . . ." (*Kirchliches Amtsblatt für die Diözese Münster*, vol. LXXVII, no. 18; p. 98.)

Even the much revered opponent of Hitler, Bishop (later Cardinal) von Galen marked the opening of the war in a letter to his clergy in which he declared, "Once again a large part of our men and youths has been called to arms, and they are engaged in bloody conflict or stand guard on the borders in firm determination to shield the Fatherland and to risk their lives to win a peace of freedom and justice for our *Volk*." (*Ibid.* Vol. LXXXIII, no. 23, pp. 99-100).

⁶ The official encouragement given by the Catholic hierarchies of the nations allied against Nazi Germany in support of those nations' war efforts is clearly relevant here. Logically there are only three possible alternatives: (a) either the Allied cause was just and the German bishops in error; or (b) the German cause was just, and the Allied bishops in error; or (c) both wars were unjust and both hierarchies in error. The principle of contradiction would make it impossible for both sides of the same war to be fighting the just war. Again, while the present paper rejects alternative (b), it makes no conclusions as to whether (a) or (c) obtained.

⁷ One such critic has written, "Dr. Zahn quotes Bishop Neuhausler as saying that he knew of no priests sent to Dachau for 'opposing the war'. For what other crime or crimes was anyone sent to Dachau?" The answer is extremely simple: for listening to foreign broadcasts; for praying publicly for the Jews; for denouncing the secularization of religious schools; for voicing any criticism of Hitler or any of his policies; for innumerable other "crimes" representing a refusal to accept the Third Reich's insistence upon total consensus. It is true that the diaries of Nazi leaders complain of the "treasonous" activities of the Catholic Church in Germany; but, in the

eyes of Hitler, Goebbels, *et al*, any opposition at all—and this would include von Galen's firm opposition to euthanasia—would be viewed as efforts to "undermine" the war effort. Ironically, if he accepts these complaints at their face value, he must also accept the totalitarian state's claim to total consensus in its time of emergency, for conclusions inevitably involve the premises on which they are based.

⁸ Max Bierbaum, *Nicht Lob, Nicht Furcht: Das Leben des Kardinals von Galen* (Münster: Verlag Regensberg, 1957), p. 330.

⁹ Of particular value, since it thoroughly documents the Munich developments, is Johannes Neuhausler, *Kreuz und Hakenkreuz*, (München, 1946). A more recent summary is the article by Karl Aloys Altmeyer in the May 1960 issue of *Herder-Korrespondenz* (v. XIV, n. 8, pp. 374-81). The Altmeyer article purports to be a refutation of these research findings; but all of its citations carry pre-war dates. He does promise a "second part" which will deal with the war situation; but that "second part" has not been published, at least not in the two subsequent issues of the *Korrespondenz* that have since appeared.

The history of the persecution of the press is only indirectly relevant to this study, which focuses upon the wartime controls operative upon the individual Catholic. The historian of the era would be obliged to balance the position of the papers published in wartime against the fact that many (most, perhaps) had already been suppressed. Not so the sociologist. For his purposes, only the papers *actually in publication* could be regarded as such a social control. Papers no longer in existence (and the positions they *might* have taken) can not be viewed as instruments of control inducing one pattern of behavior or another. Of course, the knowledge that other papers had been suppressed because of their opposition to the political regime (and the extent to which such knowledge was general is a debatable question) might have the effect of reducing the impact of the controls represented by the papers that were permitted to continue publication. However, this would undoubtedly be more than counterbalanced by (a) the fact that the latter were still designated as "official" Catholic publications and (b) the fact that the reader would be psychologically disposed to welcome their approval of his own inclinations to conform rather than risk the penalties non-conformity would involve.

¹⁰ One of the papers employed here, the *Klerusblatt* of Eichstätt, was published by an organization of diocesan priests with its cir-

culation presumably intended mainly for its members. However, an analysis of its contents suggests that a wider actual circulation may be taken for granted.

¹¹ Of course, a contemporary personal document (diary, letter, etc.) would have greater reliability; but even this would be inadequate for an effort to make an *actual* reconstruction of the situation under recall since the individual actor is usually not aware of all the controls influencing his behavior.

¹² *Bayrische Katholische Kirchenzeitung* (April 21, 1935), p. 125.

¹³ Conrad Gröber, "Von der Notwendigkeit der katholischen Presse", *Münchener Katholische Kirchenzeitung* (January 15, 1933), p. 24.

¹⁴ A fragmentary sampling of such items would be articles in the following issues of the *Bayrische Kirchenzeitung*: March 17, 1935; July 1, 1938; August 7, 1938; January 22, 1939; May 12, 1939. Mention should also be made of the enthusiastic note taken of the incorporation of Austria and Czechoslovakian territories into the Greater Reich; see especially the 1939 keynote issue of *Klerusblatt* and the April 10, 1938, issue of the *Bayrische Kirchenzeitung*.

The fiftieth anniversary of Hitler's birth was commemorated extensively in the general circulation diocesan papers reviewed here. This was probably obligatory in the sense that failure to meet Nazi expectations would have been interpreted as editorial disloyalty. Nevertheless, the Catholic reader must be forgiven if he took this as clear evidence that Hitler could not be so bad after all in view of the fact that he was honored and supported by the religious press which was presented to him as the official pastoral organ of the Catholic religious community.

¹⁵ *Bayrische Kirchenzeitung* (January 15, 1939), p. 23.

¹⁶ One example tells of the leadership provided by the Franciscans in battles against the Turks and in the 1809 struggle for Tyrolean independence. The immediate purpose behind the article, it may be assumed, was to refute the malicious charges being circulated by the Nazis concerning the Order. *Bayrische Katholische Kirchenzeitung* (1936 volume, pp. 238-39; exact date missing).

¹⁷ September 24, 1939, cover page.

¹⁸ *Münchener Katholische Kirchenzeitung* (February 14, 1940), pp. 25-26. An interesting sentence follows this, one that might again suggest a special message hidden between the lines for anyone who would want to look for it: "Indeed, not every victory brings blessings, rather only the victory which is blessed by

God."

¹⁹ *Ibid.* (February 18, 1940), pp. 37-38.

²⁰ *Ibid.* (January 14, 1940), pp. 7-8.

²¹ *Ibid.* (October 22, 1939), p. 558.

²² *Ibid.* (November 19, 1939), pp. 583-84.

²³ *Ibid.* (April 7, 1940), pp. 79-80.

²⁴ *Klerusblatt* (November 13, 1940), cover page.

²⁵ *Ibid.* (November 6, 1940), p. 42. A distinction is made between the "Gefallenen" (those who die in war) and the "Toten" (those who die from other causes). "This is why the German nation remembers its fallen warriors with reverence. When the drums roll and the arms are presented over their resting places, then the great flood of German determination and German awareness of common unity—released by their sacrifices—bursts forth. And every German says in his heart, they shall not have died in vain!"

²⁶ *Münchener Katholische Kirchenzeitung* (October 15, 1939), p. 552. This ends: "Saint and soldier at one and the same time—people might think this is a contradiction. The life of Reinhard Johannes Sorge proves otherwise."

²⁷ *Klerusblatt* (October 9, 1940), p. 9.

²⁸ A few examples, all taken from *Klerusblatt*, will suffice: (November 1, 1939), p. 557. Title: "The Power of the Nation." The Message: "Great is the age in which we live; only by giant standards can it be measured; but, fortunately, its gigantic struggles found a great race to match them."

(February 5, 1941), p. 43. This presents a quotation from the folk poet, Jean Paul: "He who is not willing to share deprivation and death with his *Volk* does not deserve to live with it."

(April 30, 1941), p. 142. One of many little "morale jingles" calling upon housewives to save bones, rags, and paper to be picked up from time to time by a school child. The parallel to tin can and fat collections to support the American war effort is obvious. Items such as these also serve to verify the assumption indicated earlier that this paper was really intended for general circulation among Catholics.

²⁹ *Münchener Katholische Kirchenzeitung* (October 8, 1939), p. 545.

³⁰ *Ibid.* (January 7, 1940), p. 3.

³¹ *Ibid.* (February 25, 1940), p. 45.

³² *Klerusblatt* (November 20, 1939), p. 58.

³³ *Münchener Katholische Kirchenzeitung* (October 29, 1939), p. 568.

³⁴ *Amtsblatt für die Erzdiözese München und Freising* (February 25, 1941), pp. 29-30.

³⁵ John Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations* (London, 1935), p. 129.

HELICON'S GREAT FALL LIST

A POWERFUL NOVEL

MOUNTAIN WITHOUT STARS

by Maurice Zermatten

The story of the elemental darkness which lies dangerously close to the surface in the most Christian of communities. No one of the characters is entirely guilty, but each of them in some way or another has compromised his Christianity, allowing the devil that single foothold from which he reduces them to tragedy and despair. It has an impact that cannot soon be forgotten. It moves with the inexorable pace of Greek tragedy, but its point of view is genuinely and profoundly Christian. \$3.95

A DISTURBING QUESTION DISCUSSED

MORALITY AND MODERN WARFARE

edited by William J. Nagle

At long last, an intelligent and unequivocal statement by leading American Catholics on the morality of nuclear warfare: Thomas E. Murray, Gordon C. Zahn, John C. Ford, S.J., Col. John K. Moriarity, John Courtney Murray, S.J., etc. \$3.95

A FRESH LOOK AT THE NATURE OF FAITH

THE ASSENT OF FAITH

by Henry Bars

introduced by Msgr. H. Francis Davis

A fresh discussion of the nature of faith viewed in its concrete human setting. The intelligent convert will find the work extremely valuable, and the many friends of John Henry Newman will be quick to recognize a kindred spirit. \$4.00

THE EARLY DAYS OF THE PAPACY

ST. PETER AND THE POETS

by Rev. Michael Winter

A brilliant history of the first days of the Papacy, supported by excellent research and integrated into a modern approach to apologetics. The increase in the dialogue among the churches will evoke a heightened concern with what really did happen in the first centuries. \$4.50

A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO GOD

GOD OF THE SCIENTISTS

by Remy Chauvin

Remy Chauvin, already a highly respected scientist and writer of scientific treatises, now devotes his careful and scholarly attention to an honest consideration of the conclusions which can be drawn concerning the existence of a Supreme Being from observable data. \$3.95

Write for our FREE lively newspaper
and our catalogue of Children's Books

A CLASSIC WORK OF DEPTH

TRANSFORMATION IN CHRIST

by Dietrich von Hildebrand

The classic work on spirituality of this century is once again available in English. Von Hildebrand discusses the fundamental attitude of the Christian, the desire to grow in Christ, and then devotes a chapter to each of the spiritual attitudes necessary for this growth. \$4.50

A NEW LOOK AT THE LITURGY

BRINGING THE MASS TO THE PEOPLE

by H. A. Reinhold

introduced by Frederick R. McManus

A new look at the liturgy of the Mass by the recognized leader of the liturgical revival. "I can think of no one better qualified than Father Reinhold to write a book such as this. He has a thorough knowledge of liturgical theology and history, is personally acquainted with many of the scholars and pastoral leaders in his field, and has years of experience as a parish priest to serve as balance wheel for the conclusions he arrives at."—Godfrey Dieckmann, O.S.B., Editor of *Worship*. \$2.95

FROM THE BEST OF CATHOLIC THINKERS

CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURE

edited by J. Stanley Murphy, C.S.B.

Authoritative essays on many aspects of Christian culture by some of the most respected Catholic thinkers of the day: Dawson, Sigrid Undset, Mestrovic, Barbara Ward, Gilson, Malik, Maritain, Spaight, Cogley, Donald Macdonald. \$3.50

THE BIBLE FOR ALL

MEET THE BIBLE

by John J. Castelot, S.S.

A noted scholar with long experience in writing on Biblical themes for the average reader now makes available for the general public the best of modern research on the Word of God. \$2.95

HELICON PRESS
BALTIMORE 27, MD.
In Canada:
PALM PUBLISHERS

CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY

J. M. CAMERON

IN OUR DAY the Church is present, as it were, only on the margin of politics. Even in those countries, such as Ireland and Spain, where the Church is in one sense an obvious power in politics, the action of the Church is still marginal; for the substance of politics, however it may be constituted and whatever analysis of it we may offer, is what it is by reason of those secular forces which determine the character of politics in other states where the Church institutionally is of little or no account; and the fundamental decisions of the political authorities are always in the last resort swayed by secular considerations of precisely the same kind as those operative in non-Catholic societies. There is, outside the Soviet Union, the popular democracies, and China, a common social pattern, diversified in appearance and in its degree of maturity and in the political superstructure it bears, but still a common pattern: that of the capitalism of the mid-twentieth century. It is a capitalism distinguished by vast technical achievements, a steady flow of consumers' goods in the more advanced countries and the promise of similar bounty in the backward countries if only—no doubt this is a very large if—the problems of investment and population increase can be solved. It seems obvious to many that the masses in at least the United States, Great Britain, Western Germany, Scandinavia and similar

countries, have 'never had it so good.' That it is nevertheless a sad society is reflected in its characteristic art. That it is an immoral society is made plain, not so much by the sexual license, the passion for gambling, the violence so characteristic of its great cities, all the things that attract the ready censure of the moralist in and out of the pulpit, but rather by the way it spends its vast resources. Schools, hospitals, decent houses, handsome towns, the care of the old, the feeding of the hungry in the backward countries, these are obvious priorities in so rich a society; but they are commonly secondary to quite other concerns: advertising, palaces for oil companies, banks and pornographic newspapers; and—above all—defence, and a defence that is no defence but a threat to annihilate others a few minutes before we are ourselves annihilated.

This is a highly schematic and in detail unjust account of mid-century capitalism. But, despite all that is richly human within these societies, all that toughly struggles with the trivialities of the admass society, all that responds with generosity to the claims of the weak and the oppressed, it is no farther from the truth than is a telling caricature from its original. We live in a corrupt society, quite possibly in a doomed society, and one doomed, not by the political conflicts within it, but by its incapacity to free itself from the demons released when the first atomic bombs were dropped upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It would be unfair, but not so unfair as all that, to say that Catholics have very little to offer in face of this situation. Much moralizing goes on, it is true,

J. M. Cameron is professor of philosophy at the University of Leeds, England. His article appeared first in the invaluable Dominican-edited monthly BLACKFRIARS (34 Bloomsbury St., London, W.C. 1, England, \$4.50 a year), June 1960.

rather in the style of moral rearmament. It is alarming to find a certain rapprochement between some prominent Catholics and this dubious movement.) There is much mulling over an ill-defined body of doctrine sometimes known as 'the social teaching of the Church,' a mulling over which has no political consequences whatever, for the doctrines considered remain at a high level of generality, so that often quite opposite lines of policy seem equally compatible with them (contrast, for example, the savagely competitive societies of the United States and Western Germany with the apparent paternalism of Spain and Portugal, both of them equally approved by some Catholic publicists), and a good deal of what is said on such topics as private property and nationalization is calculated to comfort those who are satisfied with things as they are. In Britain and the United States there are tiny groups—the group round Dorothy Day, for example—more or less at odds with things as they are; in France such groups are much bigger and much more important—and for this reason France is, of all the western countries, the one where the critically minded Catholic (cleric or layman) feels less stifled than elsewhere. But the general picture is one in which Catholics, both the masses and the élites, are, except in certain specific fields such as those of education and sexual morality, contented with mid-century capitalism and prepared to defend it as a way of life against what is held to be the relentless and unceasing threat of world Communism to subvert it.

The comparative absence of the Church from the life of politics is not something peculiarly characteristic of the twentieth century. The rise of industrialism overtook a largely somnolent Christendom odiously content with the division of powers and of spheres of influence between throne

and altar. The middle-class revolution and modern capitalism overcame a world wrapped in dreams of a social order, hierarchical and sanctified by the decencies of religious observance, the substance of which had dwindled to nothing. The terrible fractures of the shell of this order, from 1789 onwards, were put down to the machinations of a handful of agitators and *illuminati*. The true state of affairs was very different and corresponded with fair accuracy to that described by Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto*. The middle-class revolution and the growth of industrialism were two aspects of a single process which had shattered the old social order beyond all possibility of reconstruction. The social ties of pre-capitalist society, between man and man, class and class, had been replaced by the cash nexus. Society seemed to be driving towards the point where it would be polarized between the owners of the means of production and a vast proletariat. The conflict between classes was not a fiction invented by Marx and Engels and put about by agitators: it was the plainest of facts in the England of Chartism or the Europe of 1848. And the response of the proletariat to the pressures of capitalism, the creation of the labour movement—trade unions, co-operative societies, political parties—is one of the great human achievements, an achievement rich in moral significance, for it represented much more than a merely defensive movement concerned with economic interests. It was in part a reconstitution of the human community fragmented by the rise of capitalism; and it created an entire world within which the politically conscious working man enjoyed a community of moral values and a community of aspiration. It is the immense *seriousness* of the world of the labor movement, its richness and humanity, that middle-class commentators, the

Catholics among them even more than the others, have failed to grasp; and because they have failed to grasp this seriousness, they have failed equally to measure the tragedy of the corruption and decline of this movement in our own day.

Of course, in ultimate terms, for the believer, for the Church, which lives by the divine promises, the failure of the Church to be visibly present in the midst of great developments of the human spirit is not tragic. We live by faith, not by sight. The implication of the Church with the world is at all periods a trial of faith. One thinks of the degradation of the Papacy in the darkness of the tenth century, of Renaissance Rome, of the blood and agony of the seventeenth century the wounds of which are as yet scarcely crusted over. And yet it is important to put aside the temptation to quietism, a relapse into a peace which is quite other than the peace of Christ. "All will be well," no doubt. To believe otherwise would be to lose one's faith. But there is a kind of peace of mind which is bought too cheaply, which represents not the victory of faith but a retreat into blindness and complacency. If in our own day there are those who (for example) treat, when faced with the problem of nuclear warfare in relation to questions of "defense," the entire Catholic moral tradition as of no account, as irrelevant to the conflict between Russia and the West—for is this not a conflict between Christianity and atheism, between the cause of God and the cause of the Devil?—this is a peace of mind bought too cheaply. Strangers and pilgrims we may be; but unless we are to relapse into a neo-Augustinian politics of a Lutheran type—and this would be to neglect the medieval and the modern political experience—we have to face the contemporary world of politics as that world within which Providence has

placed us for purposes that we can, at least in part, hope to understand.

If the Church (in the sense of the actual historical community of the faithful) is, and has been throughout the era of the middle-class revolution, present only on the margin of politics, this is not a state of affairs to be altered by a simple decision. For one thing, this does not altogether depend upon Catholics, nor has it ever done so. We rightly feel as shameful those deficiencies in us which are in part responsible for this state of affairs. But the world necessarily resists the mind of the Church, and this is, and will be, just as true of a "Catholic" régime as of any other. The Emperor Frederick II, Philip the Fair, Henry VIII, were products of a culture permeated by Catholicism, as are the Italian Communists of today. What has first to be done is something simpler and more humble: to understand how the present situation has come about; to understand our own society; to free ourselves from the major deformations that have overcome much Catholic social thinking; and patiently to explain to others how we see the tasks of Catholics today. The present writer would not wish to suggest that there is in the political field *one* saving truth which all Catholics of good will may be brought to accept; rather, that there is a multitude of obstacles to our thinking intelligently and responsibly about political matters. These have to be removed before we can even begin to do the job.

WE ARE IMPRISONED within a number of political myths, forms of "false consciousness," to use the Marxian-Hegelian terminology, that are demonstrably false but are nevertheless deeply rooted and hard to shift. This is almost a part of the definition of "myth" in politics: a demonstrably false picture which is all the same cherished with affection and tenacity from motives

which the cherishers are unwilling to recognize. This is clear enough if we take one of the great fundamental myths of our age, one with a wider influence than we commonly allow, and one which (scandalously) is not without influence upon sections of Catholic opinion: the myth of the Jewish world conspiracy. This myth is farcically absurd; its absurdity is demonstrable; but it is alive and vigorous in the minds of many otherwise rational people. Other myths which enchant Catholics—though not Catholics only—are of a more complex order; and they are entertained with varying degrees of seriousness. I want to examine a particular instance; and then to examine the more generalized form of which this is a particular instance.

The Spanish Civil War was for European and American Catholics, as for liberals and socialists, a traumatic experience; and in both cases the war itself was transformed by mythical thinking into something that it never even remotely resembled. Here I am concerned only with the mythical thinking of Catholics. The Catholic account, set out in the Catholic press at the time, still present in the minds of the general run of Catholic publicists, is roughly as follows. The Spanish Civil War was a revolutionary attempt on the part of the Communist International to set up a Soviet State in Spain. The revolution was marked from the beginning by atrocities which revealed by their nature—the burning of churches, the murder of priests and religious, the prohibition of Catholic public worship—that a fundamental feature of Communist strategy was the destruction of the Christian religion. The attempt to set up a Soviet state was thwarted by a popular defense of the Church by Spanish Catholics under the leadership of General Franco, with the aid (it is grudgingly admitted) of Italian and

German troops and war material, aid which was only solicited after the vast scale of Soviet intervention had become known.

Such is the popular Catholic account. It is false, and known to be false by many of those who nevertheless propagate the account.

The Spanish Communist party was of little importance at the beginning of the war. The major parties—and they were certainly in favor of using the war as a means of social revolution—in the Republican coalition in its first stages were the Socialists and the Anarchists, with their associated trade union organizations, and, in Catalonia, the P.O.U.M., a semi-Trotskyist workers' party. It was these parties, and these parties alone, that were responsible for the anti-clerical atrocities that marked the first stages of the war. (It is worth noting that the burning of churches and the murder of priests are not *new* phenomena in Spanish history.) The rise of the Communist party to a position, first of influence, and in the later, hopeless stages of the war, of nearly supreme power, was a consequence and a condition of the reception of military aid (material, pilots, specialists and—above all—G.P.U. men) from the Soviet Union. The Spanish Communist party, and the synthetic sister party set up in Catalonia, had no roots in the Spanish working class and was above all a party of the white-collar workers and even of sections of the bourgeoisie (e.g. the orange-growers of Valencia.) Its close allies in the Republican coalition were the Basque Catholics. (These latter, many of whose leaders, priests and laymen, are still in prison or in exile, are an awkwardness for the myth-mongers, more especially as the Basque country was one of the few areas of Spain where there was evident Catholic devotion before the Civil War, where, for example, mature males of the work-

ing class or the peasantry were to be seen at Mass on Sunday.) The Communists were throughout the war a counter-revolutionary force, strangling, when and in so far as they had enough power, the incipient social revolution, partly by their influence within the Republican coalition, an influence which sprang entirely from the carefully apportioned Soviet aid (aid which, incidentally, was paid for out of the gold reserves of the Bank of Spain), partly by the use of police terror under the leadership of the G.P.U. agents that entered Spain along with the tanks and the aeroplanes. (It is a macabre and appalling postscript to the war that most of the Soviet military specialists were liquidated in the later stages of the Great Purge on their return to the Soviet Union.) The scale of Soviet aid, always far less than that of the Italians and the Germans, was never considerable enough to give the Republicans a decisive advantage; it was enough to keep the war going until Stalin decided that Spain was expendable in the interests of his grand strategy. By the end of the war, if not before, an alliance with the Germans was becoming a genuine possibility. These are the principal facts denied by the standard Catholic myth. Naturally, the myth is used in various ways and in various forms. For example, the extent of Communist terrorism against the other parties of the Republican coalition is sometimes brought out in order to magnify the role of the Communists. But in general there is no serious attempt to see the facts of the Spanish situation in all their complexity. Everything is simplified and distorted in the interests of a prefabricated picture of base Communists engaged in an anti-religious war against single-minded defenders of the Faith. It is true, the counter-myth of constitutionally minded liberals and social democrats attacked without pro-

vocation by a Fascist counter-revolution is almost as distant from the facts, though it has greater surface plausibility.

I have already said that the myth of the Spanish Civil War is a particular instance of a more general myth. This myth I will now try to describe. It is the myth of the world conflict between the Church and Communism understood as being roughly coterminous with the conflict between the western Powers and the Powers of the Soviet bloc. Of course, that these two conflicts exist, and that there are connections of a kind between them, no one would wish to deny; nor would I wish to deny that it is the steady policy of all the Communist states at best to hamper and at worst to destroy the influence of the Catholic Church and, though with less consistency, of other Christian bodies. The facts of a savage persecution in, say, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and China are plain enough. It is also plain that the Communists, in so far as we assume that what is put out for public consumption represents what they think, are also imprisoned within a myth which is the exact reverse of the Catholic myth: the view that the Pope, the Chinese bishops, indeed, all devout and active Catholics, are agents of "western Imperialism" and spies for Britain and the United States.

An anecdote (a true story) well illustrates the dangers of the Catholic myth. During the war a Swiss priest was asked what he would do if there should be either a Soviet conquest of Switzerland or a Nazi conquest. He replied: "If the Communists were to come, I would stay with my people, for I know I should be faced with an anti-Christian power. If the Nazis were to come, I would try to escape abroad; *for I fear I should deceive myself.*" That we should deceive ourselves: this is what we risk as we dwell within the myth.

The western world has already passed judgment upon itself. The publication of the judgment is to be found in the explicit values of the affluent society and in the accepted concept of defense (the preparation of total war with nuclear weapons.) Provided we do not quarrel seriously with this judgment, we are not only tolerated within western society; we are even given a place of honor, as front-rank fighters in the struggle against Communism, as indispensable providers of moral backing for the policies of N.A.T.O. Of course, the Church as such is not sucked into the myth. The utterances of Popes, of individual moral theologians and of particular national hierarchies, the witness of lay groups throughout the Catholic world, all these show an independence of the myth and are signs that the divine origin and mission of the Church are never permitted to be completely hidden. But if we take the Catholic masses, in so far as they are deployed politically through the Christian Democratic parties and the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States and receive their political formation through much of the Catholic press—notably that of the United States—then the situation is very different; for here the enchantment of the myth is virtually complete.¹

THE BAD CONSEQUENCES of imprisonment within the myth are many. The following may be singled out. First, there is a turning away from serious political analysis to a form of thinking which is paranoid and thus quasi-automatic. Secondly, there is a total lack of interest in the *truth* of political statements;² what are thought to matter are the supposed interests and intentions of those who make the statements (in this as in other matters there is a striking parallel with the vulgar Marxism of the Communists.) Thirdly, there is a gross

confusion, which is a betrayal by Catholics of their apostolic responsibility, between the Church and those political orders that are taken to be the institutional defenses of the Church in the present situation.

The turning away from serious political analysis may be illustrated by the phenomenon of McCarthyism in the United States and by the reluctance to engage in a serious examination of Communism, especially since the death of Stalin. It would be idle to deny that the Catholic masses in the United States were largely convinced of the truth of McCarthy's picture of American and world politics; indeed, this picture is still widely entertained by those influenced by such powerful organs of Catholic opinion as the *Brooklyn Tablet*. That this picture is a form of mythical thinking need not be demonstrated in detail. McCarthy himself was always clear that the touch of fact would have disintegrated the picture; and although his allegations—that he had in his hand the names of so and so many card-carrying Communists in the employ of the State Department, and so on—were always given a factual *form*, the factual backing was never produced; in a sense—and this is the mark of mythical thinking—the question as to whether or not there *was* factual backing for these statements was profoundly uninteresting. In the same way, anti-semites have no interest in the factual truth of allegations of ritual murder or in the provenance of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. These matters have the same role in political discourse as magical explanations of natural processes in the natural sciences.

The failure to engage in a serious examination of Communism is more important, for it is characteristic of many intelligent Catholics who were never absorbed by the delusions of McCarthyism. Fundamentally, it springs from the

desire that there should be, as it were, a counter-Church; and from this desire there springs the belief that Communism is this counter-Church. Further, just as in this form of thinking Communism is disengaged from the historical actualities in which it is embodied, so, too, with the Church; the Church implicated in the world, with all the ambiguities and imperfections this involves, is refined into the shining and integrated enemy of a clinically pure Communism.

Communism is as much an historical phenomenon as Jacobinism. In both cases there is a revolutionary doctrine, extremely complex in its origins, which is caught up into a great political enterprise and becomes identified with a system of States. In both cases, the original dynamism of the doctrine is modified by the necessary political concerns of those who both hold the doctrine and occupy positions of power, positions which make their own demands, demands that cannot always be reconciled with what were originally taken to be the implications of the doctrine. In both cases, it is hard to say at what point the doctrine changes from a genuine belief to a manipulated ideology, useful as a means of bringing about political consequences desired for reasons quite unconnected with the doctrine, and from an ideology to a form of ritual speech no longer taken seriously by those who use it. It is easy enough to see that in the case of Jacobinism the change from revolutionary doctrine to manipulated ideology is as early as Thermidor, if not earlier. It is not much more difficult to see that the Bolshevism of as early as 1921 is already beginning to change its form under the pressure of the exigencies of the situation of the young Soviet State.

It is reasonable to believe that with the death of Stalin Communism began to pass through yet another mutation. The entire period of Stalinism was in

violent contrast with the critical and iconoclastic tradition of Bolshevism; and it was too profound and irreversible a social experience for it to be possible, even had such typical products of the Stalinist machine as Malenkov and Khrushchev desired it, to return to the earlier doctrine of Bolshevism. What is dead as doctrine may survive as ideology and as ritual speech.³ But the empirical and pragmatic character of latter-day Bolshevism is revealed in a hundred ways: the compromise between the old Stalinists of the apparatus, the pitiful remnants of the opposition and the new middle class of technocrats, scientists and administrators (in itself a considerable political achievement represented by the ending of the terror and the breaking of the independent power of the political police) has already produced consequences both within the Soviet bloc and in the relations between this bloc and other states the depth and importance of which it is easy to underestimate. In any case, no political analysis which sees Mr. Khrushchev and his lieutenants as the general staff of the world revolution has much relation to the complexities of the Communist world.

Many Catholic commentators are reluctant to admit this. It is as though the picture of a bloc of states every feature of whose policy must be interpreted in relation to the strategy of world revolution *must* remain a fixed point upon which to orientate oneself. Otherwise one would be lost, one would not know where to go or what to say. Politics as a spectacle would then be infinitely complicated, infinitely baffling, a vast maze in which one cannot hope to chance upon the guiding thread; in which all judgments are judgments of, at best, probabilities, in which cautious decisions have to be taken in the twilight of opinion, not the glare of knowledge; above all, it would follow from

the very uncertainties of politics that the fixed point for the Catholic would be his own moral tradition, not the delusion of the great Communist world conspiracy which provides a justification for the abandonment of this tradition; for in the apocalyptic struggle against the Communist antichrist everything (so it is supposed)—lies, hatred, slander, mass murder—is allowed. It is easier to accept a world in which the Devil is external to ourselves, is embodied in an institution, than to face the presence of evil within ourselves; and so the fixed point has to remain.

If we really are, as I have argued, faced with a form of social consciousness that is in its fundamental features delusory, then it would be wrong to suppose that it will be overcome by intellectual criticism. Paranoia is not cured by argument. Nor is there on the social level any therapy corresponding to that from which something may be expected at the level of the individual. Social delusions are destroyed by forces that one cannot anticipate and by the relentless pressure of facts, a pressure that is in the end effective. Think, for example, of the horrid prevalence of the belief in witchcraft from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries; or of the short nightmare during which the delusions of National Socialism overcame the German nation. In terms, then, of political argument we cannot hope to achieve more than small and isolated successes, and that with individuals whose thinking is delusory in only the most superficial sense.

THE REALLY HOPEFUL feature of our situation lies not so much in the growing signs here and there of political sanity among Catholics (here again, in relation to such a question as the war in Algeria, the French offer us a splendid example), signs of an increasing disposition patiently to examine

the political experience of our century and to draw the necessary conclusions, though many examples could be cited, as in that profound renewal of the Church which is becoming manifest in our day. The plainest sign of this renewal is the gradual restoration of the Liturgy to the people. A change in modes of worship, and one moreover which is the fruit of the labors of scholars and antiquaries, how can this (some may ask) be a sign of a profound renewal of the life of the Church? How can a change in modes of worship affect the social role of the Church and touch the life of politics? What relation could there be between the Offertory procession and the young men and women pouring along the road to Aldermaston, between the Gélineau psalms and the world of "pop" singers? No doubt such questions almost ask themselves.

If we are inclined to suppose that a change in the modes of worship cannot have serious consequences for real life, this is because we have lost our hold upon the meaning of worship, that we no longer—outside the pages of the textbooks—see this as the central activity of the people of God from which everything else may be hoped for. The central activity of those who were brought into the Church by the first preaching of the Apostles was "the breaking of the bread, and the prayers."⁴ It was from this centre, and through what this centre was, that the task of preaching the good news to every creature was in obedience undertaken. The entire effort of the Church, which has seen the rise and fall of civilizations and has shown itself in every century capable of leavening the dough of unregenerate human nature, springs from and returns to "the breaking of the bread, and the prayers." It is true, the Eucharistic Sacrifice has an absolute value which is independent of the degree of fervor and understanding in those who offer it; but to contribute

less fervor and understanding than can at a given time be had is (if the expression may be permitted) a degradation of the Liturgy, and is accompanied by a false separation between preaching and teaching and the Liturgy. When the priest says *Orate, fratres* with no thought that his brethren should heed or understand, when the Mass of the catechumens is recited at the altar while a sermon is preached to the congregation, when the Canon is ended and the people of God present at the sacrifice do not even know that it is their privilege to ratify it with the *Amen*, then the function of the Liturgy is obscured; and it is possible for an entire generation of Catholics to fail altogether to realize the nature of the sacrifice—*meum sacrificium ac vestrum*, the Church teaches us through the mouth of the priest—at which they are present throughout their lives.

The restoration of the Liturgy to the people is, then, not only a means of enabling both laity and clergy to participate intelligently—that is, as mature men, not as children—in public worship; it is also renewal of the teaching mission of the Church and a renewal which presents us with a *norm*, the sacred tradition embodied in the Liturgy, which brings with it a sense of proportion in devotion and a realization of the relatively peripheral character of ephemeral fashions in devotion. The Liturgy thus becomes, what in theory it has always been, the means by which we make our own the substance of the Faith. In this process of making our own the substance of the Faith many old things that appear to be new come to light. There is, for example, a fresh realization that we are the new Israel, "a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a consecrated nation"⁵; and with this realization a new awareness of the orthodox doctrine of the priesthood of the laity.

Here is, perhaps, one of the chief fruits, so far as one can anticipate the later developments of a movement that is still in its earliest stages, of the Liturgical Movement: the growth in maturity of the laity in the body of the Church. In the modern period the laity has come to political maturity; but within the Church laymen have tended to remain childish. The anti-clericalism (and the clericalism) endemic in Catholic countries springs from this contradiction between political maturity and religious immaturity. With the Liturgical Movement and all that may come from it we are presented with the possibility of overcoming the contradiction and with it the tension and the sterility which have so often characterized the politics of Catholic societies. The appearance of a maturity which is that of the complete man, a social and political animal who takes his membership of the supernatural society seriously and intelligently, is a solvent of mythical thinking. It is not accidental that the centres of resistance to liturgical reform and to that whole renewal of the life of the Church that goes with it are precisely those groups most deeply enslaved by the political myths of our time; nor is it accidental that the punishment for religious immaturity in Catholic societies should be the popularity of mass Communist parties, themselves strongholds of another kind of mythical thinking. The opposed myths are, as it were, parasitic one upon the other.

This renewal of the life of the Church through the Liturgy and the Bible is still in the main something to be prayed for, hoped for, worked for. That it is a matter of extreme urgency (not that we should be consumed with anxiety), as urgent for the missionary work of the Church as for the salvaging of the Catholic masses in the old centres of Catholicism, scarcely needs to be argued.

I am tempted to think that the greatest possibilities are to be found in the United States. In such societies as those of England and France the egalitarian present is profoundly modified by the hierarchical past. American society has never known, in quite the European way, the pressures of the social and ecclesiastical hierarchies, and this gives its atmosphere a charm and an intoxication—if, as well, a certain crudity—that one cannot find in Europe. There is, of course, an enormous flaw in American egalitarianism: the failure completely to integrate the Negro community within the common society. But one guesses that the thousands of Negroes who come in a great torrent from Mississippi and Alabama and the rest of the Deep South to the industries and towns north of the Mason-Dixon Line are in part moved by the hope that the United States may be for them what it has been for the immigrants from Europe. And in relation to *this* problem American Catholics have a good record, bet-

ter, perhaps, than that of the other religious bodies. It would be ironical, and splendid, if the most potent of the Catholic myths were to receive a mortal wound in the land of the late Senator McCarthy.

¹ Not all sections of the Christian Democratic parties are imprisoned within the myth. The French M.R.P. and the left wing of the Italian Christian Democrats are notably independent in their thinking.

² A striking instance of this disregard of truth is to be found in a broadcast talk recently delivered over the Nairobi (Kenya) Radio by the Reverend E. Colleton, C.S.S.P. "At the very beginning of the Russian Revolution a decree was passed declaring that all women between the ages of seventeen and thirty-two were the property of the State." Thus Father Colleton. It is many years since we came across this fabrication. The talk is reprinted in *Christian Order*, Vol. I, No. 1, Jan. 1960, edited by Paul Crane, S.J.

³ I have discussed this question in two Third Programme broadcasts, "Problems of Communist Language," reprinted in *The Listener*, 3 and 10 September, 1953.

⁴ Acts ii, 42.

⁵ 1 Peter ii, 9.

The Cross and the Fasces

Christian Democracy and Fascism in Italy

Richard A. Webster

The Italian Christian Democratic Party has emerged as one of the most important and enduring governing parties of postwar Europe, and a mainstay of the Western alliance. This is the first full-length study in English of the background and history of the party. The development of autonomous Catholic social and political movements in Italy began in the nineteenth century, and continued until the failure of the Popular Party and the triumph of Fascism after World War I. The narrative concludes with the rise of the new Christian Democratic Party of 1943 and its triumph at the conclusion of the Second World War.

This study has implications reaching far beyond the limits of Italian history, reflecting as it does on such contemporary questions as the compatibility between Catholicism and modern democracy.

About \$5.00

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Order from your bookstore, please

REFLECTIONS ON OBEDIENCE

A BASIC IGNATIAN CONCEPT

KARL RAHNER

JESUIT OBEDIENCE is something that is poorly understood; some people even call it the obedience of a corpse. But although Ignatius emphasized the importance of this virtue for the members of his Society—understandably enough, for an order engaged in the active care of souls—Jesuit obedience does not differ in fact from that of the other religious orders of the Catholic Church.

Our subject is far from being neglected: in the last ten years, just in Western Europe, at least fifty books and articles have been devoted to this theme. One has the disturbing sense that perhaps one is only writing in order to be listed in the bibliography of this subject. In a short magazine article, one can hardly expect to say anything at all comprehensive or conclusive, and the following pages are offered as nothing more than marginal notes on a vast topic.

MISCONCEPTIONS

IN ITS ESSENCE, obedience in religious life has nothing to do with the obedience which children owe their parents

Father Karl Rahner, S. J., one of the most important Catholic theologians in Europe, teaches in the Jesuit Seminary at Innsbruck. His article originally appeared in STIMMEN DER ZEIT (Verlag Herder, Wien, monthly, 20 D.M.), April 1956; it was written for a special issue commemorating the fourth centenary of the death of St. Ignatius, founder of the Jesuit order.

CROSS CURRENTS has already published two other essays by Father Rahner: "The Church of Sinners" (Spring 1951), and "The Lay Apostolate" (Summer 1957).

and others in authority, who are supposedly equipped to watch over their upbringing. The reason is that this latter type of obedience aims directly at its own eventual transcendence. By means of this training in obedience, the obedience of childhood later becomes unnecessary; the adult, liberated from the domination of blind instinctive drives, is able to command himself. On the other hand, in the case of obedience in religious life, we assume that the subject is already an adult. Also, we do not assume that the person who commands is necessarily more intelligent, more foresighted or morally more mature than the one who obeys. If this were so, the relationship of superior to subject would be an educational relationship. The one obeying would be a child or a man of infantile character, who is not yet responsible for his own behavior. Human nature being what it is, there are such people even in religion. Their percentage, however, should not be greater than that found in other walks of life. And I suppose that, generally speaking, it is not. After all, if people are childish and unfit for life, they have many places to hide; religion would hardly be their only refuge.

One conclusion can be drawn from these rather obvious considerations: Superiors should not act as if by nature or by reason of their office they are more intelligent, more clever, more morally steadfast, or more provident and wise in the ways of the world. This may be true in individual cases, for the world is not so constructed that only the more stupid become superiors. But it should be soberly stated (for subjects, lest they demand too much of superiors, some-

thing which would be unjust and show a lack of charity; for superiors, lest they delude themselves): the higher the office, the smaller the possibility, humanly speaking, of fulfilling it. For we may reasonably presume that the degrees of variation in mental and moral gifts among men are less than the degrees of difficulty found in the management of various social enterprises. As a rule, therefore, more important duties will unavoidably be more poorly performed than lesser ones. No judgment is passed here on any particular case. As a matter of fact, sometimes people do grow in stature in performing more difficult tasks. But for the most part, the opposite takes place. Along with the assumption of a more important responsibility comes the painful realization, felt both by the superior and those about him, that the man is far from being equipped for his task. The defective fulfillment of higher obligations cruelly lays bare the shortcomings of a man's capacities which previously escaped our attention.

Let us repeat once more: obedience in religious life is not the obedience of children. Therefore, the religious superior should not play the role of an Olympian papa. In the life of the cloister (even in orders of women) there are still to be found age-old rituals governing the etiquette of superiors, involving demands of respect from subjects, secretiveness, manifestations of superiority, appeals of superiors to a higher wisdom, displays of condescension, etc. All this should gradually be permitted to wither away. Superiors should cast a long and quiet glance at the world around them: those who are truly powerful and influential, who receive a great deal of unquestioning obedience, place no value on ceremonial of this sort. They find no need of concealing their weakness, anxiety, and insecurity behind a pompous front. Superiors should quietly admit that in

certain circumstances their subjects know more than they do about the matter at hand. Given the specialization of modern life with its need for countless types of ability to cover its many areas, present-day superiors can no longer act as if they can understand any and every matter that falls under their authority. In the good old days a superior could do everything that he commanded his subject to do. He had previously done the very thing himself. He had distinguished himself (otherwise he normally would not have been made superior) and so had given proof that he understood at least as much as his subject. At least this was the rule in the past, though naturally there were exceptions to it even then. Today it is quite inevitable that what formerly was the exception should become the rule. Every religious superior has many subjects who necessarily possess a knowledge of science, of pastoral functioning, of current affairs, which the superior (who can be a specialist himself only in a single, limited field) cannot possess. He finds himself or ought to find himself, in the same position with regard to the knowledge of others as Eisenhower does with respect to the mysteries about which his atomic experts advise him. The superior, therefore, is dependent upon the information of counselors to an extent not required in the past. The advisors, usually provided for superiors by the constitutions of an order, today in many ways possess an utterly new and more urgent function than in former times when they were in practice only a democratic check on an excessively authoritarian and uncontrolled government of one individual.

It would be well, therefore, if superiors would always seek the information they need in a spirit of objectivity and concreteness, for they must give commands for objective and con-

crete situations, no matter what be the value of obedience to an objectively erroneous command. This is not always done. A secret-cabinet policy may often be a well-intentioned means of acquiring such objective counsel, but it is not always effective. In religious life, on final analysis, there can be no real democratization of obedience, as will later be shown. But there can be objective and clearly determined methods of procedure for achieving the counsel and information needed for decision. Unfortunately this is not always the case. Again I insist, mostly for the benefit of the hostile critic of religious obedience: those in religious life realize that religious obedience is not the obedience of children. It does not presuppose children, but mature adults. And only in the measure that it can legitimately presuppose this can it be at all true to its own proper nature.

Again, religious obedience is no mere "regulation of traffic." Certainly where men live together in a community there must be order. That there be order, the power to command must be present. Not everyone can do as he pleases, and moreover, not everyone can discover for himself just what is required by the total whole. Command, however, implies obedience. When obedience is conceived merely as a rational or rationally prescribed function of order for the life of a community and for the coordination of its organs and activities toward a common goal, then perhaps the pattern has been discovered which can intelligently explain civic and national obedience.

In this concept, however, the peculiar nature of religious obedience has not been grasped, even though it cannot be denied that in religious life this aspect of obedience is also present, and necessarily so. Religious obedience is no rational and inevitable regulation of traffic, by which every sensible person

submits himself to the traffic policeman, and in which a coordinating agency takes care that everything moves without friction toward the common good. At times attempts have been made to explain religious obedience in this merely rational fashion. But this explanation is too easy and cannot reach the real roots and depths of religious obedience. And yet the obedience entailed in the rational regulation of traffic and of the sensible coordination of work in a common effort is part of religious obedience, though it is not the most characteristic nor the most profound element of the evangelical counsel. For the daily functioning of obedience in religious life it ought to be noted that this element of obedience is present; yes, that it is almost identical with the superficial tasks of quotidian obedience. For day-to-day life, therefore, a certain de-mystification of obedience should quietly take place, perhaps to a greater extent than is now permitted in some parts. In the many small details of daily life, obedience is in reality nothing else than a rational method by which rational beings live together.

Therefore, the superior should not try to give the impression that he stands under the immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost, but should be courageous enough to seek approval for his commands by giving reasons for them. It is incomprehensible how such an approach to mature and much-loved brothers or sisters in the Lord should be a threat to the authority of the superior, who, according to the command of Christ, should see in the authority of his office only the greater obligation to serve. This does not mean that there should be long debates and discussions over every small decree of a superior. That was the folly of the Parliaments in the past. This would be irrational and childish (although unfortunately it does occur). The problem can be met and

overcome by an appeal to higher ascetical motives. Without irritating himself or others, the subject should calmly and maturely consider the many unavoidable regulations of daily life in a religious community for what they really are: inevitable burdens of earthly life which weigh upon people in the world just as much as they do on people in religious life. Much irritation among religious persons caused by details of common life flows solely from immaturity which does not comprehend that a person does not prove his independence and personal integrity by rebelling against communal rules and regulations. And yet it still remains true: religious obedience, according to its own proper nature, is more than a merely rational regulation of traffic.

There is a third consideration which must guard religious obedience from misconception and excess. It is not true, even in religious communities, that all initiative should take its rise from superiors. Nor should we be too quick to consider this statement a mere platitude. To comprehend it really, we must make use of metaphysics, a metaphysics which consists in pondering with wonder on the commonplace and the obvious and then drawing some conclusions. Human authority (even when exercised in God's name) must not be conceived as adequately and exclusively competent to monopolize all initiative, all effort and all personal decision. Nor does it imply that subjects are called to initiative and decision only when authority gives the signal.

One frequently gets the impression, both in religious orders and in the Church in general, that initiative, action, militancy, and the like, are indeed considered necessary and desirable in subjects, but only on condition that the go-ahead is given "from above," and only in the direction which has already been unequivocally and authoritatively

determined by superiors. Unconsciously and spontaneously a tendency is vigorously at work to make the subject feel that he is so built into his order or the Church that only the total structure through its hierarchy is capable of initiative; that opinion or enterprise find their legitimacy only in express, or at least tacit, approval from authority.

Unless we wish to absolutize the community, the principle of subsidiarity has application not only between smaller and larger societies, but also between individuals and their communities as well. Yet there can be no subordination of the individual to a community and to the authority representing it, if it tries to make the individual an exclusively dependent function of the community and its authority. We need only put the question in all simplicity: may one propose a wish to a superior, or, with due modesty, propose an alternative policy? Everyone will answer: "Obviously, yes." Hence it is unnecessary first to ask the superior whether he wants the request to be presented or the alternative proposed. Yet this request, this alternative suggestion is also initiative, in which one must take the responsibility of deciding whether it is to be presented or not. For even when with all obedience and modesty the decision is left to the superior, the suggestion alters the situation of the superior in making his decision. It broadens or narrows the field of choice. Indeed even when the subject shows the greatest discretion, the superior is "influenced," whether he likes it or not, whether or not he would have followed the suggestion on his own.

There is no autarchic human authority which is pure activity and in no way passivity. To command absolutely is proper only to the Creator, who is not faced with opposing structures and unavoidable initiatives, because He Himself in the strict sense makes every-

thing out of nothing. All other authority, even in the Church and in religious orders, is not the only determining initiative but is one force in an immense network of forces, active and passive, receiving and giving. Authority has and should have the function of directing, coordinating, overseeing, and planning the whole interplay of human initiatives. It is not, to speak strictly, even in the ideal order, so representative of God that it alone is the autarchic planner and designer of all human activity. This would be the *hybris* of a totalitarian system which cannot exist, and, more significantly, should not exist.

Even in religious orders, therefore, in practice authority needs, calls for, and puts to use the initiative of subjects. Even in the abstract, there can be no *absolute* ruler and director of it. Independently of authority there exist initial sparkings of forces which cannot be controlled by authority. Because this is so and cannot be otherwise, it also *should* be so. That is to say, in no community or society, not even the Church or religious orders, *may* authority act as if all good initiatives originated from it, so that every execution of plan, command, and wish originated in authority alone. Even the most laudable initiatives of the Holy See often are only the reaction to an action which originated elsewhere, and this is important. The same is true in the case of authorities of religious orders. Subjects are not mere receivers of commands, because that is simply impossible. The aim of obedience is not to make merely passive subjects. This is not even an "asymptotic" ideal, but a chimera and the usurpation of the creative power reserved to God alone, which He can delegate to no one. Only God has "all the threads in His hand," and He has empowered no one to act in His fashion.

Consequently the superior cannot be

a god in the fulfillment of his office. Not to prevent his subjects from assuming initiative is not enough for a superior. He must positively count on it, invite it; he must not be irked by it. He must, to a certain degree, recognize himself also as only *one* of the wheels in a heavenly mechanism whose ultimate and comprehensive significance is directed by one only, by God and no one else. The superior always remains something moved. In an ultimate sense, he does not know exactly to what end evolution is moving. In spite of all the authority given him, and in spite of all the supervision he is charged with, he acts in trust and ventures into the unknown. He too never knows exactly what he is doing or starting when he commands or refrains from doing so.

He must remember that authority is one, but not the only, source for heavenly impulse, direction, and stimulation. He must realize that God never took on the obligation first to advise the authorities selected and authorized by Himself about God's own activity in the Church for the salvation of souls and the progress of history. The superior has no exclusive vision of the divine will with the mission to pass it on to his subjects. There is no God-given warrant for such a process of communication. Rather the superior must also be an obedient man, a hearer. The formal correctness and juridical validity of his commands does not guarantee that they are likewise ontologically guaranteed. If the subject must obey in order not to be disobedient before God, this fact is no proof that the command given was the command which, according to God's antecedent will, should have been given. It can be the product of a permitted fault in the superior. It can proceed from dead traditionalism, from human limitations, from routine, from a short-sighted system of uniformism, from a

lack of imagination, and from many other factors.

There is in the world a plurality of forces which can in no way be hierarchically subject to authority—though such forces cannot contradict authority as far as the latter succeeds in bringing them within the field of direction and command. This latter task, as has been said, can and should be only partially achieved. Hence the subject in religious life has no right simply to take refuge behind obedience, as if he could thus be free from a responsibility which he himself must bear, the responsible direction of his own personal initiative. We often hear apologies of obedience which praise this supposed advantage. It does not exist. At least not in the sense that the religious can thereby escape from the burden of personal responsibility. He himself chooses obedience; otherwise he would not be in religious life. He must then answer for the consequences of his choice.

The received command is a synthesis of elements. One is the superior's personal and original activity, the other is the external condition for that activity. This condition is constituted by the subject himself: his mode of being and action, his capacities and incapacities (perhaps culpable), his approach and attitude to the superior. This conditioning is prior to the command and makes the subject co-responsible for the command itself. Certainly the religious can often say to his own consolation that the superior has to answer for this or that decision and not the subject. But the extent of this consolation is not great. Taken as a whole, the religious cannot escape the responsibility for his own life, down to its last details. He simply hears in the command the echo of his own character and activity. There does not exist in this world a control-center of action from whose uninfluenced motion all else in

existence originates. A human being cannot relinquish his personality to a representative, not even in religious life. That is in no way the purpose of obedience.

TRUE OBEDIENCE

To provide a positive definition of religious obedience is by no means a simple matter. We could immediately and without further examination maintain that religious obedience is an abidingly vibrant obedience to God and the fulfillment of the Divine Will. But if we were to do that, we would have to determine how it is possible to know in what sense it can be said that that which is commanded is the will of God. For the fact remains that there can be commands which the subject must obey, provided that the things commanded be not sinful, but which in the objective order, are wrong, and which, in given circumstances, have been commanded with real culpability on the part of the superior. In cases of this kind it is no simple task to say why and in what sense the fulfillment of such a command could be the will of God. Nor should we over-simplify the matter by praising without qualification the "holocaust" and "renunciation" which obedience entails. For it is obvious that pure subjection to the will of another who is not God has no value as such in the realm of morality. In itself, pure dependence of self on the will of another is amoral, not to say even immoral, unless some further element be added to it.

We might add that if religious obedience is subordination of one's own will and decisions to those of another who holds the place of God and is the interpreter of the Divine Will, we must at least determine how we are to know how this other person received the divine commission to be the expositor of the will of God. This question is a

difficult one; even more so than that of poverty and of the evangelical counsel to renounce the blessings of conjugal love. For these two evangelical counsels are recommended directly in the words of Holy Scripture and by Our Lord Himself. As far as these two counsels are concerned, it is always possible to fall back on this recommendation, even when we do not succeed in achieving a crystal-clear understanding of their inner meaning. In this matter it can be said that the religious is walking in the way of the Gospel. And to him who has set out on this path in unquestioning surrender, the meaning of these counsels will be more and more fully revealed. He can always say that he is imitating Christ. And hence he needs no further argument over and above the fact that the disciple does not wish to be above his master, and that love understands what it recognizes as a fundamental characteristic in the beloved Lord.

Concerning obedience, however, the problem is not as simple as all that. As a matter of fact, we see that in the days of the early Church, in which a continuous procession of ascetics and virgins was already a fact, there was as yet no mention of religious obedience. Nor can any direct affirmation of this concept be found in the pages of the Gospels. The early ascetics lived the life of solitaries, and so there was no stimulus to the evocation of a notion of obedience. And even for a long time afterwards, obedience was not praised as a third vow. The religious accepted a celibate or monastic life in any form, and obliged himself to remain in a definite community which lived such a mode of life. It is clear that we will have to proceed carefully if we are to specify the content and arguments for religious obedience.

Before we proceed in the question of the meaning of obedience precisely as

it exists in a religious community, we must be clearly warned against another simplification which superficially gives a quick and easy solution to these questions. We cannot simply refer to the example of Christ. Beyond a doubt He was obedient. Obedience to His Father, according to His explanation, was the form, the driving power and the content of His life. We must by all means imitate Christ. But this is precisely the question: how do we know that in subordination of self to human authority we exercise the deepest obedience to God? Christ did not do it. Certainly the Apostle knows that there are human authorities which in some fashion take the place of God as far as we are concerned, and whose decrees ought to appear to us as the will of God. But Paul is speaking of the authorities which are not freely chosen nor created by us, but exist prior to us and prior to our will, namely parents, masters, and the civil governors. Can we extend and complete this Divine Will imposed on us by subordinating ourselves to new régimes of our making? If we answer that religious superiors have ecclesiastical authority because they are appointed by the Church, this reply alone does not lead us to any clear-cut doctrine. Subordination to the authority of religious superiors is not imposed on men by the Church without their own free and deliberate consent as implied by the vows. Hence the question remains: why is it meritorious to submit to the authority of another, when it has not been imposed on us by God Himself? Should we not safeguard the freedom that God has entrusted to us as much as our function of personal responsibility, since, as we have already said, an absolute surrender of innate responsible freedom is in no way possible or reasonable?

Hence the argument from the Gospel in favor of religious obedience is not so

simple, nor can it be proved immediately or without further examination. Our problem could be expressed succinctly in the following question: is religious obedience a concrete prolongation of obedience to the will of God, either in general, as it finds expression in the commandments of God, or in particular as it is manifested in God's direction, inspiration and providential disposition of the lives of men?

Religious obedience should by no means be considered primarily as obedience to individual commands, nor is it even the abstract notion of a general readiness to fulfill such commands. Primarily it is the permanent binding of oneself to a definite mode of life-to life with God within the framework of the Church. It involves the exclusive dedication of one's energies to those things which are the concern of the Lord and to what is pleasing to Him. We accept as a form of life the expectation of God's coming Kingdom of grace from on high. Obedience is concerned with the sacrifice and renunciation of the world's most precious goods; the renunciation of the right to erect a little world of our own as a field of freedom through the acquisition of wealth; the renunciation of the right to one's own hearth and the felt security to be found in the intimate love of another person through the conjugal bond. It is concerned with prayer, and with the testimony to God's grace which is to be found in what is commonly known as the care of souls and the apostolate. Here we need make no further description or argument for this life based on the evangelical counsels. Obedience is a permanent life-form giving man a Godward orientation. Such orientation is ecclesiological because by it the religious reveals the peculiar essence of the Church.

It is the manifestation of God's otherworldly grace beyond the reach of

earthly merit, to be accepted by faith alone in spite of all human impotence. In this manifestation the Church achieves her existential visibility and becomes historically tangible through doctrine and sacrament. This is the life to which the religious immediately and primarily pledges himself. His obedience, with reference to the individual commands which a superior may enjoin, is specified by this life-form giving it its definite religious significance. Otherwise there would be no sense to vowed obedience. It would not be a religious matter at all. It would rather be perversity to praise this kind of obedience in any other field of life; for instance, if one were to vow obedience for the better functioning of a center of chemical research in which one is employed as a research collaborator. If we suppose that a permanent vowed obligation to a religious life is of positive value in the moral order (and this is presupposed here), and if we further assume that it is proper and reasonable, though not necessary, to lead such a life in a community, then it follows that obedience to the directors of this community is justified and meaningful in the concrete pursuit of this permanent way of life.

Hence we are not trying to canonize an abstract notion of obedience as the execution of another's will as such. Such abstract obedience is due to God alone permitting no transfer to another. Beyond this case we cannot obey purely for the sake of obeying or of not doing our own will and determination. Something like this, considered abstractly in itself, would have no positive significance in the realm of morality. It would be downright absurd and perverse. The fact that this sort of thing would be "difficult" and "a perfect holocaust," hard and troublesome for him who is obedient at all times and in all things, can scarcely be itself an argument for

the meaningfulness of obedience. The implied presupposition of this argument, namely that the more difficult and repugnant thing is always better and more pleasing to God, just because it is a renunciation difficult for man, cannot be the legitimate starting point of discussion.

Our concept of obedience also explains why religious obedience has its place exclusively in a religious society approved and sanctioned by the Church. The content of obedience must be guaranteed, if such obedience is to possess moral value. It is not enough that commands be morally indifferent. They must be morally good in their total context. The totality must represent for the Church and to the world the content of the evangelical counsels. One can vow only that which is better. Thus one cannot vow directly and as an end in itself to do something which under certain circumstances (even if not sinful) is less prudent, less good, less significant. Whence it immediately follows that the proper and essential object of religious obedience is an abiding way of life according to the evangelical counsels. For in accord with the teaching of the Church this is certainly the better thing, but in what this superiority consists will not be further explained here. Obedience is not at all to be conceived as the "heroic" (or almost foolhardy) concession of a *carte blanche* to a superior, so that the religious simply does not do his own will, either because this is always pleasing and hence its renunciation especially difficult, or because it is fraught with danger and hence to be avoided. Thus it is that obedience is always specified with reference to the constitutions of the given Order, and the superior can only command within the framework determined by the constitutions.

The real essence of obedience is missed if it is only the particular command of

the superior that is considered, and then only in terms of the abstract formula: I declare myself ready to execute the command of another, if this command be not evidently immoral. This is not the case. Obedience is the acceptance of a common mode of religious life in imitation of Christ according to a constitution, which the Church has acknowledged to be a true and practical expression of a divinely oriented existence. By virtue of this acceptance and obligation the vow explicitly or implicitly includes the carrying out of the just commands of the authority necessary in any society, when they are directed to the concrete realization of the life-form of religious commitments "according to the constitutions." Such realizations cannot be determined *a priori* once and for all.

Whoever, therefore, is critical of the notion of religious obedience, is really attacking the wisdom of the life of the counsels in the Church. He is attacking, moreover, the wisdom of a life that is not primarily concerned with the tangible realizations of worldly objectives, but which through faith makes the expectation of hidden grace the ground of existence, and translates this faith into act. Without such an act, faith itself would be meaningless. This act is representative of the Church and bears the Church's witness to the world. If this mode of existence is to have meaning, then it must inspire a willingness to carry out in any given instance the concrete actions, undertakings and renunciations, which in the judgment of competent authority are deemed necessary for the concrete realization of this way of life.

This is why obedience is connected with the teaching and example of Christ who was obedient even to the death of the cross. Whoever enters into a religious community, whoever perpetually and irrevocably makes this way of life his own, chooses for himself an unfore-

seeable destiny. For the consequences of such an election and dedication to the community and its rationale of action cannot be foreseen in detail. And these consequences can be difficult and painful. But this gamble (considered in its formal structure) is involved in every human obligation, whereby another person with his own proper will becomes an inseparable part of one's own life. We find it in marriage, acceptance of the duties of citizenship, the responsibility of office, and so forth. Hence if the religious community and its basic ideals are justified and meaningful (which in our case we legitimately assume to be true), so too is the obligation toward all its consequences which cannot be seen in advance. A human mode of life which consists in the free subordination to something higher than itself cannot exist without this element of risk. And without such a surrender the individual will remain in his own egotism behind the defenses of his own existential anxiety, which is the surest way to destruction. But the man who gives himself to what is higher and nobler, who takes the gamble, knows that he is only doing what Christ Himself did in His obedience.

Under this aspect, that which in a given instance is irrational and indefensible but actually unavoidable really becomes the will of the Father. In this way the cross of Christ, a crime of the Jews and the pagans, "had" to be; it was the will of the Father who had planned it, even though it came about only as the result of the shortsightedness and guilt of men. The permanent dedication to the ideal of the counsels in imitation of Christ, who was poor and self-denying, the crucified legate of God, consecrated to prayer and atonement, is lived all but exclusively in a community professing the same ideal. Hence the obedience which it entails must be regarded as the will of God, even if

a particular command appears to be senseless (just as death, failure and the other tragic circumstances of human existence appear), provided of course that what is commanded is not immoral in itself. Religious obedience is thus a real participation in the cross of Christ. Nor should one protest that the irrationality of a mistaken command frees the subject from his contract, and cannot be considered as a share in Christ's mission. We must realize that religious obedience is more than a rationally accepted agreement governing "traffic-arrangements" in a common enterprise. This, of course, is included, for life in any community demands obedience, though in our case community life is directed to God.

In any other society, in the event of an unwise command, obedience would be justified only by the rational insight that such unavoidable eventualities must also be reckoned with in the original bargain. Otherwise, obedience, which is always to some degree necessary, would end, for it would be left to the discretion of the subject to obey. But in religion the imitation of Christ is practiced. There the cross of Christ is considered not merely as something inevitable, or as the misfortune of life, by and large to be evaded, but rather as the embodiment of grace and its acceptance through faith, as something which "must" be, "so that the scriptures might be fulfilled," since only "thus" can one enter into one's glory. There the command, judged unwise according to its immediate historical context, will be seen as something which in the framework of religious life is worthwhile, even desirable. This of course does not justify the superior in issuing such a command. Yet such an order can be understood in the same way as the saints in their imitation of Christ understood failure, shame, the shattering of cherished plans, martyrdom, and thousands

of other unjustifiable contingencies. They secretly longed for them as the embodiment of their faith in God's grace now reaching its perfection.

It might here be in place to recognize that morality and spontaneous moral judgment have a greater function than is ordinarily supposed. The command of a superior may be objectively sinful, and if recognized as such by the inferior it should not be put into execution. Everyone will agree that a superior, even with the best intentions, can issue an order which is objectively wrong. If one does not consider as sins only those things which are expressly labeled as such in confessional manuals, then it will be hard to deny that that which is materially false can also very often be objectively immoral. What is more, it is not easy to explain why this is not generally so.

Perhaps a fictitious example may be of help. A higher superior instructs the principal of a boarding school that he must under all circumstances make the boys go to confession once a week. Let us suppose that the subordinate, in this case the principal, clearly realizes what the superior in his idealistic remoteness cannot comprehend, that such a demand will eventually prove very harmful to the spiritual life of his charges. Question: have we here merely an inept pedagogical practice, which must be "carried out" because commanded, or have we in fact an innocent but unjustified demand which, since it is actually a serious threat to the genuine spiritual development of these youths, should not be carried out by the subordinate? The very ineptness of the practice offends against moral principles. Must the subject now declare that he cannot square it with his conscience, and ask to be relieved of his office? Reading the older moralists one gets the impression that they were more concerned with such cases than we are

today. Have we today become more moral, or has the principle "an order is an order" gained foothold even in such holy quarters as religious communities? Do we avoid talking about such possibilities out of fear of evils produced by the conscientious objector, and so act as if something of this kind practically never occurs? But is not the consequent evil caused to conscience greater than the utility of a frictionless functioning of external government requiring of subjects a literal obedience to commands? Even the subject has the duty in conscience of examining the moral admissibility of what has been commanded. The just "presumption" that the command of a superior is not only subjectively but also objectively morally unobjectionable does not constitute a simple dispensation from the essential obligation of every man to attain to moral certitude in regard to the free action he is about to perform. This action is no less his own, and no less one for which he will be responsible, just because it is commanded.

As a religious grows older he asks himself with a deep and secret anxiety whether he has done anything in his life which can stand judgment in God's sight. Nothing of course can so stand, except what He has given out of pure mercy. What is worthy of God comes from God's grace alone. For this very reason what one does is not indifferent. There is an absolute difference between man's potentialities when God's grace is accepted and when it is rejected. God has told us, and He is greater than the human heart, that there are deeds of selfless devotion, obedience to God's holy will and self-forgetting dedication. Yet we always discover in ourselves, if we are not stupid, naive or conceited, things which always make us afraid that there is nothing in us but open or disguised egotism. Are we sure that God's grace was ever operative in us? Such an

event should have been life-transforming. Yet was there ever a moment when we did not seek ourselves, when success was not the fruit of egotism, when our love of God was not anxiety, when patient prudence was not really faint-heartedness? The divine achievement of miraculous cleansing takes place in different ways, giving us the right to hope that not everything in our life was open or covert self-seeking. Nor need painful anxiety about it be another manifestation of self-seeking or secret self-justification before God. Whoever is so concerned has made his life essentially simple and easy. We act on our own but the last and most important deed will be effected in us by God Himself operating through the bitterness of life itself. The individual can always do one thing at least. He can give himself over to something greater than himself. He can also see to it that this greater Reality be more than an ideal or a theory, which on final analysis is under his own control. The individual can strive to make this nobler Reality actual. This Reality must make demands on us, when we do not desire to be constrained; must act even when we do not wish it; must cause us suffering when we ourselves would rather avoid it. This happens when the greater Reality to which we dedicate ourselves becomes a tangible force of incomprehensible greatness, whose word of command is directed towards us—and we obey. This means to obey silently, and in the true sense, unquestioningly; to submit to a demand we have not ourselves invented.

When this happens we have too little time and too little interest to defend or develop our personal integrity. We might even be so fortunate as to become a true person, who exists in so far as he forgets and sacrifices self, in so far as he obeys. But we must remember that life's good fortune is God's grace. In order to become obedient,

and in transcendence lose ourselves—the only way of ever really finding ourselves—we must perhaps see nothing at all extraordinary in obedience, hardly ever think of it directly. We should rather think of the Reality which we serve as a matter of course. That Being is worthy of all love and service, because ultimately it is no mere cause, but *The Person: God*. Perhaps the truly obedient man is simply the lover, for whom the sacrifice of self-surrender is sweet and a blessed delight. Perhaps we should not speak so much of obedience, for it is already threatened when we praise or defend it. Either tactic is only meaningful as an encouragement for the young in order to strengthen their wills to embrace in silence a matter-of-course service of God in the Church through a life of prayer and witness. They must learn that this is meaningful even though the heart shudders and the wisdom of this world panics at the thought of losing self in the loss of freedom.

As for the ultimate obedience, which demands and silently takes everything, it will be exacted by God alone. It is the command to die the death which overshadows every minute of our life, and more and more detaches us from ourselves. This command, to move on and to leave all, to allow ourselves in faith to be absorbed in the great silence of God, no longer to resist the all-embracing nameless destiny which rules over us—this command comes to all men. The question, whether man obediently accepts it, is decisive for time and eternity. The whole of religious life grounded in obedience is nothing more than a rehearsal, a practical anticipation of this situation, which more and more envelopes human existence. For the religious it is the participation in the death of Christ and the life concealed in Him.

Translated by ERWIN W. GEISSMAN

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN BELIEF

MICHAEL FOSTER

Synopsis

CONTEMPORARY BRITISH philosophy repudiates allegiance to a "school," but certain traits seem characteristic of it. It sees the task of philosophy as "analysis," i.e., as clarification, rather than as the attaining of new knowledge. It marks itself off from Logical Positivism, in that it does not restrict the claim to be meaningful to the factual and verifiable statements of science, history, and common-sense nor write off ethical, aesthetic, and theological propositions as nonsense. (But though it concedes *meaningfulness* to these latter classes, it is questionable whether it concedes to them the capacity of being true.)

In considering the relation of contemporary philosophy to Christian faith, two standpoints are possible. (1) One

*Mr. Michael Foster was Student of Christ Church and Lecturer in Philosophy in Oxford University. He was author of *MYSTERY AND PHILOSOPHY*, chairman of the University Teachers Committee of the World's Student Christian Federation, and chairman of the University Teachers Group of the British S. C. M. This lecture was originally delivered to the 942nd Ordinary General Meeting of the Victoria Institute at the Town Hall, Oxford, January 31, 1957. Mr. Foster was revising his lecture in consideration of recent developments in philosophy at the time of his death; his article has already appeared in *THE CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR*, (a distinguished quarterly associated with the Faculty Christian Fellowship, 475 Riverside Drive, New York 27, N. Y., \$4 a year) Fall 1960.*

may examine the statements of Christian faith or theology from the point of view of contemporary philosophy. The debate has hitherto been conducted, both by Christians and others, mainly from this standpoint. From this point of view a main question concerns the validity (in respect both of meaning and of truth) of theological propositions. Or (2) one may attempt to see contemporary philosophy in the light of Christian faith. An attempt at this is made in the paper. From this point of view a main question is whether the demand for clarity, in the form in which contemporary philosophy makes it, is not contrary to a belief in mystery which Christianity must hold.

Philosophy on a theological basis is an alternative to the existing contemporary philosophy.

In writing this paper I have drawn largely on Chapter 1 of my book *Mystery and Philosophy* (London: SCM Press, 1957).

1. *Historical*

A great change has come over British academic philosophy in the last forty years. Up to the first World War, British universities were still dominated by the idealist philosophy of T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, B. Bosanquet, the Cairds, etc. This dominant position has now been taken over by a different philosophy which originated largely in Cambridge, but has now its chief centre in Oxford and has spread rapidly among universities in many parts of the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian world, though as far as I know not yet much outside these areas.

Professor B. Blanshard¹ has brought the features of the new philosophical scene into relief by contrasting the Oxford philosophy of the 1950's with that which he remembers of the Oxford of the period after 1913 when he studied there, and Mr. J. O. Urmson has written a brilliant and authoritative account of the development of the new movement between the two World Wars.²

The movement has historical roots in the tradition of British Empiricism. Hume is an important figure in its ancestry. Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore, both of Cambridge, broke away from the prevailing idealism (to which both had been originally attached) in the last years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, and the new movement is very largely derived from them, with additional influences from the Viennese Logical Positivists (whose philosophy was introduced to English readers by A. J. Ayer in 1936), and an original genius, L. Wittgenstein. Among its representatives in England are J. Wisdom of Cambridge,³ G. Ryle,⁴ J. L. Austin, Stuart Hampshire,⁵ P. F. Strawson,⁶ D. L. Pears, G. J. Warnock,⁷ G. A. Paul, R. M. Hare,⁸ T. D. Weldon⁹ and P. H. Nowell Smith¹⁰ of Oxford.¹¹

¹ B. Blanshard, a lecture *The Philosophy of Analysis*, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1952.

² *Philosophical Analysis, its Development between the two World Wars*, Oxford, 1956.

³ His writings are collected in two volumes, *Other Minds* and *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*, Blackwell, Oxford (1952 and 1953).

⁴ *The Concept of Mind*, London, 1949. *Dilemmas*, Cambridge, 1954.

⁵ *Spinoza*, Pelican, 1951.

⁶ *Introduction to Logical Theory*, 1952.

⁷ *Berkeley*, Pelican, 1953.

⁸ *The Language of Morals*, Oxford, 1952.

⁹ *States and Morals*, 1946. *The Vocabulary of Politics*, Pelican, 1953.

¹⁰ *Ethics*, Pelican, 1954.

¹¹ Further examples of the writings of many of the authors named will be found in the two

2. Characteristics: *Repudiation of Allegiance to a School*

What is this philosophy? What are the tenets which its representatives hold in common? This is not a question which contemporary philosophers themselves would regard as legitimate, because they do not regard themselves as belonging to a school or as subscribing to any common tenets. "There is no official doctrine of modern philosophy. Modern philosophy is a common pursuit of illumination in certain fields."¹² "I suggest that what is new and genuinely original in contemporary philosophy, or in the best of it, is just the fact that it offers not yet another new method or system."¹³ Whatever it may look like to an outsider, contemporary philosophers themselves regard themselves as pursuing not a certain kind of philosophy, but philosophy. They are more conscious of the differences which divide them from one another than of common characteristics. If there is any delimitation which they could accept, it would perhaps be the characteristic of being *contemporary*. Thus a volume of essays by some of the younger contemporary philosophers bears the title *Revolution in Philosophy*. This implies a clear consciousness of distinction between this philosophy and philosophy as it has been pursued, or mis-pursued, in the past: but not a consciousness that there could be alternative methods which would be legitimate in the present.

Nevertheless, my purpose in this paper is to do what contemporary philosophers themselves are reluctant to do, namely to identify in contemporary philosophy, if not common tenets, a

volumes *Logic and Language*, ed. A. G. N. Flew, Blackwell, Oxford, 1951 and 1953.

¹² G. J. Warnock in a B.B.C. broadcast talk in 1955.

¹³ Stuart Hampshire, "Changing Methods in Philosophy," *Philosophy*, April, 1951, p. 144.

common spirit, and to try to understand its significance as a whole.

3. "Analysis"

In spite of the reluctance to adopt a common label, sheer pressure of practical convenience favored the introduction of a title which should be a little more informative than "contemporary" is, and the name which has been most commonly accepted for the new movement is *Philosophy of Analysis*.¹⁴

Writers who have used this term have warned against treating it as more than a name.¹⁵ Nevertheless, it does seem to indicate correctly some of the common features of the new philosophy, and we may start by using it as a clue.

4. *Rejection of Metaphysics*

The name "Analysis" gives a clue especially to some things the new philosophy

¹⁴ Cf. the titles of the following works: *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, ed. H. Feigl and W. Sellars, New York, 1949; *Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Max Black, Ithaca, New York, 1960; *Philosophical Analysis, its development between the two World Wars*, J. O. Urmson, Oxford, 1956; *The Philosophy of Analysis*, lecture by B. Blanchard, Proceedings of the British Academy, 1952; and of the periodical *Analysis*, which appeared first in 1932.

¹⁵ Thus Professor Max Black wrote in the introduction to his *Philosophical Analysis* (1950) "Instead of trying, where so many have failed, to analyse analysis, I shall confine myself to some informal comments upon the work of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein; these may serve to recall the complexity of the recent historical background and act as a deterrent against treating 'Philosophical Analysis' as a 'school' having well-defined articles of association," and Margaret Macdonald in her introduction to *Philosophy and Analysis* (1954) wrote that the phrase "philosophical analysis" was "introduced as a technical philosophical term for the work of Moore and Russell. It was later extended to that of Wittgenstein, and is now applied to the work of any philosopher which resembles, or shows the influence of, one of these models."

rejects. It rejects the notion that philosophy is to be thought of as a means of knowing which is parallel and additional to the empirical knowledge of the sciences, history, and common sense. E.g., that while science can discover truths about the world of the senses, philosophy can discover truths about a supersensible world. Or that, while science is concerned with the explanation of particular happenings within the natural universe, the explanation of the universe as a whole is something which falls outside the scope of science and in that of philosophy.¹⁶ In these and similar conceptions philosophy is thought of as though it were a sort of super-science, pursuing truth and attaining knowledge in the same way as the sciences do, but somehow freed from the limitation of a science, in not being confined to a special field, or in not being subject to empirical tests.

The conception of Analysis involves a fundamentally different view of philosophy from this. According to it, the task of philosophy is not to inform, but to clarify; not to give new knowledge by means of some faculty of speculation or intuition, but to enable me to know in a new way what I knew already. An early statement (or foreshadowing) of this view was given by G. E. Moore in

¹⁶ This is a view which G. E. Moore held in 1910. See his *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 1-2. "It seems to me that the most important and interesting thing which philosophers have tried to do is no less than this; namely: To give a general description of the whole of the Universe, mentioning all the most important kinds of things which we know to be in it, considering how far it is likely that there are in it important kinds of things which we do not absolutely know to be in it, and also considering the most important ways in which these various kinds of things are related to one another. I will call all this for short, 'Giving a general description of the whole Universe,' and hence will say that the first and most important problem of philosophy is: To give a general description of the whole Universe."

his famous paper "The Philosophy of Common Sense" which was published in 1925.¹⁷

There are two senses in which we can be said to "understand what we mean." In one sense, I understand what I mean by a sentence if I can use it correctly, though I may never have reflected philosophically. E.g. a competent scientist who uses the phrase: "the light causes a blackening of the photographic plate," and a competent historian who writes: "the religious struggles culminating in the Thirty Years War had caused a widespread demand for religious toleration," certainly understand what they mean, without the need of a philosopher to tell them. And yet the philosophical analysis of the concept of cause, while not doing or undoing the work of the scientist or the historian, gives a new understanding of what they were meaning all the time.

Analysis, according to this view, is what philosophers in the past always have been doing, without realizing it, except in so far as their performance of their task has been distorted by their own misconceptions of what the task of philosophy is.

5. *Linguistic Analysis*

What does philosophy analyze? Moore says it analyzes Common Sense. But how do I get access to the datum which is to be analyzed? An older English tradition would have said: by looking into my own mind and consulting my own

¹⁷ In *Contemporary British Philosophy*, ed. Muirhead, Second Series. Moore writes: "I am not at all sceptical as to the *truth* of such propositions as 'The earth has existed for many years past,' 'Many human bodies have each lived for many years upon it,' i.e. propositions which assert the existence of material things: on the contrary, I hold that we all know, with certainty, many such propositions to be true. But I am very sceptical as to what, in certain respects, the correct *analysis* of such propositions is," p. 216.

consciousness. Locke appeals to this datum in the following words: "I ask anyone, whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night,"¹⁸ and the use of the term Common Sense still as it is used by Moore implies this possibility of consulting an inward authority. But modern philosophers deny such access to an inward oracle. In their view my only access to a man's meaning is through what he *says*, i.e., the datum of analysis is *language*, and this is what philosophy is concerned with.

6. *Logical Empiricism and Ordinary Language*

To think of philosophy as concerned with the meaning of words is not entirely an innovation. Socrates, who founded the tradition of European philosophy, devoted his inquiry to the search for definitions, asking such questions as: "What is justice?" "What is virtue?" But he assumed that each word had a single true meaning, if one could discover it, and that the philosopher's business was to elucidate this, transcending the varied and confused versions of it current among ordinary men. The modern analyst renounces this ideal. He sees it as his business to elucidate not "the true" meaning of words, but the meaning which language actually has in the mouths of those who use it. If common usage fluctuates, let him trace the fluctuations; it is not his business to establish for a word¹⁹ a single unchanging meaning (which in fact in actual use it never has!) but to analyze the meanings which it has in actual use.²⁰

¹⁸ *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. Bk. IV, ch. ii.

¹⁹ Actually analytical philosophers are concerned rather with the meanings of sentences than of single words. This is another characteristic, which I mention only in passing.

²⁰ This empirical attitude is expressed in

Hence "ordinary language," instead of being thought of as something imperfect, which philosophy supersedes, remains as the datum which philosophy has to analyze.²¹

7. Therapeutic Clarification

It would be wrong to think that this is necessarily a matter of trivial importance (though, as with other philosophies, it is possible to pursue it in a trivial spirit). Logical analysis has been compared²² to the task of the psychoanalyst. It is the work of revealing a man to himself. The gain to be derived from this may be thought of in terms of an increase in intellectual mastery. The tools are sharpened, and mistakes made in the past may be avoided in the future. Perhaps most contemporary philosophers tend to see it like this. But it can be seen differently. It may be part of the task of enabling a man to face and accept what it is that he believes, liberating him from dogmas which he could no longer wholly accept, but which haunted him because he had not faced them.²³

8. Philosophy of Analysis and Logical Positivism

Contemporary philosophy is identified in the popular mind with "Logical

Wittgenstein's famous directive, "Don't look for the meaning, look for the use." "Don't look for the meaning"—otherwise you will fall under the influence of the old Socratic assumption that there is something which can be called *the meaning* of a word; "look for the use"—i.e. for the ways in which it is actually used.

²¹ Analysis of ordinary language is one of the directions which contemporary philosophy takes, and is that with which this paper is principally concerned. Another is the attempt of formal logicians to construct a logically perfect language.

²² By Professor H. A. Hodges.

²³ As Professor Ryle was haunted by the dogma of the "ghost in the machine." See *The Concept of Mind*, p. 9.

Positivism." This is the name given to the philosophy of a group of Austrian philosophers (the "Vienna Circle," which was introduced to the English-reading public by A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* in 1936. Its basic doctrine is that (apart from the tautological statements of logic and mathematics) a statement can have literal meaning only if it is empirically verifiable. This implies that the statements of logic, mathematics, natural science, and history are to be accepted as meaningful: but that aesthetic, ethical, metaphysical, and theological "statements" whatever emotional value they may have, are to be regarded as being literally nonsense.

Contemporary philosophers hotly repudiate the identification of their philosophy with Logical Positivism, and for a critic to fail to distinguish them from it is to forfeit at the outset any claim to be taken seriously by them. "I am not," said Mr. G. J. Warnock in a broadcast talk in 1955, "nor is any philosopher of my acquaintance, a Logical Positivist." What is repudiated in Logical Positivism is its "restrictive iconoclasm," its *restriction* of meaning to empirically verifiable statements, and its pejorative designation of other classes of statements as non-sensical. The contemporary philosopher is catholic, while the Logical Positivist discriminative. He accepts *every* use of language as worthy of unprejudiced examination. Each will be shown to exhibit a logic of its own, which it is the philosopher's business to elicit, and ethical statements (e.g.) in being *different* from scientific statements are not therefore *worse*.

I confess, for myself, that I think nevertheless that "Logical Positivism" would be not at all a bad name for contemporary British Philosophy. "Positivism" seems to me to indicate its distinctive feature better than "Analysis" does, and the difference which I have just been describing could be safe-

guarded by distinguishing British Positivism from the earlier Viennese form (in a somewhat similar way to that in which J. S. Mill distinguished his form of Utilitarianism from his father's and Bentham's without discarding the name). It is true that Oxford has broken through the Viennese restriction in respect of *meaning* (it does not confine meaning within the limits marked by the Verification Principle), but has it broken through the parallel restriction in respect of *truth*? Does it admit as *true* any statement outside those classes of statement which the Viennese philosophers marked off as meaningful?²⁴ But I shall continue in this paper to use Logical Positivism of the Viennese doctrine and Philosophy of Analysis of the contemporary one.

9. Christian Faith in the Light of Contemporary Philosophy

This philosophy clearly presents problems to Christian believers. To some students who come to the university from a Christian environment in home or school it can present itself as a challenge to their faith itself.

The challenge of Logical Positivism is obvious. If its division of statements into the meaningful and the nonsensical is accepted, theological statements will fall into the latter class. The challenge of the philosophy of analysis (or "Logical Empiricism") is more subtle and perhaps more penetrating. Starting from a recognition of the *difference* which separates theological from scientific statements, it inquires (or at least invites inquiry) into the peculiar character of the former. This is a new inquiry, because it is a new²⁵ idea, to be

²⁴ I return to this question later in this paper. See p. below.

²⁵ I don't mean *brand* new. Classical Christian theology has recognized it, as the doctrine of "Analogy" bears witness. But perhaps

believers as well as to unbelievers, that theological statements have any *peculiar* character at all. Archbishop Ussher, e.g. in *dating* the Creation in 4004 B. C., assumed that it was an historical event, i.e., that the logic of the statement "God created the world" is the same as that of the statement "Julius Caesar invaded Britain." Is this not perhaps a lesson which Christians are to learn from the new philosophy: *viz.*, that a statement of faith is something different from an historical statement or a scientific one and different again from a metaphysical one in the sense which metaphysics bears in the tradition of European philosophy? If Christian philosophers have been forced to ask: what then is the special nature of statements of faith?²⁶ have they not been forced into a reflection which is salutary and was needed from a Christian point of view?

The debate which has so far proceeded between philosophers of analysis and Christian philosophers and theologians has started from the basis which I have tried to indicate: on the side of the philosophers of analysis there is the new willingness to investigate the logic of theological statements without prejudging them to be meaningless, on the side of the Christian philosopher there is, or surely ought to be, a desire to discover the logical nature of the statements in which he expresses his faith. Some documents of this debate are collected in Flew and McIntyre's book *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (1955); the best critical appreciation of the state of the discussion which I know is that of Mr. B. G. Mitchell in his paper

we needed to have it brought home to us afresh.

²⁶ Usually referred to in philosophical discussions as "theological statements." This term is correct enough, but can be dangerous if it misleads us into thinking that the problem is only that of elucidating the (professional) theologian's use of language.

"Christianity and Modern Empiricism," which was given to this Institute in April, 1953; the most enlightening contribution to it from the Christian standpoint which I know is Mr. I. M. Crombie's Socratic paper on "Theology and Falsification."²⁷

It is not my main purpose in this paper to continue this debate, but I venture to offer two suggestions before I pass on from it.

(i) From all that has been said so far, it might seem that there is no necessity, nor even possibility, of conflict between Christian belief and contemporary philosophy. If contemporary philosophy does not claim to set up a "world-view" (as e.g. the materialist philosophies of nature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did) which is incompatible with that of Christianity nor set up a standard of reason by which to judge theological argument, nor a standard of meaning by which to condemn it as meaningless; if it contents itself with examining the logic of what believers and theologians in fact say, without questioning their right to say it, how can there be any conflict between them? The conclusion that there can be no conflict here is commonly acceptable to the analytic philosopher, but is baffling to the Christian, who feels obscurely that there ought to be a point of conflict, but is unable to locate it.

On this I should like to press a point which has been made already by Mr. Mitchell,²⁸ but which analytical philosophers, so far as I know, are slow to take up. These philosophers assume that when they have conceded meaningfulness to theological statements they have conceded everything which can be demanded. But a Christian has to claim for his statements of faith not only that

²⁷ Published in "The Socratic" No. 5, Oxford (Blackwell), 1952; reprinted in Flew & McIntyre, *op. cit.*, pp. 109 ff.

²⁸ In the paper cited, p. 89.

they are meaningful but that they are *true*. If he insists on following out what is involved in this conviction, I suspect that he will find that the situation of conflict has been restored.

(ii) Mr. Mitchell rejects on this ground (rightly, in my opinion) the philosophies which would interpret theological statements as something other than assertions—e.g. as expressions of attitudes to life, policies for living, presuppositions. If they were any of *these* things, they would not be capable of being falsified nor verified, i.e., would not be the sort of statements which are capable of being true. Mr. Mitchell therefore himself wishes to revert to the position that they are assertions in the ordinary sense—i.e., in the sense in which the assertions of science and history are so—while he safeguards the distinction between theological statements and factual statements of these other kinds by appealing to the principle of the doctrine of analogy, according to which predicates *change their sense* when they are applied to God.

I would like to see what is perhaps in some respects the same fundamental truth expressed in a different idiom. The doctrine of analogy thinks of theological statements as statements which we make about God. This is consonant with the Greek conception of theology, according to which theology is that part of philosophy which is directed towards God, or the divine, as its object (as "geology" is the study of the earth, "physiology" the study of nature, etc.²⁹) Etymologically this meaning is embedded in the Greek-derived words "theology," "theological," which we still use. But their meaning has changed (though perhaps we are not wholly conscious of the change) under the impact of influences which are other than

²⁹ Newman was presumably using the word in this sense when he said "Theology is science of God."

Greek. "Theology" is for us no longer a branch of philosophy, but is a study contrasted with philosophy. To call an argument or inquiry "theological" no longer means that it has God as its object; it means that it is based upon divine revelation, not solely upon reason. If we are clear that *this* is what theological statements are, then the task of logic in respect to theology will be conceived differently. It will no longer investigate the logic of statement about God, but that of *revelatory* statements. Mr. David Jenkins of Oxford has suggested in some unpublished talks that the task of logical analysis should be conceived in these terms, and this seems to me the proper approach.

10. *Contemporary Philosophy in the Light of Christian Faith*

Though it is salutary and may be good training to bat on the opponents' wicket, the basic question for a Christian must be, not "What does Christian doctrine look like when seen from the point of view of contemporary philosophy?" but, "How is contemporary philosophy to be understood in the light of Christian faith?"

There is a difficulty here, which I do not know how to remove. How can a writer, though a Christian, claim that *his* point of view is the view of the Christian faith? Must not such an identification reduce Christian philosophy to a school or philosophy among other schools? Whereas in fact must we not expect that Christians who philosophize will fall into a great variety of schools? In face of these considerations, it seems that Christians too must follow the example of contemporary philosophers of Analysis in renouncing attachment to a school. What will distinguish them will be an allegiance of faith which is compatible with a variety, (though not of course with all varieties) of schools.

The question will then arise: Is an-

other allegiance discernible in the writings of contemporary philosophers and underlying the variety of opinions which is in conflict with that of Christian faith? Such an allegiance need not be consistently maintained, nor maintained in conscious opposition to Christian faith, since it will probably never have been recognized as being a position to which, within philosophy, an alternative exists.

It seems to me that there is such another allegiance, that there is a spirit abroad which inspires many at least of the diverse manifestations of contemporary philosophy. I shall try to delineate it, and shall illustrate what I say by quotations from contemporary philosophers; but I shall not assert that any of them is wholly to be identified with it, nor claim that any of us is wholly free from it.

This spirit shows itself in a demand for clarity, and in the assumption that this demand can always be met. Or rather (since all philosophy has been in a sense a search for clarity, and has assumed that it is to be had) the distinctive character of contemporary philosophy is its demand for clarity of a particular kind. It demands a clarity from which the mysterious has been excluded, and assumes "that nothing is really puzzling and that therefore there cannot be anything unclear that we can legitimately want to say."³⁰

"Nothing is really puzzling" means "Nothing is really mysterious." Just as in the realm of science "mystery" designates only what has *not yet* been explained, and it is assumed that the mystery will be eliminated as science advances, so in philosophy mystery is

³⁰ This sentence is quoted from a letter of Mr. I. M. Crombie. It was he who made plain to me that clarity (not analysis) is the distinguishing characteristic of the contemporary philosophical spirit with which I am here concerned.

only obscurity which has not yet been clarified.

The following are examples of this demand and this assumption. "There is no unfathomable mystery in the world."³¹ Professor Margaret Macdonald said of the periodical *Analysis* that it is "hospitable to many points of view, so long as they are definite and clearly stated."³² As long ago as 1903 G. E. Moore wrote in his preface to *Principia Ethica*: "It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements of which its history is full are mainly due to a very simple cause; namely, to the attempt to answer questions without first discovering *what* question it is that you desire to answer."

This passage was cited both by Professor John Wisdom and by Susan Stebbing in their contributions to *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*.³³ Professor Stebbing's comment is especially apt to my present purpose; she writes, "To think is to be asking oneself questions and seeking to find the answers to them; hence to think clearly it is necessary to see exactly *what* the question is to which one wants an answer."

If thinking is this, thought must end in the elimination of mystery. This is to demand that the answer shall be cast in terms which we have specified beforehand, and this implies that the truth of the matter is not such as to exceed the measure of our understanding. It is to claim a mastery of the human intellect over the subject of investigation.

A similar mastery over nature was claimed when the experimental method

was introduced into natural science at the beginning of the modern period. The essence of this method is that by its nature it is compelled to answer questions *framed by man*. This is the meaning of Bacon's famous phrase about "Putting nature to the question," as Kant saw and explained 150 years later.³⁴ The method of experiment distinguishes modern science from the contemplative study of nature conceived by the Greeks and medieval scholastics. It is a means to man's achievement of mastery over nature in the technical sense,³⁵ but in a subtler sense the application of the method itself, even apart from the practical application of its results in technology, is a claim of mastery for the human intellect over the processes of nature. It is a claim that there is nothing ultimately mysterious in nature, no truth in it to be revealed which would exceed the possibility of being expressed in terms of the answer to a question framed by man beforehand.³⁶

If I am right, the philosophical spirit which we are considering is parallel to

³⁴ *Critique of Pure Reason*. Preface to Second Edition; B xii-xiii, E. Tr. Kemp Smith, pp. 19-20; though Kant, characteristically, speaks of "reason" not of "man" as putting questions to nature. For a modern statement of this characteristic of natural science cf. Mary Hesse, *Science and the Human Imagination*, pp. 35-6.

³⁵ As the prophets of this movement proclaimed. Bacon said knowledge is power, and the principal part of his *Novum Organum* bears the title *Aphorismi de Interpretatione Naturae et Regno Hominis*. Descartes claimed to introduce a new physic which would make men "the lords and possessors of nature." (*Discourse on Method*, Pt. VI, Everyman ed. p. 49.)

³⁶ It may be that some recent developments in physics are bringing about a modification of their claim within science itself (Quantum mechanics, Indeterminacy Principle). I have no competence to assess their significance. But they do not reintroduce mystery into nature in the old sense of those for whom nature was divine.

³¹ M. Schlick, "Meaning and Verification," in Feigl and Sellars, *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, p. 156.

³² *Philosophy and Analysis*. Introduction, p. 1, my italics.

³³ Ed. P. Schilp; Wisdom, p. 421, Stebbing, pp. 518-19.

this spirit of natural science.³⁷ It rests on similar claims for human reason, and is inspired by a similar ambition for human dominion.

11. *An Alternative Conception of Philosophy*

To deny mystery is not to deny the existence of anything which is beyond the comprehension of human intellect. It is to deny the possibility of *saying* anything about what exceeds the comprehension of human intellect. "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak, thereof must one be silent."³⁸ This is to deny not God, but Revelation; or more accurately, it is to deny that language can be the vehicle of revealed truth.

Revelation is of mystery, but mystery revealed is not eliminated, but remains mysterious. It remains an object of wonder, which is dispelled when mystery is eliminated. There is no method by which revelation can be commanded: "it is" (in the Bible) "not a thing to be procured from God by any technique."³⁹ That is to say, it is not subject to human mastery.

I have argued elsewhere⁴⁰ that Greek philosophy, in its main tradition, was a philosophy of revelation. It was based on the assumption that Nature or Being, which was itself divine, disclosed itself to the contemplating intellect.⁴¹ Hence

³⁷ I would not be taken to imply that this method in natural science is wrong. Man is commanded to subdue the earth in Genesis 1; cf. Psalm 8.

³⁸ Wittgenstein, in the Preface to *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* (1921; E. Tr. 1922). Cf. *ibid.*, 6.522: "Everything which can be known, can be expressed in the propositions of science. Besides that, there is the mystical, which is inexpressible."

³⁹ *A Theological Word Book of the Bible*, ed. Alan Richardson, s.v. "Reveal."

⁴⁰ In the book already mentioned, ch. 2.

⁴¹ "Aletheia," the Greek term meaning "truth," is used to denote this character of Being, the character, namely, of disclosing

philosophy on the Greek conception not only originates in wonder (as both Plato and Aristotle say it does), but ends in wonder.

The notion of philosophy as revelational excludes the notion which we found to be assumed in contemporary philosophy, that philosophical doctrines are to be thought of as answers to questions or solutions of problems.⁴² Revelation is *prevenient* to our problems. The truth here is similar to that expressed by Karl Jaspers, as quoted by Mr. Mitchell: "A proved God is no God. Accordingly, only he who starts from God can seek him. A certainty of the Existence of God, however rudimentary and intangible it may be, is a premise, not a result of philosophical activity."⁴³

Revelation is of a mystery. A question which specifies the terms in which an answer is to be given, determines in advance that it shall not be mysterious, because mystery, when revealed, exceeds what we could have anticipated.

Gabriel Marcel has distinguished between "problems" and "mysteries": science for him is concerned with problems, metaphysics with mysteries. It is a mistake to try to turn mystery into problem. Problems are solved by the application of technique, whereas a

itself fully. The word is derived etymologically from roots meaning "not remaining hidden." M. Heidegger paraphrases it as "Die Unverborgenheit des Seienden" ("the unhiddenness of the real.")

⁴² As examples of this assumption, compare the following: "All philosophers must take account of the same facts; of particularity and repetition, physical objects and minds, moral and aesthetic values, necessary and contingent truth, etc. What is important is whether they satisfactorily explain these facts, or such of them as they consider; whether they *solve philosophical problems*, not whether they use one trick, or wave one banner, rather than another." Margaret Macdonald, *Philosophy and Analysis*, Introduction, p. 7. My italics.

⁴³ Jaspers, *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*, p. 36; quoted by B. G. Mitchell, *loc. cit.*, p. 93.

mystery transcends every conceivable technique. The sphere of techniques is the sphere of man's achievement, whereas as mysteries are subjects of revelation.⁴⁴

The conception of philosophy against which contemporary British philosophy is in revolt is a conception of philosophy as revelation. In the case of the continental idealist philosophers, it is obvious that they conceived their role in this way. The pictures and interpretations of the universe which they give differ from religious revelations only in the claim that they have been received through the vehicle of reason. But this revelational exercise of reason was not confined to those Rationalist philosophers who produced metaphysical speculations on the grand scale. It extended also to the sober philosophers of the British Empiricist tradition. Thus Locke says, "Reason is natural revelation."⁴⁵

This claimed *revelatory* function of reason—this seems to be essentially what contemporary philosophy rejects; and I cannot defend it (although I was myself brought up in a philosophy based upon it, of which no doubt I bear the traces still). In this paper I wish to defend the idea of a philosophy based upon revelation, but not of a philosophy based upon *natural* revelation. Natural revelation is open to attack from two sides, not from one only; not only from the side of those who reject revelation as a means of knowledge, but from the viewpoint of a different conception of revelation.

This different viewpoint is expressed in the words of Canon T. R. Milford,

⁴⁴ For all this see Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existence and Being and Having*; in the latter volume especially the "Metaphysical Diary" (which was written between 1928 and 1933.)

⁴⁵ *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, ch. xix, 4.

in the preface to his book *Foolishness to the Greeks*.⁴⁶

This book expounds a definite point of view, which might be called "Christian Realism," in the sense in which Kraemer speaks of Biblical Realism. It tries to interpret life and the world from a position inside the historical body whose centre is Christ. It invites others to stand where we stand and to see if they can see what we see.

"It invites others to stand where we stand, and to see if they can see what we see." Yes; but it does not assume that what can be seen from here must be equally visible to others from where they at present are. Such thinking will be theological, not in the etymological sense of that word, but in the sense which it has now come most commonly to bear: the sense, namely, of *apocalyptic*, or "based on revelation," where it is assumed that the revelation is communicated, not universally to all men through their reason, but through the Spirit indwelling a certain community. "Armchair revelation" is suspect from this point of view, as much as armchair speculation is from the point of view of the scientist.

Wittgenstein is said once to have described what he did as "one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called philosophy."⁴⁷ It is as though different elements which were held in solution in the traditional philosophy have now been precipitated. Perhaps natural science is one, and linguistic analysis another. Certainly theology is another such element, and if it did not already enjoy a better title, could put in its own claim to be "one of the heirs."

⁴⁶ London, 1953.

⁴⁷ Quoted by M. Macdonald, *Philosophy and Analysis*, p. 11.

Order paperbacks and LP records at discount
through Cross Currents Brick Floor Store

W. L. Warner: *Social Class in America*, \$1.60
 Buber: *The Prophetic Faith*, \$1.45
 Fedotov: *The Russian Religious Mind*, \$1.95
 Desan: *The Tragic Finale*, \$1.60
 Buber: *Two Types of Faith* (Jan.), \$1.35
 Copleston: *Medieval Philosophy* (Jan.), \$1.35
 H. Frankfort: *Ancient Egyptian Religion* (Jan.), \$1.35
 M. P. Nilsson: *Greek Folk Religion* (Jan.), \$1.25
 Whitehead: *Process & Reality* (Jan.), \$2.75
 Machiavelli: *History of Florence* (Jan.), \$1.85
 David Roberts: *Psychotherapy & the Christian View of Man*, \$1.25
 Tillich: *The Shaking of the Foundations*, \$1.25
 Niebuhr: *The Children of Light & the Children of Darkness*, \$1.25
 Newman: *Development of Christian Doctrine*, \$1.35
 Christopher Dawson: *Understanding Europe*, \$.85
 Gerald Vann: *The Heart of Man*, \$.75
 Peers tr.: *Autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila*, \$1.25
 Frame tr.: *Complete Essays of Montaigne*, 3 vols., \$1.45 ea.
 G. Ernest Wright & R. H. Fuller: *The Book of the Acts of God*, \$1.45
 Walter Kaufmann: *From Shakespeare to Existentialism*, \$1.45
 Raymond Williams: *Culture & Society, 1780-1950*, \$1.45
 H. A. Reinhold, ed.: *The Soul Afire*, \$1.95
 Webster New World Dictionary, \$1.95
 Jean Danielou: *God and the Ways of Knowing*, \$1.35
 Richard Rovere: *Senator Joe McCarthy*, \$1.25
 Arthur Hertzberg, ed.: *The Zionist Idea*, \$1.95
 Jacques Riviere: *The Ideal Reader*, \$1.45
 Gregory Zilbourg: *Freud*, \$1.45
 Grover Smith: *T. S. Eliot's Poetry and Plays*, \$2.45
 Harold Goddard: *The Meaning of Shakespeare*, 2 vols., \$1.95 ea.
 Herbert Butterfield: *Man on his Past*, \$1.65
 John Dewey & A. Bentley: *Knowing & the Known*, \$1.95
 Walter Lippman: *A Preface to Morals*, \$1.95

Outstanding LP recordings

HANDEL'S MESSIAH—Sargent & Uddersfield Chorus, 3 lp's, \$14.90
 HANDEL'S MESSIAH—Scherchen & Vienna Academy, \$15.85
 FESTIVALS OF LESSONS & CAROLS — Kings College Chapel, for
 S. Martin, \$5.95
 CHILD'S CHRISTMAS IN WALES (Dylan Thomas Reading), \$5.95
 MUSIC OF MEDIEVAL COURT & COUNTRYSIDE (Xmas)—NY Pro
 Musica, \$4.98
 —& from the famous Archive Records
 GREGORIAN CHANT: Office for the Dead, Benedictine Monks of
 S. Martin, \$5.95
 MONTEVERDI: L'ORFEO (complete), 2 lp's., \$11.90
 BACH: ST. JOHN PASSION, 3 lp's., \$17.85
 BACH: CHRISTMAS ORATORIO, 3 lp's., \$17.85
 GREGORIAN CHANT: Compline of Christmas & 2nd Vespers, \$5.95
 BACH: ST. MATTHEW PASSION (complete), 4 lp's., \$23.80
 Please list substitutions & include 25¢ per record for postage.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A EUROPEAN CATHOLIC VIEW

MAURICE HAYOUL

THE INFLUENCE of Hollywood may be an important factor in international misunderstanding. Although most Europeans probably know better with their conscious minds, we are apt to believe what we see on the screen, and there all Americans are rich and fortunate people who enjoy a relaxed and happy existence. They are surrounded by the esteem and gratitude of those for whom they provide work or other aid, or even just the comforting vision of their own success.

Of course, no society was ever like this. The European, who prides himself on his realism, knows very well that the poor man does not admire his rich neighbor. Even when the rich man is kind, his generosity arouses no special feelings of gratitude, although it may elicit conventional expressions of appreciation. Even if the creditor is understanding, he will scarcely be popular: this fact may shock our sense of how things ought to be, but experience would appear to support it.

This psychological factor would appear to be the most reasonable explanation for the irritation aroused by the United States in the minds of their friends all over the world. The well-

known scrawl "U. S. Go Home!", which has appeared on so many walls in recent years, was never seen in Communist countries, but in those lands which the Americans had helped to rebuild. The ungrateful slogan blossomed on the walls of the very towns which American boys had come to liberate from intolerable tyranny, servitude and poverty at the price of their own young lives.

In Europe itself, the rapid recovery which was largely due to the genius of the Marshall Plan and the far-sighted assistance of American experts, did not succeed in keeping alive the sincere friendship of the people thus helped for the country that helped them. In South America, it is apparently necessary for the Vice-President of the United States to travel in an armored car, protected by the kind of large police escort usually associated with a dictator. And in Japan, Communist activity, although real, is a far from adequate explanation for the inability of President Eisenhower to make his scheduled visit this past summer.

But though this phenomenon of hostility is a general one, its European manifestations deserve special attention now when the Western European governments are in a position to exert more influence than previously on American politics and finance. These debtor nations have recouped their losses to such an extent that the agreements they are now making amongst themselves could become a threat to American export trade, and their monetary policy a cause for concern among Treasury officials in Washington. If the time, now still remote, should ever come when the citizens

Maurice Hayoul writes regularly on international events for the excellent Belgian catholic monthly, LA REVUE NOUVELLE (5, Square de la Residence, Brussels 4, Belgium, \$9 a year). The present article was written in reply to a request to account for the reserve with which many Europeans view the conduct of American foreign policy.

of Western Europe, although they owe Americans the liberation and reconstruction of their countries, feel nothing but envy and irritation for their protector and patron, the reappraisal of American foreign policy may be more agonizing than anticipated.

EVEN SUPERFICIAL STUDY shows that although the debtor's complex of inferiority plays a certain part in the mixed feelings toward America present both in official circles and among Europeans in general, it is far from being the only factor. American foreign policy since the war is also greatly responsible for this unfortunate development, and it might be worthwhile to list some of the most important aspects of this question.

The first is certainly the profound difference between the way East-West problems are considered in Washington and the manner in which they are viewed in the capitals of Europe. The policy followed by Mr. John Foster Dulles did not ever really gain the whole-hearted support of the European nations. Of course, it may be unjust to credit this eminent statesman with a special method of approach to East-West relations, since his over-all policy was and is that of most American political leaders. Nor have we forgotten his last tragic voyage through the capitals of Europe, when both he and his doctors knew his death was imminent, and he made a final effort to save something from the wreck of a policy which he had always considered the expression of a Divine Will, whose instrument he wished to be.

The cold war with Soviet Russia and her allies, the policy of military bases set up all around the Communist world, the lists of products which it was forbidden to export to Eastern countries—all came from the same initial premise that the Soviet regime, built on a fragile dictatorship, would one day blow apart.

On that day the peoples now laboring under the tyranny of a cruel minority of Communists would joyfully regain something resembling the American Way of Life. The main tenets of this latter were freedom of worship, freedom of opinion, freedom of trade, freedom of movement for both men and merchandise, and the right of every individual to choose his own course of action and deal with its inherent risks as he saw fit.

From the European standpoint, this outlook was hardly anything but an abstract ideal, or a gross misrepresentation of fact; it also appeared to be annoyingly one-sided and blind to realities. To the European leaders, the Communist countries are mostly European countries. When the governments of London, Paris, Bonn, Amsterdam or Rome echo American rhetoric and proclaim Soviet experiments or state socialism to be devilish attempt at the deliberate destruction of Christian civilization, the European man-in-the-street may be tempted to yawn. In the mind of most European leaders, these experiments in communism are certainly evidence of an ideology which is foreign to the European mind. They understand very well that European political society must be protected from the contagious and destructive activity of the Cominform and its successors. But they do not believe that it is by treating communism as something different from what it really is—i.e. a political experiment with both good and bad points (the latter being by far the more numerous)—that it can be countered with any success. The attitude adopted by Great Britain, whose political realism and prudence are proverbial, is very significant in this respect. The London government has never shown the slightest signs of an implacable ideological hostility towards the Moscow government and its satellites—

nor, for that matter, towards the Peking government today.

This reluctance to adopt a devil-theory of international relations, although congenial to many educated Europeans, may sometimes seem an effete intellectualism in the American climate. It is noteworthy, however, that a simplified echo of it can be found in a frequently heard remark which betrays the impatience of the European man-in-the-street. To the American it will appear to be an insult, and a sign of total incomprehension and ingratitude; it must also be confessed that the phrase is partly compounded of unhealthy cynicism and the irresponsibility of leave-me-out: "I don't want to be under the Russians, but I don't want to be an American satellite either."

ANOTHER FACTOR VERY similar to the former, and which also deserves consideration, is the too-frequent American tendency to group their enemies in one bloc and treat them all alike, instead of distinguishing between the problems confronting them, and dealing with each separately. In its search for a master plan to contain Communist expansionism which has gained ground on so many fronts over the past fifteen years, American policy tends to treat as communism anything or anyone which indirectly serves to propagate its doctrine, and to associate itself, by assimilating them with the American concept of freedom, with anyone or anything which is capable of being used in the fight against communism.

Such a division into black and white only tends to arouse European resistance to American policy, an attitude which may not be well understood by untrained, politically-appointed ambassadors to the Old World, or American newspapermen and congressmen who make quick trips to Europe to get the

"feel" of things. The European critic tends to underestimate the degree of informed and discriminating intelligence on the secondary echelon of the State Department, and forgets the hosts of idealistic and well-prepared American experts on most relevant questions—many of whom will find little they cannot agree with in this paper.¹ But when there are so few indications of this mature awareness in the top-level statements and administration-approved policies, even the sympathetic European observer remains uneasy.

The memory of McCarthyism certainly contributes to this uneasiness. Europeans probably exaggerated its importance, seeing it as a fundamental threat to American democracy. The average American never seems to have considered that there was any real danger, and events have proved him right in believing that American political structures and the wisdom of his fellow-citizens would enable the country to see the fever run its course.

It may also be that the witch-hunting that went on, the Commissions of Inquiry into un-American activities, the ostentatious withdrawal of passports, were grossly exaggerated by news agencies which, for the most part, were also American. Nevertheless, most Europeans, accustomed to the toleration of a certain degree of "intellectual anarchy" in the freedom the lunatic fringe will exercise in the democratic process, are justifiably unsympathetic at the too-frequent accusations of "crypto-Communism" by those who speak with authority in the name of the United States. The post-McCarthy years have seen a commendable relaxation of the barriers which previously caused the refusal of visas to European scientists and made for the tactless handling of university matters. Even now, however, the undisguised hostility of American diplomats towards

European politicians who permit themselves to take part in study tours on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain, or who display too much interest in the progress made by the satellites countries, and the continuing activities of congressional investigating committees who summon a visiting British drama critic for signing a statement calling for less partisan press coverage of the Castro regime, or demand that Dr. Pauling produce the names of those who helped him collect signatures of leading scientists protesting the further testing of hydrogen bombs, continue to contribute to a suspicion of America's role in the struggle for greater freedom.

This feeling of irritation with regard to American policy is enhanced by the alliances concluded by America. Old Syngman Rhee, Marshal Chiang Kai-Shek, Franco, Batista, Trujillo and the other Latin-American dictators, the corrupt dynasties of the S.E.A.T.O. powers, neo-colonialism and its resulting scandals in the oil-producing countries and in the Middle East—it would be impossible that these relationships would not cause feelings of concern and uneasiness in Europe.

Europeans, of course, in view of their history and their natural trends of thought, have hardly the right to set themselves up as judges of American behavior. The old colonialist countries have not forgotten the precepts of Disraeli and Talleyrand. They too avail themselves of various means to achieve their ends. But when they do so, they incur a certain amount of blame. They are aware of this, and accept the fact that the crusading spirit of American democracy will often judge them severely. But they are thus in a good position to expose the hollowness of much of the official American rhetoric in regard to a "crusade for freedom," since it often leads to alliances with the most

socially backward, morally corrupt and politically uncertain elements in the world of today. When the American policy of overseas alliances suffers a series of reverses the prestige of this policy for Europe will hardly be increased. The practical implications of a negative anti-communism will hardly convince European governments and public opinion—as, in effect, U. S. policy intends—that they should hand over the collective destinies of nations to America, who, trusting in her generosity and super-human efficiency, cannot understand why this responsibility is not given her.

A WORD OF EXPLANATION is necessary here concerning American leadership itself. The American is used to seeing political responsibility shared between his home state, which in many cases enjoys sovereign rights, and the Federal Government. He has no difficulty in accepting the fact that a federal authority, higher than the local administration handling most of his civic affairs, should monopolize a certain number of contingencies affecting his everyday life. The European, however, suspicious by nature, is much more attached to the complete sovereignty of his political administration. Only a confluence of rare circumstances made possible the creation of the supranational Coal and Steel Community comprising the six countries of the Common Market. Ironically, although the financial burden of the Atlantic Treaty Organization rests squarely on the United States, to too-many Europeans it appears to be a disguised form of creating satellites. The fact that American boys are standing guard over distant frontiers threatened by interests which are no concern of theirs is almost incomprehensible to most Europeans. Although European governments frequently speak of the great sacrifices they are making in the

cause of the Atlantic alliance, nobody who really studies the question can fail to realize that none of them makes contributions on behalf of the N.A.T.O. organization on a scale even remotely resembling the extent to which the Washington government is involved. Moreover, not one of the European governments can truthfully state that it has not tried—not once but many times—to wriggle its way out of performing the obligations which it accepted as a member of the Atlantic organization.

Nevertheless, whatever the psychological reasons (some of which have been suggested above), and however unfair it may be to American motives, to many Europeans N.A.T.O. and the entire Western coalition in general seems only a clever American way to get an army at cut rates, as well as military bases sufficiently dispersed that any reprisals initiated by a powerful adversary would not fall on American cities. The fact that all this is untrue—to put it bluntly, is a colossal lie—has no bearing on the case. It is obvious that the general European public was not sufficiently or intelligently informed of the stakes at issue, in spite of the large sums spent precisely for this purpose. The fact remains that a large number of non-Communist Europeans are profoundly convinced that this coalition is something to be regarded with deep suspicion and that its leader, America, whose interests do not necessarily coincide with those of Europe, may one day cause the Europeans to become the front-rank soldiers, the cannon fodder of World War III.

THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN the regional objectives of American policy and the imperative contingencies with which it has to contend on an international scale is not, however, an American monopoly. Even quite minor powers

have to face up to these difficulties. But as the leader of a coalition which, until a year or two ago, was a determining factor on every continent, the United States is now in a position where the decisions it makes will infallibly alienate a friendly state or ally, whichever alternative they choose. It is not easy to be friends with the Arab States and Israel at one and the same time. It is practically impossible to encourage the accession to independence of the Bandung group of nations without creating a rift in the Atlantic alliance with France, the Netherlands, Great Britain or Belgium; or to promote in North Africa the very same developments which are viewed with dismay when they occur in Cuba or Puerto Rico; or again, to pursue an aggressive policy in this area and a conservative one in that, deal with Japan in such a way that Indonesia, Malaya or Argentina cannot claim such action as a precedent later on . . .

The geometric centre and hub of these contradictions in terms is obviously Europe. While Japan may have no interest in South America, while Puerto Rico may not greatly care if she is treated a little differently from South Africa, the governments in London, Paris, Bonn, The Hague and Brussels react in quite another way. European votes at the United Nations are often the outcome of calculated bargaining. Whatever the point at issue may be—Algeria, the Belgian Congo, Suez, South African *apartheid*, the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Israel, Burma, the Philippines—the European nations invariably find it a matter for criticism, comparison, indignation or alliance. Not that they have quieter consciences, not that they do not experience the same difficulties—General de Gaulle is finding it very hard to carry out his Algerian policy along with his hopes for the French Community—but because while every nation is pre-

pared to accept the consequences of its own actions, such consequences are hard to swallow when they come from the leader of the coalition.

Since the combination of American strength and the cohesion of the western coalition is needed to guarantee world peace, some difficult questions should be asked. How many European governments, how many European voters are there who really and truly approve of the American veto on the entry of Red China into the United Nations? The American voter and taxpayer, who has dug into his pocket to help the ungrateful Europeans to an extent that no other taxpayer in the world would have accepted—what will he think if he realizes one day how much fear and compromise are behind the qualified agreement of the European powers to follow the policy line laid down by Washington?

It would take many more pages to analyse this phenomenon in detail. Is it necessary to do so? Is it not enough to acknowledge that it is practically impossible for the country leading the Western world today to obtain from its European partners more than their grudging support of a very restricted number of its objectives and diplomatic maneuvers?

OUR ANALYSIS of the misunderstanding between the Americans and their European allies, which we have hitherto confined within the limits of political disagreements, the mistakes made by both sides and the spontaneous manifestation of sociological and psychological complexes has now reached a point where these factors alone are not enough to explain the strained relations between the two continents. In the final analysis, we believe that this tension proceeds from a much deeper and possibly insuperable factor, which is the fundamental difference between the es-

ential tenets of political philosophy in the two great societies. We believe it is possible to describe this difference by stressing its two main points. The first is the harsh judgment of Europeans by Americans; and the second is the criticism of Americans by Europeans. We may well feel that both are unjust, but perhaps chiefly in their outward expression, for ultimately—and this is the heart of the problem—we do not have identical theories of political structure.

American democracy owes its youthful vigor to the fact that only a small group—those with “advanced ideas”—do not assume that a society founded on universal suffrage, economic liberalism and the equitable distribution of the fruits of labor between the various social strata of the nation, has a kind of eternal and absolute rigidity, somewhat like the divine right of kings in former days. Many Americans must believe, without conscious blasphemy, that God in His infinite wisdom and mercy must necessarily wish Man to organize his society along the lines of an American-type democracy.

There is no parallel to this in Europe, no such virtually unanimous consensus. There is no European country which does not have a big minority of citizens who consider that the electoral system, economic liberalism, and even a certain tolerance towards what the majority of citizens, or each individual citizen, regards as downright error, are crimes against society and the main cause for all our troubles. These citizens are split up into the fanatic partisans of an authoritative system of government, the need for a wise tyrant and for general acknowledgment of the State's obligation to drive out error and defend the truth, and other citizens who hold that State Socialism, a proletarian dictatorship, the destruction of capitalist fortresses and the exploitation of Man by

gold, are principles in defence of which it is worth sacrificing one's life and liberty. Out of this daily encounter between two irreconcilable political systems in our European societies comes a kind of political scepticism, which weakens our government structure and is not conducive to the "crusading spirit"—except in short feverish bursts, generally as a reaction to some insult or injustice inflicted upon us.

The second area in which it seems to me that it is very difficult, from a philosophical standpoint, to attempt to reconcile the European political experience with its American counterpart is precisely that of the "crusading spirit." Once the principle is accepted whereby Communism is a work of destruction inspired by the spirit of evil, then every possible means must be employed to wipe it off the face of the earth. Too many statements by American leaders give Europeans the feeling that this is the American method of dealing with the problem. When American foreign policy recruits the essential moral values of our society—employing churchmen, doctors of philosophy, and universities, in the interest of its crusade, European eyes often light up with anger. American Catholics would find it hard to believe the suspicion with which many of their European brethren receive the anti-Communist pronouncements of Cardinal Spellman when he makes one of his journeys abroad, finding in them a politically partisan rather than a religious meaning.

On behalf of himself, his children and the political entity to which he belongs, the average European is firmly resolved never to permit the growth of communism or the introduction of a similar doctrine. Yet the average European is not imbued with the crusading spirit. For him, what is rather too simply described as "Vatican policy" is a political matter, and the essential

values of civilization should not be implicated in political matters.

Naturally, such a state of mind is not conducive to any crusade, and one can easily criticize the inclination of some Europeans to divide the world in terms of "spheres of influence" as already containing the seeds of defeat. Nothing could be more true. But the fact remains that the European mind tends to become paralyzed at the apparently unanimous participation of the American people in the anti-communism crusade. We observed the secondary aspects of this contrast of opinions during the Budapest crisis. We meet them again in the form of shocked protests, often unfair and sometimes irrational, against espionage activities carried out behind the Iron Curtain by organizations sponsored by America, or the content of radio programs beamed at the People's Democracies. Here again we are not concerned with determining which side is right and which wrong, but merely with describing a phenomenon providing new and stronger motives for mistrusting American policy.

The American crusading spirit appears to the average European sometimes as evidence of a lack of political maturity, and sometimes as an indication of unforgivable cynicism. In any event, it is now certain on the Old Continent that no American call for a holy war will ever receive the answering shout of "God wills it!" that Peter the Hermit aroused when Europe was young.

ONE COULD EASILY say that much can be accounted for by realizing that Europe is old, and her partner is triumphantly youthful, rich, and strong. Certainly, the spite and unaccountable pleasure felt by many Europeans at the failure—immediately acknowledged—of American space projects is a sign of senility. This delight and amusement

at the leader's downfall and discomfiture is possibly a characteristic of human nature which can also be found in the everyday world, and should be considered in much the same way that one makes allowances for the bitter tone of people who are nearing the end of a hard and disappointing life.

But such an incomplete analogy should not allow anyone to underestimate the gravity of the situation, or mislead the public with empty talk about the prestige of the United States. Khrushchev's temper tantrums may frighten Europeans more than Eisenhower's policy—and handling—of the U2 incident, but they cannot obscure the strained relations between America and Europe. Nor can Europe's attitude find ultimate explanation in the decline

of its power vis-à-vis both Russia and the U. S.; the objective observer would have to point out that, from the economic point of view itself, Europe is in the process of making an astounding comeback—thanks to American help.

If the collaborative effort of Europe and America in the cause of peace and freedom is as important as western statesmen have been insisting these past fifteen years, we may say—not as an alarmist, but as a friend of the alliance—that the present drifting apart of the two entities could develop to the point of imperiling the very existence of mankind. With so much at stake, a few harsh words may be worth more than conventional reassurances, if they help to clear the air; indeed, nothing that can be done to clear up this misunderstanding must be neglected.

Notes and Reviews

FOREIGN POLICY AND MORALS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

It was Moscow, August 9, 1960. With a flair for the symbolic, the Soviet hosts to the 25th International Orientalist Congress—which I attended as a member of the American delegation—included in the opening ceremonies a commemoration of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki: several thousand scholars from all over the world stood bowed in silence. Many Africans and Asians, in particular, asked me subsequently what constructive thinking was being done in the U. S. on the consequences of having ushered in this new age. Fifteen years of the Nuclear Age, indeed, confront mankind with unprecedented problems. Asians are still quick to point out that so far an A-weapon has only been used by a Western country against an Asian one. They associate nuclear power with materialism and colonialism and a fear that such weapons, now being the major part of arms' arsenals, will very likely be used in Asia or Africa. One is asked by friendly Asians how our military planners are organizing and maintaining effective conventional armed forces. They want to know about our economic, moral, psychological and political capability to deal with the vast complex of problems ushered in by the nuclear age.

Although public discussion is still lagging, there has been of late a spate of publications evidencing a serious desire to study these problems in the U. S. Two interrelated approaches stand out: (1) a concern of American scholars with a rigorous conceptualization of the discipline of contemporary international relations and its many distinct problems, and (2) a concern by many with "values" and "morality" in the conduct of nuclear age foreign policy. We shall

take up some manifestations of these concerns in turn.

Prof. Stanley H. Hoffman of Harvard has edited a very useful and an up-to-date compendium in his *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Prentice Hall, 1960, 293 pp, \$5). Most significantly, this book is a plea for "theory understood as a set of interrelated questions capable of guiding research both of the empirical and of the normative variety." The architectonic role Aristotle attributed to the Science of the Polis, might well belong today to the rigorously systematic Study of International Relations. These relations have become in the 20th century the very conditions of our lives. Hoffman pleads, in fact, for a political philosophy of world affairs. By building relevant "utopias," a systematic empirical analysis and such a normative philosophy would be able to merge. "By spelling out our views on the purpose, the prerequisites, the possibilities and the procedures of an ideal international order, we would accomplish a triple task. We would meet the requirement of clarifying our personal value positions... avoid the piecemeal engineering approach of policy scientism... avoid the twin escapistisms of 'realism' and 'idealism'" (p. 189.) Hoffman, owing a huge intellectual debt to Raymond Aron, critically analyses the concepts of Aron, J. Bernard, E. H. Carr, F. S. Dunn, E. B. Haas, M. Kaplan, H. C. Kelman, G. Liska, H. J. Morgenthau, F. S. Thompson, R. C. Snyder, A. Wolfers.

Two distinct problems are submitted to detailed analysis by another long list of these "new experts." For the benefit of a general public opinion strategy and arms control are discussed in *Ameri-*

can Strategy for the Nuclear Age (Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, eds., Doubleday Anchor, 1960, 455 pp. \$1.45) and in the important quarterly of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, *Daedalus* (Fall 1960, pp. 674-1075, \$2). Hahn presents some papers from the National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers (1959), stressing the "protracted conflict" thesis of Lenin and Mao Tsetung (foreshadowed by the ancient Chinese military writer Sun-tzu in the 6th century B.C.) positing a war to the finish between two alien systems. In the present case this is projected till the end of the century by A. M. Jonas, W. R. Kintner, G. Niemeyer, S. T. Possony, R. Strausz-Hupé and others. The Soviet Union is depicted as a dynamic powerhouse aiming at world conquest. (Incidentally, Prof. Elliot R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State*, with foreword by Philip E. Mosely, Columbia, 1960, 512 pp., \$6.75, tracing the evolution of Soviet ideology on this point, also warns against overlooking this hard core of Soviet thought.) On the other hand, when analysing the actual response strategy, no such unanimity is in evidence. Nuclear weapons are the new element in the strategic equation. Therefore emphasis is on strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets. Some writers hold that neither the "massive retaliation" of Dulles, nor the "limited war" doctrine advocated by his critics, adequately copes with Communist strategy. Others ask, can stability be achieved in a mutual deterrence posture, when an "all-offense" deterrence is becoming a two-way street? The Soviets have "learned" fast and have also veered in the direction of strategic nuclear war and its peacetime version, deterrence. Baldwin holds limited nuclear war to be impossible in Western Europe, because of the psychological climate there. No unanimity is offered in strategy proposals. The assumption of eventual

"inevitable" Communist conquest is the basic concept holding the 33 essays together, among them some by D. G. Acheson, A. J. Cottrel, E. Johnson, H. Kahn, H. A. Kissinger, W. W. Rostow, D. Sarnoff, A. Wohlstetter, B. D. Wolfe and T. W. Wolfe. It is unfortunate that only R. B. Foster stresses the moral dimension of the problems and the common humanity of the protagonists. This latter fact "requires an examination of the ethical basis of our strategies within the perspective of long-term moral consequences." (p. 186.) Are not both sides faced with an ancient moral as well as practical problem of the relation of power to value?

The 21 contributors to the "Arms Control" issue of *Daedalus* present us with a sober and mildly hopeful handbook on the art and science of controlling arms. Contributions to this volume seem less bellicose. "It is irrational to treat every Soviet arms-control proposal as if their sole motive in advancing it was to help them achieve world domination" (D. G. Brennan, p. 699). "The safest premise is this: in breaking or keeping agreements, the Soviets can be trusted to pursue their own interests as they see them. Hence, measures for arms control should be reliable if they can be so devised that compliance will be more in the Soviet interest than evasion or violation." (R. R. Bowie, p. 709.) But how about space? "Neither the U. S. nor the Soviet Union appears to be genuinely eager for space control." (W. R. Frye, p. 736.) (Incidentally, Professors Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenthal have provided much material on international controls in retrospect, on the international controls for the Antarctic and for Outer Space, in *Controls for Outer Space*, Columbia U. P., 1959, 379 pp., \$6.00. The scholarly treatise provides a sane climate for discussing this vital problem.) S. R. Davis' account of recent American policy

shifts—many not found in documents—adds real life dimensions to the problem. Among the other contributors were A. D. Barrett, K. E. Boulding, H. Brown, S. Davis, P. M. Doty, B. T. Feld, W. T. R. Fox, E. Fromm, H. H. Humphrey, H. Kahn, H. A. Kissinger, A. Larson, I. de Sola Pool, T. C. Schelling, L. B. Sohn, E. Teller, J. B. Wiesner, Ch. Wright. All except Fromm avoid normative considerations as much as possible.

Western Christian tradition has evolved into a position of vindicating the use of force, when defending the moral order, while at the same time limiting warfare for the sake of the very same ethical order. With the 20th century, however, total power and war have been exalted, as well as total abolition of force and establishment of eternal peace has been advocated. The American Civil War and the two world wars were "total." The paradox of democracy's instability of mood—aversion to militarism and infatuation with war psychosis—has further favored unconditional surrender. The ultimate nuclear weapon is a challenge to rethink not only in strategic, but also in moral terms, the meaning and purpose of conflict in human life. For Americans this must essentially mean the submitting of the fundamental problems of U. S. foreign policy at a time of world leadership to disciplined, imaginative and constructive examination. In this way both the revolutionary character of our times—the present 'world revolution' was initiated and its forces set free by the Westernization of the world—and the magnitude of American moral responsibility in the contest with the USSR are slowly beginning to emerge. Fifteen years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Christian community, moreover, begins to stir.

This reexamination of values in the light of the Christian awareness of cer-

tain approaches to recent international relations and to the ideas underlying them, deserves our closest attention. Here five significant contributions can be cited: Kenneth W. Thompson, *Christian Ethics and the Dilemmas of Foreign Policy*, Duke U. P., 1959, 148 pp., \$3.50; by the same author, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics*, an American approach to foreign policy, Princeton U. P., 1960, 261 pp., \$5.00; Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good, ed., *Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics*, his political philosophy and its application to our age as expressed in his writings, N. Y., Scribners, 1960, 364 pp., \$6.50; Sister Dorothy Jane Van Hoogstrate, S. L., *American Foreign Policy*, realists and idealists: a Catholic interpretation, Herder, 1960, 332 pp., \$6.25; and William J. Nagle, ed., *Morality and Modern Warfare*: the state of the question, Helicon, 1960, 168 pp., \$3.95.

In *Christian Ethics* Thompson is deeply concerned that qualities like gentleness, magnanimity and compassion seem alien to the conduct of foreign policy. He analyzes the moral imperative and the ambiguities, limitations and dilemmas of international life. Is a Judaeo-Christian Realism possible? The purest standards of love and generosity, he answers, are not wholly irrelevant as final norm. (p. 28.) They help us in seeing the world through the eyes of an ally or adversary. But where in private and public spheres, idealism and realism, bellicism and pacifism, can ethical principles fix the approximate limits? (Thompson does reject the "middle ground" of John Courtney Murray, S. J., *Morality and Modern War*, N. Y., The Church Peace Union, 1959, as guide in practical problems. Cf. also the perceptive criticism of Murray by Julien N. Hartt, "Religion and the Bomb," *Worldview*, II, No. 4, April 1959.) Thompson spells out some concrete suggestions in his sequel, *Political Realism*.

Explaining the views of leading American political realists, realists from a moral viewpoint like Niebuhr, Morgenthau, Spykman, Nitze, Kennan, Halle, C. B. Marshall, Lippman and Reston, he sheds the light of "political realism" on three fundamental problems: international morality, collective security and the dilemma of present U. S. policy in regard to armaments, diplomacy, and colonialism. Some of the findings are: never compromise a principle (the ultimate objective), do compromise on interests (through prudence); recognize the intimate connection between power and peace; realize the bankruptcy of the moralistic tradition of American thinking. A strong country must pursue an intelligent, accelerated arms program, while at the same time it is seeking limited political solutions to concrete problems. Realists, idealists, legalists, moralists, rationalists (and romanticists?) in foreign affairs all agree that a new and unprecedented era has commenced, calling for novel solutions.

For Thompson, the political realist conservative and Christian principles motivate novel solutions. For the former he relies on British historic experience; the latter rests much on the "political theology" of Niebuhr. Davis and Good have done an invaluable service by presenting for the first time the full range of Niebuhr's political thought in which theology and politics are not really separate fields. Their book is an authoritative and orderly sourcebook of "Niebuhrism." For example: the problem of justice must maintain contact with *both* the moral imperative of the Christian commandment of *love* and the fact of the persistence of *self-love* in actual history. Man as creature is dialectically counterposed to man as creator, necessity to freedom, love to law, sin to grace, history to eternity, idealism to realism, order to justice, liberalism to conservatism, socialism to

laissez-faire, Christian pessimism here and now to Christian optimism in eternity.

Sister van Hoogstrate offers the first comprehensive analysis of all of the above and more. She examines patiently and in great detail both "realists" (Niebuhr, Beard, Kennan, Morgenthau, Mowrer, Weinburg, Spykman, Schwarzenberger, Morley, Lerche, Schuman, Reves and Haas) and "idealists" (Osgood, Lippman, Perkins, V. M. Dean, C. B. Marshall, W. Y. Elliott, W. T. R. Fox, Jessup, Halle, Tannenbaum, of international realities, but shows how others.) She concludes that the Catholic position corresponds more closely to the idealists than the realist interpretation of international realities, but shows, how the latter is really an independent approach. She relies much on traditional Thomism, on the works of Eppstein, Messner, Rommen, and the pronouncements of the Popes.

This provides a necessary ordering of approaches and solutions, without achieving agreement on all definitions. It is significant that the realistic commence with St. Augustine and proceed via Luther to see human nature as overwhelmingly afflicted by original sin. The idealists too commence with St. Augustine, but affirm that "it was not original sin which gave rise to the state." (Van Hoogstrate, p. 182.) But it is equally significant that evidences of important dialogues are missing: the Catholic-Protestant, and their mutually militant attitude as against the pacifist. Van Hoogstrate, for example, omits any reference to the writings of Thompson, *Christianity and Crisis*, *Worldview*, or to H. Butterfield. In this connection attention should also be given to the four essays on "Ethics and Foreign Policy" so far published by the interdenominational Church Peace Union (William Clancy, Education Director, 170 E. 64 Street, New York 21): *Ethics and*

National Purpose by K. W. Thompson; *Morality and Modern War* by J. C. Murray, S.J.; *Religion and International Responsibility* by R. Gordis and *The Recovery of Ethics* by P. H. Nitze.

A most welcome Catholic pioneering effort in this direction is also *Morality and Modern Warfare* with its chapters by: W. J. Nagle, "Introduction," J. E. Dougherty, "The Political Context," J. K. Moriarty, "Technology, Strategy and National Military Policy," T. E. Murray "Morality and Security: The Forgotten Equation," J. C. Murray, S. J. "Theology and Modern War," J. R. Connery, S. J. "Morality of Nuclear Armament," J. C. Ford, S. J. "The Hydrogen Bombing of Cities," G. Z. Zahn, "Social Science and the Theology of War," W. V. O'Brien, "Nuclear Warfare and the Law of Nations" and N. J. Brown, "The Moral Problem of Modern Warfare: A Bibliography." The authors see in responsible American foreign policy a terrible moral dilemma: the need to balance the demands *both* of charity regarding warfare and of obligations in justice regarding the spread of communism. They appeal, nonetheless, to forming a correct conscience on modern warfare. The facts and moral issues must be studied, as Fr. Murray pleads, by a "vigorous cultivation of politico-moral science." Going to war should be the result of a policy choice and not a technological one. "We find ourselves today with a predominant military technology, tactics, and strategy which cannot 'win' wars in any moral or just sense, and cannot win them in some practical sense" (p. 38.) Massive retaliation earns severe indictment.

As an escape from the dilemma, Thomas E. Murray, the former Atomic Energy Commissioner, advocates his three point "rational nuclear armaments" program, developing nuclear weapons in the lower order of destructiveness. He warns of the moral fallacy

of totalization and recalls the "forgotten equation," i.e. a nation must protect the security of its moral life. Fr. Murray attempts, subsequently, to justify a war with some nuclear devices. He warns of moral simplism and moral scepticism. He rejects Morgenthau's contextualistic morality, as well as the various types of neo-Lutheran theory which see evil as ubiquitous in all human actions. With Julius Stone he holds the concept of aggression as outmoded. Instead he suggests a return to the concept of justice. "As a moral problem, war is ultimately a problem of policy... of social morality... [to be] put to the People" (p. 78.) "Force is still the *ultima ratio* in human affairs, and its use in extreme circumstances may be morally obligatory *ad repellendam injuriam*" (p. 87.) (Incidentally, in the May issue of *Worldview* Fr. Murray had criticized the "ambiguist" approach to problems of ethics and foreign policy and called for a return to "the tradition of reason in moral affairs." Thompson replies in "The Problems of Means," *Worldview*, June 1960 by saying that the "ambiguist" approach is not the "invention of intellectuals, but a basic problem inherent in political responsibility" and that the natural law position provides a "safe haven of abstractions... with which an uninitiated outsider can come to terms.") Finally, Fr. Ford and Prof. Zahn do not agree with the other contributors. They carry the burden of the other side in the dialogue. They point to both the unsolved contradictions inherent in *all* nuclear strategies so far and to "the single overriding need today... for a truly *relevant* moral theology to replace the sterile formulas and distinctions which have been virtually meaningless in the present world context" (p. 108.) A very helpful bibliography on English and foreign language sources concludes this stimulating volume.

Almost all the writers above have practically dismissed as irrelevant a diverse range of thinkers who are concerned with pacifist insights and non-violent solutions, like The Fellowship of Reconciliation (Nyack, N. Y.), Pax (London, G. B.), Richard Gregg, Friedrich Heer, Alfred Horné, Stephen King-Hall, G. H. C. Macgregor, Ernst Schwarcz, Monès Sperber, Philip Toynbee, Gerald Vann, Wayland Young, to mention some. The variance of thought on the still "open-ended" theological question of the morality of nuclear warfare is in part correctly assessed by Nagle, when he states that the "defense of the free world" is for the U. S. not just patriotism, but responsibility. Certainly, Catholics in England and continental Europe could more readily differ from American Catholics on this issue, who in turn are in general unanimity with American Protestants. This is borne out by *Morals and Missiles: Catholic Essays on the Problem of War Today*, London, Clarke, 1959, 76 pp., M. de la Bedoyere, F. H. Drinkwater, Dom Bede Griffiths OSB, Chris Hollis, Sir C. Mackenzie, Archbishop Roberts, S. J., Fr. F. Stratmann, O.P., E. I. Watkin, and edited by Ch. S. Thompson. Fr. Murray would categorize their attempts as "relative Christian pacifism" of Zahn's variety (war has now become a moral absurdity) or "absolute pacifism" of the Sermon on the Mount variety (unqualified embrace of the principle of non-violence.) Paul Crane, "Catholics and Nuclear War," *The Month*, October 1959, p. 223-229, supports Fr. Murray when stressing that "relative pacifism . . . reveals a weakness of which the would-be Soviet aggressor will be quick to take advantage." Gerald Vann, O. P. labeled such "pessimism" as war-mongering already in the pre-atomic age. His 1937 *The Psychology of War-Mongering*, 20 pp., has been reprinted by Sands (15 King Street, Covent Garden,

London, W. C. 2.) Another pre-war classic has been republished in a revised edition, G. H. C. Macgregor, *The New Testament Basis of Pacifism and the Relevance of an Impossible Ideal*, Nyack, Fellowship Publications, 1960, 112 pp., together with an answer to the views of Niebuhr, *The Relevance of an Impossible Ideal*, 48 pp., both \$1.25. These theological studies of Christian pacifism are by a professor of divinity and biblical criticism at the University of Glasgow.

Erich Fromm in *Daedalus*, trying to make a case for unilateral disarmament, places himself in position between strict pacifists (Victor Gollancz, Lewis Mumford, some Quakers) and moral opponents of thermonuclear war (B. Rus sel, St. King-Hall and C. Wright Mills.) He states unequivocally: "The real threat to our existence is not Communist ideology, it is not even the Communist military power—it is the hollowness of our beliefs, the fact that freedom, individuality, and faith have become empty formulas, that God has become an idol, that our vitality is sapped because we have no vision except that of having more of the same. It seems that a great deal of the hatred for Communism is, in the last analysis, based on a deep disbelief in the spiritual values of democracy. Hence, instead of experiencing love of what we are *for*, we experience hate of what we are *against*. If we continue to live in fear of extinction and to plan mass destruction of others, the last chance for a revival of our humanist-spiritual tradition will be lost."

Gandhians and men like Commander King-Hall in England advocate non-violent resistance, requiring a maximum of courage and faith. *Defense in the Nuclear Age*, Nyack, Fellowship Publications, 1959, 234 pp., \$2.75, calls for unilateral disarmament, plus non-violent resistance to Communism, because

of "military necessity." Wayland Young, *Strategy for Survival* (Penguin Books, 1959, 95 pp.), urges Britain to form a non-nuclear club as the first step in nuclear disarmament. Philip Toynbee, ed., *Fearful Choice: A Debate on Nuclear Policy*, (Wayne State U. P., 1959, 112 pp.) is a British symposium suggesting that Europe's withdrawal from the arms race would not result in Soviet occupation and abuse. Richard B. Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence*, (Fellowship Publications, 1929, 192 pp.) is a revised edition of a 1932 study by a Western student of Gandhi. Gandhian principles are restated and explained in modern Western terms. Finally, Ernst Schwarcz, *Paths to Freedom through Nonviolence*, Vienna, Senzen-Verlag, 1959, 71 pp., is a revised study of the East-West conflict and the methods of nonviolent resistance (original German was published in 1952, *Wege zur gewaltlosen Befreiung*.)

The concern of all these religiously committed people is perhaps best expressed by the historian Herbert Butterfield, *International Conflict in the Twentieth Century, A Christian View*, N. Y., Harper, 1960, 123 pp., \$3.00. Just as there is need for a methodical analysis of power, aggression, international order, there must be one of *détente*. Its primary condition is the realization that the hostile party is human too. Butterfield names Marxism, Calvinism and Democracy as typical "isms" that can not be rooted out of this world. "The destructiveness which some people are now prepared to contemplate is not to be justified for the sake of any conceivable mundane object, any purported religious claim or supramundane purpose, or any virtue that one system of organization can possess as against another" (p. 92.) "I am giving a personal view; but I am not sure that the greatest gift the West could bring to the world would not be

the resolution neither to use the hydrogen bomb nor to manufacture it any further" (p. 95.) A "chief error may... be... a righteousness that is too stiff-necked and a readiness to believe that one can go to any degree in the use of force on behalf of a cause that one feels to be exclusively right... At least when the world is in extremities, the doctrine of love becomes the ultimate measure of our conduct" (p. 98.) "There is need for the love which is the equivalent of creative imagination" (p. 120.)

Here, then, is plenty of source material for the reflective intelligence. What are some possible conclusions? The conduct of foreign relations in a world in which force is becoming both more available and less usable no longer lends itself to facile solutions. Only moral-legal concepts can provide the normative limitations and overcome force in the international society. All the evidence clearly shows the contradictions inherent in a purely strategic and technological approach. In this respect Part IV, "Problems of Military Strategy" in Hahn's book provides food for thought, as do the factual data in *Daedalus*. Moreover, no war which has an ideological core has ever remained limited. How can we disengage ourselves from the moral-strategic dilemma of nuclear massive retaliation, balance of terror, deterrence, limited nuclear war? Did not the periods of greatest American strength coincide with Russia's greatest expansion? Did not the pressure of American strategic supremacy coincide with the period of greatest Soviet insatigence and ambition to "catch up"? The nuclear realist position, defended by both Catholic (Murray) and Protestant (Niebuhr) theologians, regards the nuclear stalemate as serving a precarious justice. Its ethical, theological, military and political underpinnings are, however,

quite problematical. There exists no single satisfactory answer. To quote the conclusion of *Morality and Modern Warfare*, "we have a moral responsi-

bility to continue to seek the *best* answer that ingenuity and knowledge and faith can produce" (p. 147.)

ERNST F. WINTER

RECENT RUSSIAN STUDIES

Scholarly interest in the nature of Russian society began in the middle ages; with the more direct involvement of Russia in European affairs since the 16th century, there has resulted a vast interpretative literature which has served not only to explain the Russians to the west, but to the Russians themselves. At the turn of this century Professor V. O. Kliuchevsky (1841-1911), one of the greatest of a great line of Russian historians, pointed out the complexity of establishing a "national character," and the danger of facile generalizations. Yet since survival so obviously depends in part on western knowledge of the Soviet Union, scholars have been trying to provide that understanding. Naturally the many current books on Russia are of varying quality, but there are several which make a serious attempt to penetrate the intellectual and spiritual life of the Russian people.

The first, *Russische Heiligenlegenden*, translation and commentaries by G. Apel, E. Benz, W. Fritze, A. Luther and D. Tschizewskij, edited and introduced by Ernst Benz, (Verlag Die Waage, Zurich, 1953, 572 pp., 52 pictures, \$7.50), is a valuable addition to the study of Russian religion from the point of view of the lives of the Russian saints, both for its splendid reproductions of paintings, and above all for the learned and careful introduction and commentaries. These lives are in the tradition of Byzantine hagiography, but while many of the "stories" are copies from older models, there is also new material, as the saints are portrayed in the context of city life in medieval Russia, in

the forests during the movement of the Russian people northward, or in relationship to the rise of modern Muscovy. It would be hazardous to point out striking differences here between western and eastern spiritual concepts; in Russia, as in the west, the lives of the saints impress the reader with the extraordinary effect which the ideals of asceticism and Christian charity had on the exceptional in a society so recently pagan.

Remarkable for its learning is Emanuel Sarkisyanz, *Russland und der Messianismus des Orients—Sendungsbewusstsein und politischer Chiliasmus des Ostens*, (J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck] Tubingen, 1955, pp. 419.) Sarkisyanz is an American scholar who writes as a sociologist, rather than as an historian. He feels that Bolshevism is a perversion of messianic ideals which lie deep in Russian religious thought, as well as in Russian radicalism. He is aware of the significance of Russian borrowings from western "messianic ideals"—for example the concept of the national mission in early 19th century German thought, the role of the socialist intellectual, or of the proletariat in French socialism or in Marxism. The study of Russian intellectual history in the 19th century is in fact a study of western ideas in Russia. Sarkisyanz wants to know why the Russian educated classes adopted those messianic concepts with such fanaticism? He believes that the answer lies in the Russian religious tradition, in the peculiar outlook of the Russian intelligentsia. Certainly Sarkisyanz supports his views with an im-

posing body of evidence. This reviewer remains unconvinced, however, and believes that a closer attention to western thought on the one hand, and Russian historical development on the other, would do much to dispel the popularity of the view that Russian attitudes were unique.

Also in the sociological tradition is Vatro Murvar's *Russian Social Monism and American Social Pluralism* (Gonzaga University Press, Spokane, Washington, 1959, pp. 139. Available from the author P. O. Box 1029, Spokane 10, Washington.) Professor Murvar offers a daring analysis of Russian and American society. In a few pages he seeks to prove that "The totalitarian or monistic social system of Russia is the final product of a development of two thousand years of Eastern Roman or Byzantine civilization, of Mongolian rule over Russia and, in succession to both, of pre-Soviet Russian civilization," while "The humanitarian, liberalistic or pluralistic social system of America is again the final stage of a long historical development of the Western Roman, Western European civilization and of rather recent (during the last 180 years) American experimentation in government and economics." Murvar leans heavily on Toynbee and Berdyaev, both rather dangerous guides. There is some truth in this view, which is not new. The historian would make extensive qualifications to almost every statement, but Murvar is to be commended for trying to focus the question and it is to be hoped he will continue his studies in this area.

A decisive period in Russian intellectual development is covered in volume I of Peter Scheibert's *Von Bakunin zu Lenin* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1956, pp. 344). This study of Russian radical thought from the 1830's until the 1850's (later volumes will carry the study to 1895) is a model of objectivity and first-

rate intellectual history. Scheibert knows the works of the western thinkers who influenced Russian development so well that he never falls into the trap of ascribing what belongs originally to the west as the exclusive property of the "Russian soul." He quite properly points up such things as the influence of western idealism in creating an interest on the part of the Slavophils in native Russian piety. Not only does he place western influence in proper perspective, but he gives the reader a deeper understanding of Russian intellectual life by picturing not only such well-known figures as Chaadaev, Herzen, Bakunin and Belinsky, but also lesser known persons such as Petscherin, Botkin and Majkov.

Another excellent work in intellectual history, which would appear to be eminently deserving of translation, was Professor R. V. Pletnev's *Lektsii po Istorii Russkoy Literaturi 18 i 19 vekov* (Lectures on the History of Russian Literature in the 18th and 19th centuries), (Russian Culture Club of Toronto, 72 Ossington Ave., Toronto 3, Ontario, Canada. pp. 241. \$4.00). Prof. Pletnev's knowledge of Russian and western literature is truly remarkable, and since he is himself a poet he is able to present the beauties of Russian literature with much more insight than is allowed the plodding historian. Profoundly Christian, Pletnev is especially interesting in his discussions of Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy.

Those wishing to read a good one-volume history of Russia would be well advised to use Professor Warren Bartlett Walsh's *Russia and the Soviet Union—A Modern History*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958, pp. 640. \$10.00). Walsh's book is part of the important 15-volume University of Michigan History of the Modern World, to which it is an excellent contribution. It has none of the

dryness of a text book, although it does give as much material as we usually expect from one. His interpretations are well balanced, although no Marxist would agree. The style is undistinguished, however, and would be much

improved if the expression "norms and values" were never used. The latter half of the book dealing with the 20th century is the better part, much of the material being new.

F. A. WALKER

THE POLITICS OF BERNANOS

In the introduction to *Bernanos, His Political Thought and Prophecy* (Sheed and Ward, 1960, 202 pp., \$3.95) Thomas Molnar maintains that Bernanos' political experience "shows an extraordinary transformation under the pressure of his religious faith" (p. xvii). He finds this transformation manifested by Bernanos' evolution beyond the "fascist temptation" of the extreme right as well as beyond the "temptation of despair." Although one fails to follow Molnar's presentation of religious pressure on Bernanos' interior dialogue, where *à quoi bon* is answered by *tout est grâce* (p. 62), he does show a certain evolution through the first half of the book where youthful political passions as a *camelot du roi* and Bernanos' vacillating relationship with the *Action Française* are described. The transformation of Bernanos provoked by the Spanish civil war in 1936 follows and Molnar points out that Bernanos' most important experience was witnessing this event at first hand in Majorca. "He saw the destiny of his country rehearsed before his spectator's eye and described the mechanism of terror and persecution that France was to experience in her own body a few years later" (p. 104).

The uninitiated reader will benefit from this first half of the book devoted to French political life before 1939: Drumont is well situated in the background; Maurras and the *Action Française* are set in the perspective necessary to understand Bernanos' inevitable evo-

lution beyond them. In the discussion of the war and its aftermath in France, de Gaulle's rôle is made clear, and Bernanos, after a self-imposed exile of seven years in Brazil where he had devoted himself to writing for free France, is brought home to his country by the General to become, in the words of Mauriac with which Molnar concludes his book, "an old molossus with bloodshot eyes, biting at the shins of fat sheep and foolish ewes" (p. 201).

With such a conclusion it seems clear that Molnar did not aspire to make Bernanos' evolution significant for today. Perhaps this disposition on the author's part accounts for his not pursuing Bernanos' evolution after Majorca with any conviction. Indeed, one feels that Molnar begs his reader to excuse Bernanos for refusing de Gaulle's offer to make him Minister of Education in the post-war government.

Perhaps Molnar also errs in taking the category "Catholic literature" too seriously. He seems very eager to classify Bernanos as first and last the author of the *Diary of a Country Priest*. He ignores the *Nouvelle Histoire de Mouche* written, in Bernanos' own words, as a direct result of Majorca, and he neglects to mention, even in his bibliography, *Un Mauvais Rêve* where Bernanos comments so fully on the tragedy of the *génération expiatoire*. In general, he has dismissed as unimportant any works of Bernanos inconsistent with the label "novelist of the sacerdotal soul."

Besides such minor errors as a con-

fusion of the relationship of Psichari and Renan (p. 40), Molnar errs seriously in dating Bernanos' work, stating that after 1936 "he never again wrote a page of fiction" (p. 98). *M. Quine* was completed in Brazil in 1940 and Albert Béguin, to whom the literary world owes so much of what it knows of Bernanos, always maintained that this work is Bernanos' masterpiece. Molnar, however, will surely have the average reader as well as the French Academy on his side when he states that the *Diary of a Country Priest* is "his greatest work and probably the guarantee of his literary survival" (p. 98) since Béguin's choice is understandable only when Bernanos' interior life has been penetrated.

The book fills a real need and will be of use to the English-language reader as he approaches the political writings

of Bernanos for the first time. But Molnar would have saved both himself and his reader much confusion and many generalizations had he not tried to relate the novels and political thought. He is right, of course, in maintaining that the two parts do form a whole. But this whole can be grasped only through accepting the whole of Bernanos. Only then can it be seen as a spiritual unity, rooted in the spirituality of St. Thérèse of Lisieux and St. Joan of Arc. Yet even when this has been sighted, the critic should keep before him the danger represented by Céabre in Bernanos' *L'Imposture*—dismissed too easily by Molnar—the priest who wrote erudite works on mysticism yet lost his faith in God.

WILLIAM BUSH

RUDOLF BULTMANN

One reason for the slow response of American theologians, Catholic and Protestant, to the work of Rudolf Bultmann is that few move easily in the world of existential analysis, especially that represented by Heidegger. This is hardly surprising since existentialism had little appeal to the Anglo-Saxon mind until the last few years; and if Heidegger is not its most important representative, as many think, he is surely its most difficult and obscure. This is not to suggest that Bultmann cannot be appreciated apart from a grasp of existential analytics or the particular Heideggerian categories he employs. What is more likely is that, lacking an understanding of the latter, one will be able to appreciate Bultmann's aims and problems and fail to understand or appreciate his solution. Hence, the tendency to assume that his attempt to "demythologize" the New Testament is just another

instance of liberal Protestant theologizing of an outmoded sort, lofty in its aims but pernicious in its means.

The recent translation of two important studies of Bultmann should help considerably to make him more comprehensible in this country and to clarify some misinterpretations. Fr. L. Malevez, S. J., in *The Christian Message and Myth* (Newman Press, \$4.50), for instance, stresses the difference between Bultmann and the older schools of liberal Christianity and comparative religion. Bultmann, he shows, criticized the liberal mode of demythologizing on two grounds, that it "was made at the expense of the *kerygma* itself," and that it attempted to get rid of mythology rather than to reinterpret it existentially. A genuine demythologizing, according to Bultmann, by doing away with the pre-scientific trappings of Christianity, will bring out the real purpose of the mythical presentation

which is, "to express its belief in the dependence of our human existence upon the God who calls us as persons."

In attempting an "existential interpretation" of the Christian message, Bultmann found it essential to employ philosophical categories. Just as the ordinary Christian must come to scripture predisposed to hear its message by possessing some dim natural awareness of human existence, so too the exegete needs the assistance of philosophical categories that he may "meet the text half-way," in Fr. Malevez's expression. It is precisely the analytic of Heidegger which provides the most suitable categories. His analysis of *Dasein* (human existence) lays great stress on the desperate plight of man and thus provides suitable preparation for grasping the Fall and forgiveness. So too, Heidegger's attack on an essentialist ontology and an "objectivizing" ontology lays an appropriate foundation for a denial that any human certitude could offer a support for faith.

But while Fr. Malevez is sympathetic to Bultmann's view (as opposed to Barth) that an antecedent philosophy is needed by the exegete, he objects strongly to the particular philosophical categories he does use. Heidegger's anthropology and ontology lead to a serious mutilation of the Christian message by allowing it only to speak about man and his condition, and only in a narrow way, and to say nothing about God. Yet despite the fact that Bultmann will accept only that in the New Testament which illuminates man's condition here and now, Fr. Malevez, as opposed to many Protestant critics, does believe that Bultmann escapes turning the "saving event" which takes place in Christ into something entirely subjective. That said, however, he does point out that Bultmann's view, though granting some degree of objectivity,

does not see Christ Himself as having any ultimate significance.

This comes close to the central criticism that Giovanni Miegge in *Gospel and Myth* (John Knox Press, \$4.00) levels at Bultmann though he, like Fr. Malevez, is restrained and judicious in his criticism. Dr. Miegge, a Waldensian, is relatively more interested in Bultmann as an exegete than as a philosopher of religion or man. Thus, while Fr. Malevez spends considerable time on the philosophical inadequacies of Bultmann, Dr. Miegge emphasizes Bultmann's short-comings as historian and student of mythology. Miegge's main objection is that in "Bultmann's reconstruction the Jesus of History is resolved, almost without remainder, into the Christ of faith," and that, "the objective Christ of history and dogma does tend to be dissolved into the *Christus pro nobis*." He does, nonetheless, join Fr. Malevez in affirming that "Bultmann's real position can be understood only if the 'objective' significance of his affirmations, in the theological sense of that term, is recognized."

Somewhat lacking in Fr. Malevez's account of Bultmann's thought is an adequate account of Bultmann's place in relation to other contemporary movements in hermeneutics. Dr. Miegge's book supplies such an account up to a point and does succeed in making clear how Bultmann's acceptance of the prevailing trends of the form-criticism school led him to emphasize that the *Gospel* is primarily message, or *Kerygma*. He makes clear also how the influence of researches into the history of religion and comparative mythology led Bultmann to see his task as that of freeing the *Kerygma* from its early association with the "Jewish Apocalyptic Myth" and the "Hellenistic Gnostic Myth."

DANIEL J. CALLAHAN

FREE SPEECH IN THE CHURCH

This small but important work by Father Karl Rahner, S. J., (Sheed and Ward, \$3.50) is a translation of two essays which originally appeared in German in 1953. The first bears the title of the book, while the second deals with the "Prospects for Christianity." On the opening page of the first essay we read

When the subject under discussion is the individual layman's right to express his own opinion within the Church, then this resolves itself ultimately into a demand that the individual layman shall become aware, not so much of any privilege he may have in this matter, as of *his duty to feel a personal responsibility for the Church's official activity.* (p. 9)

We have italicized part of the remark above to call attention to the perspective in which Father Rahner places this challenging topic. Not only does it do justice to the theological basis of the layman's position, but it is wonderfully attuned to the psychological dimension of his relation with the hierarchy. There is nothing more frustrating to that increasingly significant number of laymen who not only love the Church but have been educated to a competent global view of Her, than the inadequate scope of the institutions habitually proposed as the appropriate means for their participation in her mission. This love and this knowledge issue in a concern which outstrips family, parish organization etc. and extends even to the Church's official activity, habitually treated as the exclusive concern of the hierarchy. The author insists upon the relevance of the layman's contribution here, and holds public opinion in the Church as the appropriate channel for it.

His argument begins with a reference to words of Pius XII which justify the existence of such public opinion (pp. 15-16). Then, to indicate why the

present is the proper time for the development of such opinion, he cites the need for the Church today to distinguish herself ever more clearly from totalitarian states: "She will now have to come down more firmly on the side of the individual's responsibility and freedom both in his secular and religious life."

(p. 17.) From the point of view of the hierarchy public opinion is needed in order that official leaders may know the actual situation in which they must guide the people. Since the free speech of the individual is an essential condition of such opinion, this speech becomes a duty, and the people of the Church "must learn that even in the Church there can be a body something like Her Majesty's Opposition, which in the course of Church history has always had its own kind of saints in its ranks—the ranks of a genuine, divinely-willed opposition to all that is merely human in the Church and her official representatives." (pp. 36-37.)

The layman exercising such freedom must educate himself thoroughly in Theology and commit himself fully to the dialogue within the Church, rather than simply criticize from an aloof position. It will spur his commitment to realize that even "the questions of faith, questions in which Church and religion are involved, are not esoteric matters in the face of which the layman must be seen and not heard." (p. 47.) That there be security in the exercise of this freedom, a legal foundation for it within the Church seems in order, "new, legally recognized ways, which today hardly exist if they exist at all, in which the laity could cooperate with the clergy." (p. 49.)

If the effect of the first essay bears on the layman's frustration vis-à-vis the Clergy, the second (Prospects for Christianity) aims very directly at general

Christian frustration with the world. It is an examination of Christian half-heartedness, the prevailing mood which, according to the author, accompanies the Church's present defensive position. The analysis of this mood of Christianity is elaborated as an answer to a pair of questions: is the present defensive position of Christianity sufficient reason for defeatism? and How is this defensive position to be understood? The answer to the first question lies at the end of a short meditation on the nature of faith: the modern crisis cannot mean defeat for the Church because God has guaranteed its victory. It is no sign of eventual defeat that we cannot clearly see how we shall pull out of our present difficulties. The very essence of faith "consists precisely in expecting not to know in advance, and having to build on God's word alone." (pp. 73-74.)

The sense of the response to the second question is clear in the following remark:

I will say quite plainly then, that the kind of public external importance which the Church has had for the last thousand or fifteen hundred years, and which we still instinctively regard as the obvious standard whereby to judge of the Church's achievement, was not only a concrete manifestation of what the Church must be and (once having attained it) must go on being in accordance with her supernatural essence and mission. It was also (though to what degree it is not easy to lay down) the result of a purely arbitrary and temporary concatenation of historical circumstances, so that if these pass away, there is possible a change in the Church's public significance without change in the Church's essence thereby being brought into the question. (p. 80.)

The circumstances are passing away, and the indifference of the world to the Church is, like earlier passionate resistance, a phase of this passing. Father Rahner's analysis of this has both a

theological and a psychological level. The theological meditates on the situation in the light of the dogma of the second coming of Christ (the present state of the world might be a sign of its immanent end rather than that of the Church) and the dogma of the importance of grace in the matter of election (who knows just how many are to be saved?) One could wonder at the selection of these two dogmas when the facts in question are susceptible to illumination by many others: the "One fold and one shepherd," theme for example. Apparently they were chosen in the hope of reminding the discouraged faithful of the perhaps unnoticed firmness of their own position. From the psychological point of view, the spiritual crisis can be viewed as a period of massive distraction from the one thing necessary, but through which Christianity will pass successfully because man's propensity to religion is ineradicable and because Christianity, even without its divine guarantee, has no formidable rival as vehicle for this propensity.

"Prospects for Christianity" suffers in spots for having attempted to cover so much ground. The selection of dogmas mentioned above is a case in point. But we have incurred a real debt to Father Rahner for "Free Speech in the Church," and it would be out of place to press these other points. Any one of several themes might be selected around which to summarize our most favorable reaction, but let us choose that of *confidence*. Confidence in the reader: the work is completely devoid of those mannerisms so common in popular theological writing which give one the feeling (by, for example, *excessive* exhortation to caution) that it is unfortunate that the knowledge in question need pass from the trained hands which now protect it to those perhaps less disciplined. Confidence in theology: here is

no flight into popularized sociology or psychology, but reflection on events in the *direct* light of revealed truth. Confidence in the Church to meet the most

delicate and intricate problems: how many other treatments supporting free speech in the Church do we have?

JOHN F. BANNAN

FAITH AND HISTORY

The Meaning and Matter of History (Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, \$4.50). Fr. D'Arcy's latest work undertakes to investigate the problems connected with historicism and Christian theology. (The author prefers 'historicism' to the more cumbersome expression 'philosophy of history.') His objective is ". . . to inquire into the possibility of any form of historicism . . . and then, on the supposition that not all forms are ruled out, to suggest . . . the kind of contribution Christianity can make to a philosophy [of history]." (p. 11) Such an inquiry is indeed challenging and, quite obviously, encompasses a vast canvas. Unlike so many recent studies in historicism, the present work is neither inspired by nor constructed around Toynbee's monumental work. Its theme is both more modest and more controversial than much of the literature that emanates from a critique of Toynbee's *Study*.

The cataclysmic significance of much of our recent history has raised serious doubts in the minds of many concerning the validity of any theory of history which is characterized by belief in progress. It has stimulated an intensive search for a more permanent theory of history, and one aspect of this inquiry is a renewed interest in the relationship between history and theology. Can theology, with its 'other-world' orientation, contribute anything to history, to the struggles of man in his finite world? Can theology make history and its future more meaningful, more hopeful, more optimistic?

It is with these questions that the pres-

ent work is primarily concerned. The author, after briefly inquiring into the nature of history, proceeds to examine the various theories which establish or presuppose a relationship between theology and history. Herein is contained an analysis of the historical theories of Augustine, Bossuet, Hegel, and Vico as well as some of the more contemporary laborers in the vineyard of historicism—including Spengler, Toynbee, Père Teilhard de Chardin, Paul Tillich, Karl Barth, Herbert Butterfield and Gerald Heard. Unfortunately, his discursive treatment somewhat lessens the value of this portion of the book.

The latter part of the study attempts, in a very tentative way, to suggest what Father D'Arcy feels is the contribution of Christian theology to history. First and foremost, Christian theology, with its insistence on the dignity of each person in the eyes of the benevolent Deity, can rescue the individual from the servile obscurity to which history frequently relegates him. In the sense that each man, individually, is given the privilege of choosing his ultimate destiny, theology emphasizes the pre-eminence of man over other forms of life. Secondly, since man does not arrive at the 'heavenly city' without baggage, Christian theology serves to elevate and dignify the temporal order, to make it something more than the waste-product of the 'earthly city.' "The end of human life, as taught by Christianity, while stretching beyond and above time, does not entail a denial of human values." (p. 234) Christian theology, in effect, supernaturalizes the whole domain of

human activity. Recognizing these theological truths can, says Father D'Arcy, give the Christian historian a "new vision." It can throw additional light on man and his slow development through the ages, enlarging our vision of human efforts and human achievement and give to the historians ". . . a better taste for the things of nature and a more generous understanding of the gentile world." (p. 283)

Contemporary scholars such as C. S. Lewis, with a keen appreciation of theology as a discipline, have seen fit to emphasize repeatedly the difficulties inherent in the current efforts to construct a Christian concept of history. The historian is, of course, most reluctant to accept as historical truths the two central contributions of Christian theology suggested in this study. Such concepts are, in fact, foreign to history. Yet, the "new vision" which Father D'Arcy feels would flow from these theological truths

is indeed modest. It offers a frame of reference congenial to the historical discipline. A greater emphasis on individual and human dignity can even be described as a healthy counter-balance to the strong sociological emphasis found in much of our recent historical writing. If this is to be the contribution of theology to a philosophy of history, it would indeed be a welcome one. The lens of the camera of history can always profit from a more careful refocusing. It is only when history is asked (as it is implicitly in this study) to accept unquestioningly the ahistorical truths of theology that it hesitates to enter into the partnership. Father D'Arcy's work naturally leaves many problems unresolved, but it is both challenging and suggestive. The vast 'no-man's land' between theology and history remains—an ever-present reminder of the difficulties implicit in theo-historicism.

JOHN J. REARDON

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE
ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233)
SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION OF
CROSS CURRENTS published quarterly at West Nyack, N.Y. for Oct. 1, 1960

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, Cross Currents Corporation; edited by a staff of editors; Managing Editor, Joseph E. Cunneen, 103 Van Houten Fields, West Nyack, N.Y. Business Manager, None

2. The owner is (if owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.) Cross Currents Corporation, 103 Van Houten Fields, West Nyack, N.Y.; President, Joseph E. Cunneen, 103 Van Houten Fields, West Nyack, N.Y.; Vice-President, Joseph L. Caulfield, 46 Hudson Ave., Englewood, N.J.; Secretary-Treasurer, Sally S. Cunneen, 103 Van Houten Fields, West Nyack, N.Y.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (if there are none, so state) None.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the alien's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: 3100.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of September, 1960.

GERHARDT KRAUSE

(My commission expires March 30, 1962.)

HELICON'S GREAT FALL LIST

PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

by Claude Tresmontant

prefaced by Gustave Weigel, S.J.
translated by Salvatore Attanasio

WORK

edited by John Todd

Brief essays on the theology of work by some of the most famous writers on spiritual subjects in the world: Hilary Armstrong, Robert A. Markus, Rev. John Foster, Dom Sebastian Moore, etc. \$3.00

THE MASTER CALLS

by Fritz Tilman

A compelling book in the area of Moral Theology which introduces for the first time to the English-speaking reader the great new emphasis which characterizes Moral Theology in Europe. Writing of the author, John C. Ford, S.J. says: "The first and greatest of our modern contributors to a more Christocentric Moral Theology." \$3.00

THE CATHOLIC-PROTESTANT DIALOGUE

by Jean Guitton, Jean Danielou,
Jacques Madaule, and Jean Bosc
preface by Gustave Weigel, S.J.

Probably the most significant discussion between Protestants and Catholics which has yet appeared in English. The result of a long and comprehensive tape-recorded discussion on major points of doctrine between two of the most famous Catholic theologians in France today and two of their Protestant conferees, prefaced by America's leading Catholic ecumenicist. \$3.50

THE CHURCH AND THE BIBLE

by Christopher Butler, O.S.B.

Emphasizing that the message of the Old and New Testaments is Christ, Dom Christopher shows the place of the Bible in the life of the Church and of her members, and suggests that Biblical study may pave the way towards the healing of divisions between those who believe in the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. \$3.50

THE PRESENCE OF GOD

by Jean Danielou, S.J.

"One will read much before he finds another volume which combines such economy of words, spiritual profundity, and harmonious presentation." —Davenport, *Catholic Messenger*. \$1.95

THE MYSTERY OF THE CHURCH

by Yves Congar, O.P.

"The publishing of his studies on the Church in English will surely generate and foster the atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect between Protestants and Catholics. For an excellent preparation to intelligent dialogue with non-Catholics and for a deeper appreciation of our own faith in the Church I can recommend nothing better than a serious reading of this book by Fr. Congar." — Bernard Hwang, O.S.B., in *Worship*. \$4.75

APPROACHES TO CHRISTIAN UNITY

by C. J. Dumont, O.P.

"This book will deepen one's awareness of the existing unity of the Church. The beautiful meditations and practical programs will broaden one's ecumenical interests." — *America*. \$4.50

READING THE WORD OF GOD

by Lawrence Dannemiller, S.S.

"Anyone, or any group, who will follow Father Dannemiller's perceptively conceived and admirably worked out scheme, is certain to get far more from the Bible than he otherwise could, and for preachers, the book is a priceless help in the preparation of sermons with substance and savour." — Msgr. John S. Kennedy. \$4.50

LITURGY AND PERSONALITY

by Dietrich von Hildebrand
New & Revised Edition

"The enterprising managers of Helicon Press have done a great service to the liturgical movement by rescuing from oblivion von Hildebrand's great spiritual classic. If you are at all interested in the liturgy and don't already own a copy, buy this one just as quickly as you can." — Rev. Andrew M. Greeley in *Ave Maria*. \$3.50

WHY CHILDREN BECOME DELINQUENT

by John C. Gran

A sober discussion of America's No. 1 social problem, supported by a compelling list of case histories and written by a man of long experience in educational and police work. Mr. Gran writes without sociological cant, as a writer who knows how to tell a story and tell it well. \$3.95

On sale at all bookstores, plus many others in our catalogue, including a fine list of children's books.

Helicon Books, Baltimore 27, Md.



